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1 INTRODUCTION OF THE THESIS 
A number of financial crises started as an idiosyncrati  shock to local banks, local securities or 
local markets, but the impacts eventually spread to markets with no direct economic linkage to 
the initial shock (e.g., the Mexican crisis in 1982 and 1994, the East Asian crisis in 1997, the 
Russian crisis in 1998, and the Brazilian crisis in 1999). Similarly, the financial turmoil that 
started in the summer of 2007 and intensified in 2008 as a local problem to the US-mortgage 
market has become a global concern for financial stability. These concerns are shared equally 
among policy makers in developed as well as in emerging market economies. Financial crises 
have also attracted the interest of researchers who empirically and theoretically study how local 
turmoil may spill over to international markets and i vestigate what the consequences are on 
regional financial fragility. 
Banks are important because the instability of the banking sector may have severe financial costs 
to the economy. Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2002) for example estimate fiscal costs incurred in 
the resolution of 24 banking crisis in the last two decades and find that the cumulative output 
losses incurred during crisis periods are 15-20%, on average, of annual GDP. Further, banking 
system fragility impairs the functioning of the payment system that may ultimately lead to 
economic stagnation (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997)). A fragile banking system affects 
neighboring countries in the region through cross-border linkages and raises concerns for 
regional banking system fragility. Banks provide liquidity to the whole economy just like blood 
circulating in veins of the whole human body. The crisis in a banking sector has serious effects 
on other sectors of the domestic economy and possibly also for other economies in the same 
region and other regions. Therefore, it is important to study regional banking system fragility 
from an intra-industry and inter-industry contagion perspective.  
Further, the integration of financial markets across regions has resulted into a higher degree of 
co-movements in financial stock indices. This phenomenon persuades researchers to study 
contagion not only through direct exposures (for example, Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) or 
the third chapter of this dissertation), but also through the co-movements of financial stock 
indices (for example, Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003); Gropp, Duca and Vesala (2009)). These 




industry contagion). But there is very little evidenc  on the effects of shocks that are transmitted 
from one industry to another (i.e. inter-industry contagion) or from one part of an industry to 
another part of an industry.  Inter-industry contagion within the broader financial sector is 
important because financial liberalization has blurred the distinction between various types of 
financial activities. Resultantly, the emergence of financial conglomerates may induce contagion 
from one industry to another. 
The thesis provides an insight of the regional fragility of the banking systems and the potential of 
cross-border contagion. After this brief introduction of the thesis as chapter 1, chapter 2 give a 
short review of literature on financial contagion through cross-border banking exposures, chapter 
3 explores the possibility of cross-border contagion through direct exposures of the banking 
systems on other economies, chapter 4 investigates the determinants of regional banking system 
fragility and chapter 5 provides evidence on the inter-industry contagion within and across 
regions. 
More specifically, in chapter 2, titled “Short Literature Review on Financial Contagion through 
Cross-Border Exposures” I provide a short review of the literature on financial contagion, and in 
particular of the role and impact of cross-border exposures. The issue of cross-border contagion 
is highlighted in particular. The importance of cross-border contagion stems from different 
forces. First, in recent years, foreign claims held by the banking system have increased 
substantially. Second, the US-subprime crisis turned i to a worldwide financial crisis, suggesting 
that cross-border linkages are important as they ma pose a serious threat to financial stability. 
Third, recent advances in empirical methods and data vailability allow for a deeper 
investigation of this question. 
In chapter 3, titled “Cross-border Exposures and Financial Contagion”, I explore cross-border 
contagion using foreign claims from the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. I analyze cross-
border contagion over the time period from 1999–2006 to check the evolution of contagion risk 
over time. I also attempt to identify the size of a systemically important shock for cross-border 
contagion. And finally, I study the economic impact of cross-border contagion besides 




In chapter 4, titled “Determinants of Financial System Fragility – A Regional Perspective” I 
analyze the determinants of regional banking system fragility while controlling for common 
economic shocks and explore the extent of banking system contagion within region and across 
regions. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the empirical literature on cross-border contagion 
by evaluating contagion across regions. A region is defined as a continent containing several 
banking systems. There are four different regions including 10 banking systems in Asia, 7 
banking systems in Latin America, the US and Europe, each as one entity. I follow the 
methodology of Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) to study regional banking system fragility through 
joint occurrences of negative extreme returns in banking system indices of multiple countries in a 
region. This chapter of my thesis analyzes whether regional banking system characteristics can 
explain regional banking system fragility (i.e. the number of banking systems having joint 
occurrences of extreme negative returns on a particular day) after controlling for common 
variables in a multinomial logistics settings. The contribution of this chapter in the existing 
literature includes: 1) an evaluation of banking system fragility through co-movements in 
banking stock indices that are measured on daily basis nd provide a yardstick for instant 
evaluation of systemic crisis; 2) an assessment of he role of banking system liquidity, 
diversification of banking activities, banking competition, and the capitalization of the banking 
system for regional banking system fragility; 3) an investigation on whether specific banking 
system characteristics in the host region help in reducing the probability of cross-border 
contagion (by interacting them with the number of negative coexceedances in triggering 
regions); 4) an analysis on whether regional and country level banking characteristics play a role 
for an individual banking system to be in the tail with other countries in the region. 
The last Chapter titled “An investigation of Inter-Industry Contagion: Banking and Financial 
Services Institutions” focuses on intra-industry contagion and inter-industry contagion within the 
financial sector in all regions. The intuition for studying inter-industry contagion follows Lang 
and Stulz (1992) who argue that firms using similar input to produce similar output are affected 
by same shock irrespective of their industrial classification (SIC codes). More specifically, all 
financial institutions including banks are competing for the financial liquidity and sell similar 
financial products with different brands. Therefore, inter-industry contagion may be as prevalent 




consequences. Inter-industry contagion has been assessed before when studying the significance 
of spillovers from life insurance to the banking system in an extant literature [see e.g. Brewer 
and Jackson (2002) for the US and Stringa and Monks (2007) for the UK]. This contribution is 
unique in terms of using a different set of financial institutions. It includes assets managers, 
consumer finance, specialty finance, investment servic s, mortgage finance, equity investment 
services and non-equity investment services. Moreover, it uses an explicit multinomial logistic 
framework to gauge the   degree   of   intra-industry   and   inter-industry   contagion   through 





2 SHORT LITERATURE REVIEW ON FINANCIAL CONTAGION 
THROUGH CROSS-BORDER EXPOSURES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 A number of financial crises started as an idiosyncratic shock to local securities or local 
markets, but the dominos eventually spread to markets with no obvious economic linkage to the 
initial shock (e.g., the Mexican crisis in 1982 and 1994, the East Asian crisis in 1997, the 
Russian crisis in 1998, and the Brazilian crisis in 1999). Similarly, the financial turmoil that 
started in the summer of 2007 and intensified in 2008 as a local problem to the US-mortgage 
market has become a global concern for financial stability. These concerns are shared equally 
among policy makers in developed as well as in emerging market economies.   
These financial crises have also attracted research interest in cross-border contagion and in 
empirical studies that investigate how a local turmoil ay spill over to international markets with 
little or no economic linkages. Though there is no standard definition of cross-border contagion, 
we refer to it as a phenomenon where the financial cr sis in one country increases the probability 
of crisis in other countries. We follow Calvo and Reinhart (1996) who distinguish between 
fundamentals-based contagion (which arises when the initial shock propagates through real 
linkages including trade relationships and international business cycles) and “pure” or “true” 
financial contagion (which arises in the absence of any potential economic interconnection 
among economies but mainly due to the herding behavior of international investors).  
2.1.1 Fundamentals-based contagion  
According to the fundamentals-based contagion, the high correlations in asset prices during crisis 
periods are dependent upon the state of macroeconomic interlinkages (e.g. Cole and Obstfeld, 
1991; Backus et al., 1992; Baxter and Crucini, 1993; Cass and Pavlova, 2004; Pavlova and 
Rigobon, 2007). These papers use correlations in real economic variables like consumption, 
output, national savings, investment and exchange rate (terms of trade) and find some evidence 
of  international transmission of local shocks. However, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), among others, argue that these models have shortcomings in 
explaining cross-border contagion in regions with low economic integration like East Asia, 
Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Furthermore, these models also fail to explain the absence of 




Argentina in 2001) where the neighboring countries have significant real economic linkages. 
They argue that financial linkages may be more important, mainly due to the common bank 
lender effect. Peek and Rosengren (1997) support this argument by empirically investigating 
Japanese bank lending in the United States during the financial crisis in Japan in the early 1990s. 
They found that declines in the Nikkei index uncorrelated with movements in stock markets 
elsewhere may nonetheless be transmitted to other countries via the lending responses of 
Japanese banks.   
2.1.2 Pure financial contagion  
Pure financial contagion refers to domino effects among economies that are unrelated to 
economic fundamentals but mainly due to the investors’ shifting appetite for risk. Moreover, 
information asymmetry among market players in financi l markets may also lead to financial 
contagion as local traders replicating international portfolio composition may import a foreign 
idiosyncratic shock.  The situation is more critical in emerging markets, where the process of 
generation, acquisition, and disclosure of information is not as standardized as in developed 
financial markets. The literature on cross-border financial contagion mainly exploits this 
heterogeneity in information and provides evidence that ‘excess’ price co-movement is a 
pervasive feature of many capital markets during uncertain times. See e.g. King and Wadhwani 
(1990); Fleming et al. (1998); Calvo (1999); Kyle and Xiong (2001); Kodres and Pritsker (2002); 
Yuan (2005) and Pasquariello (2007).   
2.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL CONTAGION  
We restrict the review here to channels of interbank contagion. Bryant (1980) and Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) are the founding fathers of the theory n individual bank runs. Bank runs are a 
potential equilibrium when banks invest in illiquid, long term assets. Later on, a number of 
papers have extended these theories to incorporate possible contagion effects. Allen and Gale 
(2000), for example, theoretically considered the possibility of financial contagion propagating 
through interbank exposures among banks in different gions. Their model exploits linkages 
between regions through correlation in liquidity needs of depositors and highlights the possibility 
of contagion when aggregate liquidity is not sufficient to absorb the idiosyncratic shock. 
Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) explain domino effects through banks’ preference for long-term, 




first in order to meet the unanticipated deposit outfl ws instead of liquidating their investments 
in long-term assets. Thus, the idiosyncratic financi l problem in one bank or region may transmit 
through banking exposures in that region or other regions leading to financial contagion.   
Allen and Gale (2000) also provide microeconomic foundations for interbank contagion by 
incorporating the structure of the interbank market. They emphasize that the scope of contagion 
not only depends on the size of interbank exposures relative to capital but also on the pattern of 
their linkages. Their major findings include that contagion is less likely for “complete market 
structure” (i.e., every bank has symmetric exposure to all other banks) than “incomplete market 
structure” (i.e., banks are exposed only to major neighboring institutions).  Freixas et al. (2000) 
introduce a money centre structure in the model. The money centre is symmetrically linked to all 
the other banks, which are themselves not linked together. They show that, in some cases, the 
failure of a bank linked to the money center will not trigger the failure of the money center, but 
the failure of the money centre itself may trigger failures of the linked banks. Pritsker (2001) 
studies at least five separate channels through which real shocks are transmitted from one 
country to another, including the interbank channel. He finds that banks/financial institutions 
play a critical role in transmitting shocks because of their linkages to the real sector. Cifuentes et 
al. (2005) investigate the theoretical basis for contagious failures when a liquidity shock affects 
the banking system. They suggest that distress saleof illiquid assets depress their market value 
and that the regulatory requirement of “mark to market” further aggravates the situation of 
distressed institutions. Iori et al. (2006) use a theoretical model to discuss the insurance role of 
the interbank market and conclude that when banks are homogeneous in liquidity or size, the 
insurance role of interbank lending prevails and, in this situation, higher reserve requirements 
can lead to a higher incidence of bank failures. On the other hand, when banks are heterogeneous 
in average liquidity or average size, contagion effects may arise.  Recently, Sachs (2010) provide 
an assessment of the impact of a the structure of interbank exposures on the stability  of  a  
stylized  financial system. 
2.3 EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON FINANCIAL CONTAGION  
We can distinguish two different approaches to empirically investigate financial contagion. First, 
some papers have focused on the interbank market in transmitting financial shocks. Second, 




first describe the results of the interbank papers and the different methods employed. Afterwards, 
we briefly touch upon the equity prices measures.   
2.3.1 Interbank markets  
Research papers have mainly focused on the role of the domestic banking system in transmitting 
financial shocks. Recently, however, some papers have started to explore the scope for cross-
border contagion via interbank and other exposures of the banking system. We first discuss some 
papers on domestic interbank contagion and then we focus on cross-border contagion.  
2.3.1.1 Domestic Interbank Contagion  
There is a voluminous literature on domestic contagion studying various European interbank 
markets and the US interbank market. Degryse et al.  (2009) provide a table with an overview on 
the empirical work on interbank market contagion. We reproduce that information with some 
updates in Table 2.1.  
These studies use various measures of interbank exposure including interbank loans, payment 
and settlement obligations; OTC derivatives exposure  and interbank credit lines. Most of the 
time they rely on supervisory reports or credit registers for such information. For example, 
Muller (2006) includes credit lines in the analysis and finds that they put an additional constraint 
on solvent banks’ ability to pass excess liquidity over to banks, resulting in lack of liquidity 
during times of financial distress. Wells (2004) and Elsinger et al. (2006b) are distinct in terms of 
including off-balance sheet instruments in order to study interbank contagion. Liedorp, Medema, 
Koetter, Koning and Lelyveld (2010) test if interconnectedness in the interbank market is a 
channel through which banks affect each others’ riskiness using quarterly bilateral exposures of 
all banks active in the Dutch interbank market between 1998 and 2008. 
In these studies researchers mostly rely on counterfac ual simulations to study the scope for 
contagion while using maximum available information. This artificially simulated data captures 
core characteristics of the actual phenomenon. The method of counterfactual simulation, though 
less accurate, provides the opportunity to concentrate on the relevant type of interbank exposure 
and the systemically important financial institution(s). Upper (2007) provide a detailed critical 
assessment of this methodology. Research studies bas d on counterfactual simulation include the 




maximizing entropy using balance sheet data. Therefore, it simulates the propagation of an 
individual bank failure to the system through domino-type effects. Upper and Worms (2004) also 
apply a similar methodology to German banks’ data, which is highly disaggregated both in terms 
of bilateral credit exposure and loan maturity. 
In terms of findings, Upper and Worms (2004) conclude that the financial safety net (i.e., 
institutional guarantees for saving banks and cooperativ  banks) considerably reduces, but does 
not eliminate, the danger of contagion. Wells (2004), on the other hand, finds that a single bank 
failure has the potential to weaken substantially the capital holdings of the UK banking system. 
In the case of the Netherlands, Van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) find that the bankruptcy of one 
of the large banks will put a considerable burden on the other banks, but will not lead to a 
complete collapse of the interbank market.  
Elsinger et al. (2006a) use the matrix of interbank credit relationships of Austrian banks in a 
more generalized risk management model. They explore the effects of macroeconomic shocks 
while simulating the impact of both credit risks and market risks on interbank payment flows and 
the value of bank capital. In this setting, the net value of banks is also affected by non-interbank 
activities (i.e. changes in monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and stock market or business 
cycle shocks). They find that correlation in banks’ a set portfolios (as opposed to financial 
linkages) dominates contagion as the main source of systemic risk. Contagion is rare but can 
nonetheless wipe out a major part of the banking system.  
Also, Degryse and Nguyen (2007) investigate the evolution and determinants of contagion risk 
for the Belgian banking system. They report that a move from a complete structure to a multiple-
money-centre structure reduces the risk and impact of contagion, supporting the theoretical 
predictions in Freixas et al. (2000).  
2.3.1.2  Cross-border contagion  
 Degryse and Nguyen (2007) do not only focus on domestic contagion, but they also investigate 
contagion stemming from interbank linkages of Belgian banks with foreign banks, and provide 
some estimate of cross-border contagion risk. Using the BIS data, Van Rijckeghem and Weder 
(2001 and 2003) find the common-bank-lending channel to be the pathway of contagion in the 




exposures, and find that though cross-border exposures reduce local contagion risk, they increase 
the contagion risk stemming from foreign banks. Blavarg and Nimander (2002) also extend their 
analysis to include cross-border default on FX exposure. Cihak and Ong (2007) explore cross-
border contagion at the bank level within Europe, whereas Derviz and Podpiera (2007) analyze 
cross-border contagion using the largest banks world ide. Recently, de Haas and van Lelyveld 
(2010) use new panel data on the intra-group ownership structure and the balance sheets of 45 of  
the largest multinational bank holdings to analyze what determines the credit growth of their 
subsidiaries. A similar analysis by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) explore whether the 
consequences of shocks originating in home and host markets have likewise evolved. Global   
banks played a significant role in the transmission of the 2007 to 2009 crisis to emerging market   
economies. They examine the relationships between adverse liquidity shocks on main developed-
country banking systems to emerging markets across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, isolating 
lending supply from lending demand shocks. Navaretti, Calzolari, Pozzolo and Levi (2010) 
examines whether multinational banks have a stabilizing or destabilizing role during times of 
financial distress using evidence from EU.  
2.3.2 Equity prices  
Other studies focus on equity prices to study financi l contagion.1 Among them, Bae et al. (2003) 
evaluate contagion in financial markets through coin idence of extreme return shocks across 
countries within a region and across regions. Building on the approach by Bae et al. (2003), 
Gropp and Moerman (2004) and Gropp et al. (2009), both examine cross-border contagion 
through equity price coexceedances of major European banks. They show that there may be tight 
links among banks within countries, as well as links connecting the major banking systems in 
Europe. They do not detect a major difference betwen the strength of links among euro area 
versus non-euro area countries. Also, Hartmann et al. (2005) assess cross-border contagion in the 
euro region and compare it with domestic contagion in US. They conclude that systemic risk 
though larger on both sides of the Atlantic during 1990s, is relatively higher in the US mainly 
due to ‘mild’ cross-border risks in Europe. Further, Bautista, Rous and Tarazi (2007) explore 
                                                
1 De Bandt and Hartmann (2001) provide a survey of various studies using asset price (equity) 





determinants of domestic and cross-border contagion risk in Southeast Asia – the only study we 
are aware of that investigates bank contagion outside the US and Europe.   
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
This chapter has provided a short review of the literature on financial contagion, and in particular 
the role and impact of cross-border exposures. The issue of cross-border contagion has only 
recently been highlighted. This stems from different forces. First, in recent years, foreign claims 
held by the banking system have increased substantially. Second, the US-subprime crisis turned 
into a worldwide financial crisis, suggesting that cross-border linkages are important as they may 
pose a serious threat to financial stability. Third, recent advances in empirical methods and data 










Paper  Country /Region  Time Period  Interbank Exposure   Main Findings  
Angelini,Maresca and Russo (1996) Italy 21 business 
days in Jan 
1992 
End-of-day bilateral net balances 
for the 288 participants in the 
Italian netting system 
4% of 288 participants has the 
potential of triggering sytemic 
banking crises
Amundsen and Arnt (2005) Denmark 2004 Overnight loans between domestic 
counterparties with maturity less 
than 1 year 
1-4% of Dannish Banking Assets 
Blavarg and Nimander (2002) Sweden Sep 1999 - 
Sep 2001 
Deposits, securities, and 
derivative; FX settlement 
exposures 
16 of 108 cases with potential of 
contagion 
Degryse and Nguyen (2007) Belgium Dec 1992 - 
Dec 2002 
All on balance exposures 3 - 85% of total banking assets 
(depends on time and market 
structure)
Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006a) Austria Sep 2001Loans to domestic banks 70% of all banks when LGD of 
100% 
Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006b) United Kingdom 2003 Large exposures include off-
balance sheet instruments Federal 
funds transactions 
Probability of contagion default is 
close to zero 
Furfine (2003) United States Feb 1998 - 
Mar 1998 
Uncollateralized Less than 3.5% of total assets
Lubloy (2005) Hungary 50 days in 
2003 
All on-balance sheet exposures 
excluding equity
Limited
Mistrulli (2005) Italy Dec 1990 - 
Dec 2003 
All exposures including credit lines About 16% of total banking 
assets 
Muller (2006) Switzerland Dec 2003 Loans to demestic banks About 3% (20%) of total assets 
become insolvent (illiquid) 
Sheldon and Maurer (1998) Switzerland Loans to domestic banks Limited first round effects 
Upper and Worms (2004) Germany Dec 1998 On-balance she t exposures, 
foreign banks grouped by region 
Up to 85% of total assets 
Van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) Netherlands Dec 2002 Large exposures include off-
balance sheet instruments
Up to 96% of total assets
Wells (2004)  United Kingdom  Dec 2000   Up to 25% of total assets  
Source: updated version of Table 7.1 in Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009) (see also Upper (2006))




3 CROSS-BORDER EXPOSURES AND FINANCIAL CONTAGION 
Integrated financial markets provide opportunities for expansion and improved risk sharing, but 
also pose threats of contagion risk through cross-border exposures. This chapter examines cross-
border contagion risk over the period 1999-2006. To that purpose we use aggregate cross-border 
exposures of seventeen countries as reported in theBIS Consolidated Banking Statistics. We find 
that a shock which affects the liabilities of one country may undermine the stability of the entire 
financial system. Particularly, a shock wiping out 25% (35%) of US (UK) cross-border liabilities 
against non-US (non-UK) banks could lead to bank contagion eroding at least 94% (45%) of the 
recipient countries’ banking assets. We also find that since 2006 a shock to Eastern Europe, 
Turkey and Russia affects most countries. Our simulations also reveal that the “speed of 
propagation of contagion” has increased in recent yars resulting in a higher number of directly 
exposed banking systems. Finally we find that contagion is more widespread in geographical 
proximities.   
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The recent financial crisis, while having its roots in the US, spread globally in a very short span 
of time. The higher delinquencies in the mortgage market quickly ripple through, not only other 
financial markets in the US, but also abroad. As a result, the US subprime crisis turned into a 
global macroeconomic shock leading the US, along with the Euro zone and Japan, into recession. 
Though the governments and international financial institutions have announced bailout 
packages of trillions of dollars, the crisis is still unfolding. The deteriorating conditions, despite 
all coordinated interventions worldwide, expose fundamental weaknesses in the international 
financial system. The ongoing banking problems illustrate that monitoring financial stability is 
important locally as well as globally. Therefore, it is worth studying the transmission channels to 
be able to identify the vulnerabilities in the international banking system. 
Banks are important because the instability of the banking sector in a country may have severe 
effects on other sectors of the economy. Moreover, th  banking sector has a large penetration in 
the international market.2 Therefore, a shock can be easily transmitted across b rders due to an 
                                                
2 The reasons for international presence of banking system include: financial sector liberalization during the late 
1990s has provided opportunities for international and cross-state (cross-border) banking. Second, the wave of 
mergers and acquisitions in the banking sector, both within and outside the United States, led to banking 




unsustainable loss on bank lending to foreign counterparties. In this chapter we study cross-
border financial contagion, defined as the situation when an idiosyncratic shock that hits the 
foreign counterparty of a banking system results in no -payment of its foreign claims. If the 
banking system’s aggregate equity is not enough to absorb this shock, the affected banking 
system will not fulfill its foreign obligations in the next round. This starts a domino effect that 
impacts other banking systems worldwide. Our focus is then on contagion due to non-repayment 
of cross-border credit exposures. 
Foreign claims have increased both in absolute terms as well as relative to aggregate measures of 
real economic activity. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reported an increase in 
international claims on banks (in absolute terms), from $584 billion at end-1977 to $21 trillion in 
the second quarter of 2007.3 Similarly, in relative terms, cross border exposure  increased from 
10% of world GDP in 1980 to 48% of world GDP in the second quarter of 2006.  
Despite increasing foreign claims, only a few papers deal with this topic even though the 
ongoing credit crisis shows that cross-border contagion has become more important. The papers 
that deal with cross-border contagion can be subdivided in two groups, depending upon their 
approach. The first group employs equity prices to measure cross-border contagion (Hartmann, 
Straetmans and de Vries (2005), Gropp and Moerman (2005), Gropp, Duca and Vesala (2006) 
and Bautista, Rous and Tarazi (2007)).4 These papers mostly study within country contagion or 
contagion within continents. The second group of papers uses data on bank exposures. In 
particular, they employ cross-border exposures, but focus on the effects on a single country (Van 
Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) study interbank contagion for the Netherlands, while Degryse and 
Nguyen (2007) focus on Belgium), or they study contagion originating from the failure of 
emerging countries (McGuire and Tarashev (2007)).5 These papers highlight the increasing 
                                                                                                                                                
relationships across the world. Third, the integration of European countries into one monetary union also increased 
significantly the cross-border relationships. Fourth, banks have developed risk management systems allowing them 
to price and manage international assets more adequtely. 
3 The increase may partially be attributed to a widening of the reporting area as data for the Cayman Islands, Hong 
Kong SAR, Singapore and other offshore financial centres are only available from end-1983. Whereas Australia, 
Bermuda, Greece, Guernsey, the Isle of Man and Portugal start reporting in or after 1998. However, banks located in 
these countries accounted for less than 5% of total claims of BIS reporting banks in 2006. 
4 De Bandt and Hartmann (2001) provide a survey of various studies using asset price (equity) co-movements for 
measuring the impact of contagion. 
5 Recently, a series of papers have studied banking co tagion stemming from within country interbank exposures 




importance of cross-border exposures. We contribute to this literature by focusing on foreign 
claims of a sample of developed and developing countries to investigate empirically the potential 
for contagion risk through cross-border bank exposures across a more diverse set of countries 
and continents. We use the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics for this purpose. We discuss 
several scenarios where we assume that an exogenous, sudden and idiosyncratic shock hits the 
foreign liabilities (entirely or partly) of a country. Following the initial failure, the shock 
propagates through cross-border exposures to banks in other countries and results into domino-
type effects potentially causing systemic crisis. The contagion risk is gauged through the number 
of banking systems in other countries that potentially default following the non-payment of 
foreign claims against the failing country (ies).  
This chapter therefore aims to contribute in several respects. First, it studies cross-border 
contagion for the first time using foreign claims from the BIS database. Second, while most 
papers focus on domestic interbank contagion at one point in time, our study provides an 
extension by looking at the evolution of cross-border contagion over the period 1999 and 2006. 
Third, we attempt to identify the size of a systemically important shock for cross-border 
contagion. Fourth, our analysis shows the economic i pact of cross-border contagion besides 
indentifying highly vulnerable banking systems.  
In this chapter we find that contagion risk and thespeed of contagion through cross-border 
exposures have increased during 1999-2006. We find that a shock which affects partially the 
liabilities of one country may undermine the stability of the entire financial system. Particularly, 
a shock wiping out 25% (35%) of US (UK) cross-border liabilities against non-US (non-UK) 
banks could lead to bank contagion eroding at least 94% (45%) of the recipient countries’ 
banking assets, assuming 100% loss given default (LGD). We also find that since 2006 a shock 
to Eastern Europe, Turkey and Russia affects most countries. Our simulations also reveal that 
contagion is often more confined to geographical proximities (i.e. regional, if not global), and 
that the US is the only country immune to cross-border shocks and contagion stemming from 
other countries.    
                                                                                                                                                
(2003) for the US; Wells (2004) for the UK; Upper and Worms (2004) for Germany; Lubloy (2005) for Hungary; 




The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset while 
Section 3 elaborates on methodological details. The results are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes this chapter.  
3.2 DATA  
We use bank credit to foreign countries as the source of cross-border exposures. These foreign 
claims include the exposure of a country’s banking system to all sectors (i.e. bank, non-bank and 
public) of other countries. BIS provides information on such foreign claims of reporting 
countries to the rest of the world in the Consolidated Banking Statistics.6 It covers data on 
(national) contractual lending by the headquartered banks and all of their branches and 
subsidiaries worldwide to borrowers residing outside the country of origin (where the bank’s 
headquarter is stationed) on a consolidated basis (i.e. net of inter-office account). It is one of the 
two broad categories in which BIS compiles data through the central banks of the reporting 
countries.7 Further, we use foreign claims on immediate borrower basis, i.e. the allocation of 
foreign claims of reporting banks to the country of operations of the contractual counterparty. It 
means that, for example, we employ the foreign claims of British banks on all financial 
institutions operating in the US (irrespective of their nationality).  
The reporting institutions in each country include all institutions that are allowed to receive 
deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits and grant credits or invest in securities on their 
account. Therefore, the reporting institutions include commercial banks, savings banks, savings 
and loan associations, credit unions or cooperatives, building societies, and post office savings 
banks or other government-controlled savings banks, but not central banks. 
<please insert figure 3.1 here> 
Our sample includes foreign claims outstanding at the end of each year for the banking systems 
of 14 European countries, Canada, Japan and US.8 The foreign claims of these countries’ 
banking systems are available for a long time period (1999-2006) allowing us to study contagion 
                                                
6 ‘Reporting countries’ include all participating countries in the BIS consolidated banking statistics. These countries 
report foreign claims vis-à-vis each other as well as against all non-participating countries. These non-participating 
countries are hereby called the non-reporting countries.   
7 BIS also reports locational banking statistics, i.e. international financial claims of all banks located in reporting 
countries to borrowers outside the geographical boundary on a gross (unconsolidated) basis. 
8 Included European countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 




risk over time.  These foreign claims differ across countries, not only in absolute terms, but also 
in relation to the size of the banking system’s aggre ate equity. Figure 3.1 shows the ratio of 
foreign claims to a banking system’s aggregate equity averaged over time for each country, both 
for the total foreign claims (sum over all countries) and the largest foreign claim (the country 
with the largest liability). The solid horizontal line at ratio=1 represents a situation where the 
foreign claims would be equal to a banking system’s aggregate equity. If the ratio of a country is 
below the solid line, then the country has complete immunity against cross-border contagion. 
The reason is that the domestic banking system’s aggregate equity is large enough to absorb a 
foreign shock due to non-payment of even all foreign claims. We find that the ratio of total 
foreign claims to bank aggregate equity is 0.4 in the US, which makes the US immune against to 
any cross-border contagion. While Italy and Japan have a low total foreign claims to bank capital 
ratio, it is still greater than 1, implying that these banking systems may default in later rounds of 
contagion. Other banking systems have a very high ratio so that even the largest foreign claim 
exceeds aggregate equity (i.e. a ratio larger than one). In some cases, these banking systems 
default already in the first round of contagion. 
<please insert table 3.1 here> 
Table 3.1 provides another set of summary statistics on foreign claims. We find that foreign 
claims are clustered in geographical regions. For example, Austria has 28 percent of its foreign 
claims on Germany; Belgium has 32 percent on France and Netherlands; Denmark has 41 
percent on Germany and Sweden; Finland has 62 percent on Denmark and Sweden; Italy has 28 
percent on France and Germany; Portugal has 36 percent on France and Spain; Sweden has 64 
percent on Denmark, Finland and Germany; and Canada h s 72 percent of foreign claims on the 
US only. The exceptions to the geographical proximities rule are the US and UK. Many 
countries (especially Japan and Switzerland) have high proportion of foreign claims on the US 
and UK irrespective of their location. 
The dataset we use has several advantages. The consolidated banking statistics assigns foreign 
offices to their country of origin. This may be a better representation if foreign offices are 
affected more by an adverse shock in the country of origin as compared to a similar shock in the 
country of operations (in the latter case they could be rescued by the headquarters).  Moreover, 




banking system to foreign economies thus providing a channel to gauge the impact of external 
shock. On the other side, the non-availability of interbank data is due to the fact that the BIS do 
not report the sectoral classification (i.e. bank, on-bank and public) of foreign claims of 
reporting countries vis-à-vis each counterparty.9 Further, the consolidated banking statistics on 
immediate borrower basis does not take into account the nationality of contractual counterparties 
(i.e. for example, it reports foreign claims of British banks on all financial institutions in the US, 
but not on all American financial institutions). The BIS has managed this issue by reporting 
foreign claims on the ultimate risk basis, i.e. theallocation of claims of banks of reporting 
countries to the country of origin of the ultimate obligor. However, the data on ultimate risk basis 
are only available since March 2005, preventing us from evaluating contagion risk over time. 
Data on bank equity for the financial institutions of each reporting country are taken from 
Bankscope. We sum up ordinary equity of all financial institu ons except the Central banks to 
get the aggregate bank equity at country level for each year. We preferably use consolidated 
accounting statements of all reporting financial institutions in Bankscope in these calculations. If 
the consolidated statement is not available, then w use the unconsolidated/aggregate accounting 
statement, whatever is available. Similarly, if accounting statements are available on both IFRS 
and Local GAAP reporting conventions, then we use the former convention.  
3.3 METHODOLOGY  
We use the methodology of Upper and Worms (2004) for our contagion exercises. This 
methodology simulates a mechanical chain of domino effects caused by an exogenous initial 
shock. Our exogenous shock is the default of a trigge ing country (i.e. its bank, non-bank and 
public sector) on its foreign liabilities. As a result, the banking system of the recipient country 
suffers from non-payment of its foreign claims on the riggering country. The banking system of 
the recipient country defaults in the first round when its foreign claims against the bank, non-
bank and public sector of the triggering country exceed its aggregate bank equity. The failing 
recipient countries in each round may affect other countries in successive rounds due to their 
combined effects. The contagion process stops when there is no new country that defaults in that 
round (i.e. combined foreign liabilities of both the trigger and failed recipients of previous 
                                                
9 BIS reports sectoral classification at aggregate lev l only. For example, it reports foreign claims of British banks 




rounds are less than the bank equity of each non-failed recipient country). We employ this 
methodology over our entire sample period 1999-2006 to evaluate the impact of contagion over 
time.  

































































where ijx  are the consolidated foreign claims of the banking system of country i  on the bank, 
non-bank and public sector of countryj , N is the number of reporting countries (N=17 in our 

















total foreign liabilities of countryj  towards the rest of the reporting countries. This matrix also 
shows the foreign claims on the M non-reporting countries.  
The aggregate bank equity has an initial value iC  equal to the ordinary equity directly observed 
from the balance sheets of financial institutions i country i. It is reduced by the amount of the 
foreign claims of country i  against the triggering country in the first round, and then by the 
cumulative amount of the foreign claims of countryi against all failing recipient countries in 









ji xC θλ  
where iC  represents aggregate bank equity of country i , jλ  is a dummy variable whose value is 




(LGD),  whereas ijx  is obtained from the previous matrix representing he consolidated foreign 
claims of country i  on countryj  . 
<please insert figure 3.2 here> 
Figure 3.2 depicts the same procedure in a graphical manner. The domino effect starts when the 
triggering country defaults on its foreign liabilities. Depending upon our assumptions on LGD, 
the loss on foreign claims to the triggering country is fully or partially ascertained by recipient 
countries.  If aggregate bank equity of a recipient country is larger than the shock, the banking 
system survives with partial damage to the aggregate equity.   On the other hand, if the aggregate 
bank equity of the recipient country is not sufficiently high to absorb the shock, the banking 
system defaults. Here we assume that the banking system’s default would lead to the default of 
all sectors of the country through domestic spillovers; therefore the foreign claims on this 
country add to the shock for the next round of contagion.10 In each successive round, all non-
defaulting countries have lower chances of survival due to combined losses on foreign claims to 
defaulting countries in the preceding round. The system becomes stable when no country 
defaults in the current round or all countries default.  
There are some caveats to this simulation process. Although aggregate foreign claims at the 
country level are directly observable, the distribution of foreign claims among financial 
institutions within each country is not known. This implies that we need to make some 
assumptions on the distribution of foreign claims. A  a first step, we assume that all banks share 
foreign claims on other countries proportional to their assets. Furthermore, we assume that all 
banks’ equity is employed as a cushion to absorb the shock. Therefore the failure of a triggering 
country on its foreign liabilities affects all banks together. In later exercises; however, we assume 
that foreign claims are distributed among large banks only.   
Further we assume an exogenously determined LGD that is kept constant over time, and during 
all rounds of contagion and across all countries. While this may seem a very strong assumption, 
                                                
10 Unfortunately we do not have data on a country’s banking system exposure to another country’s banking system. 
We only have data on the claims of a country’s banking system against all other sectors (i.e., bank, non-bank and 
public) of each of the other countries. So, unless we assume that the banking system’s default would lea  to the 
default of bank, non-bank and public sectors, we cannot see the contagion in later rounds. To the bestof our 
knowledge, there is still no available cross-country dataset that would allow doing the simulations with actual 




we find however that all included countries have a similar and stable sovereign credit rating 
throughout the sample period. Therefore we deduce that all countries may have similar standing 
to deal with a crisis and hence a similar LGD for their respective debtors. In relation to the 
percentage of the LGD, we analyze several scenarios, given that there is no consensus in existing 
estimations about the recovery rates.11 Lastly it is also assumed that no netting of exposure  
occurs in the event of default.12  
3.4 RESULTS 
We analyze the impact of a country’s default on its foreign liabilities. The non-payment of the 
foreign claims of the banking systems of recipient countries vis-à-vis this triggering country 
erodes the bank capital of the recipient countries. The magnitude of the final shock is the LGD 
times the initial shock. In our examination we use various levels of LGD (i.e.  20%, 40%, 60%, 
80%, and 100%); however, we find a significant decline in contagion when LGD is below 60%. 
Therefore we report simulation results for 100% LGD (worst case) and 60% LGD (intermediate 
case) only. We present simulation results for two different cases: 1) all banks are internationally 
exposed; 2) only large banks are internationally exposed. In each case, we evaluate the possible 
contagion stemming from exposures to reporting and non-reporting countries, identify the most 
vulnerable banking systems, examine contagion risk over time, and report the economic 
significance of potential contagion. 
3.4.1 Case 1: All banks are internationally exposed 
In case 1, we investigate cross-border contagion of a default of the triggering country on all its 
foreign liabilities, under the assumption that foreign claims towards a recipient country are 
distributed among all banks in that country. Cross-border contagion occurs when the banking 
system in at least one of the recipient countries is not able to absorb the shock triggered by the 
non-payment of its foreign claims at the given LGD (i.e. the banking system’s aggregate equity 
                                                
11 For example, James (1991) estimates losses for US bank failures for the period 1985-1988, and finds that the loss 
is on average 30 percent of the failed bank's assets. For the UK, a bank study of recoveries by the UK Deposit 
Protection Fund in the early 1990s reports a median loss-given-default of 35% for failed UK banks (see Jackson 
1996). However the sample contains only 14 banks, which are small and the LGD has a large variance, from 0% to 
100%. One important issue to keep in mind is that tese are ex-post loss rates. It is possible that expected losses at 
the moment of the shock are higher and therefore banks may not be able to continue to operate if all its capital is 
perceived to be at risk. 
12 It is important to assess contagion risk under different netting assumptions, given that it is possible that some 
netting would occur. However we are prevented from doing this exercise, given that our data does not all w us to 




is less than the foreign claims on the triggering country). In this exercise, the national banking 
system acts as one unit, i.e. all banks hypothetically pool their equity to compensate the losses 
incurred on foreign claims to defaulting countries. We have 17 reporting countries that may be a 
trigger. We label these as reporting triggers. We also have the claims of the banking systems of 
the different reporting countries on 20 non-reporting countries, which we label as non-reporting 
triggers. These non-reporting countries include countries from Eastern Europe (plus Russia and 
Turkey), Latin America and Asia.  
<please insert figure 3.3 here> 
Figure 3.3 displays the results of our simulation exercise. It shows that contagion risk has 
increased over time particularly in terms of an increasing number of triggering countries that 
may lead to contagion, as well as more failing recipi nt countries to each trigger. The upper 
panels show the results for reporting triggers while lower panels elucidate contagion from non-
reporting triggers. Each scenario is evaluated at 100% LGD and 60% LGD. Panel (a) shows that 
the number of reporting triggers increased to eight n 2006 (i.e. the US, UK, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland), as compared to only four countries in 1999 (i.e. 
the US, UK, Germany and the Netherlands). The US, UK and Germany would have triggered 
cross-border contagion over the entire sample period. The contagion triggered by the US is the 
most severe, and spreads to almost all reporting countries in many years. The default of UK also 
affects a majority of other reporting countries (12 to 15 countries). The US and UK have 
triggering potential even at low percentages of LGD. The impact of cross-border contagion from 
Germany has particularly increased over time, affecting 13 countries in 2006. The Netherlands 
almost always affects Belgium, while default of any Scandinavian country affects the whole 
neighboring region. Japan triggers cross-border contagion in 2002 only affecting Ireland. 
Similarly Italy triggers cross-border contagion in 2006 only; however it would affect 14 out of 
16 recipient countries. Panel (b) depicts a similar p ttern for 60% LGD: cross-border contagion 
is triggered by the US, UK, Germany, and Scandinavian countries. 
<please insert figure 3.4 here> 
Similarly, panel (a) of figure 3.4 reports contagion triggered by non-reporting countries/regions 




Scandinavian region. Moreover, the default of Latin American countries has cross-border 
implications for Spain throughout. Distinctively, the default of Eastern Europe (plus Russia and 
Turkey) affects 15 recipient countries. Though Austria is the only country that is directly 
exposed to the shock, the combined effect in later rounds cause Scandinavian countries to default 
and then the contagion spread to Ireland and other major European countries in later rounds. 
Panel (b) of figure 3.4, that reports results for 60% LGD, shows a low contagion potential from 
non-reporting countries.  
<please insert table 3.2 and table 3.3 here> 
Another interesting question is which banking systems are more vulnerable to contagion, and 
thus often appear as failing recipient countries. We find that the number of directly exposed 
banking systems (that default in first round) reaches its highest level in 2006, when 12 banking 
systems default immediately after the triggering countries experience the shock. Table 3.2 and 
3.3 provide the direct and total cross-border contagion risk in 2006, respectively. The rows 
indicate the triggering countries that initiate contagion whereas the columns represent the 
recipient countries. Sweden and Ireland are the most directly exposed banking systems that 
default 5 times and 4 times respectively (see table 3.2).  On the other hand, Italy and the US are 
completely immune to cross-border shocks taking into account ‘all-round’ contagion effects as 
shown in table 3.3.  
Our results show that the US banking system is always resilient to cross-border contagion risk. 
Also, in recent years, the Italian banking system has become resilient to contagion risk from any 
of the triggering countries. This may stem from the large number of small banks in Italy that are 
not exposed heavily. Therefore the result here may be driven by our strong assumption that all 
banks, including small banks, are internationally exposed. We relax this assumption in the next 
exercise. Other recipient countries including Austria, Denmark and Finland are not completely 
resilient to contagion risk but default occasionally only in the last rounds. Therefore, we classify 
them as less vulnerable recipient countries. Lastly, Japan, France and Portugal have moderate 
level of contagion risk as they default in intermediate rounds.   




We also find that the number of banking systems that default in the first two rounds has 
increased for each triggering country in recent years. The increase is more profound when the 
triggers are the US and UK as shown in figure 3.5. Specially, the US affects 13 or more countries 
in just two rounds (see figure 3.5, panel (a)). Similarly, the default of UK leads to a cross-border 
contagion affecting 9 or more countries in first two rounds throughout the sample period as 
shown in panel (b) of figure 3.5.  
<please insert figure 3.6 here> 
The economic impact of possible contagion is shown in figure 3.6. We measure the economic 
impact of contagion as the percentage of total assets of the defaulting banking system(s) 
compared to total assets of all banking systems that could potentially be affected (excluding the 
triggering country). We find that the failure of the US has the largest economic impact 
throughout the time period. Its failure would potentially affect more than 90 percent of the global 
banking assets. Next to the US, the impact of the failure of UK is the most severe as it would 
affect around 50 percent of the banking assets in ma y years. The impact of Germany’s failure is 
increasing over time and would potentially affect around 50 percent of banking assets in 2006 
(similar to the UK). Other countries’ cross-border exposures generate a much lower impact.  
3.4.2 Case 2: Only large banks are internationally exposed 
In case 2, we assume the same initial shock as in case 1; however, foreign claims are assumed to 
be distributed among large banks only. We are therefore considering that the international 
banking market presents a two tier structure, where only large banks operate across borders in 
the interbank market and act as money centers for smaller domestic banks. Evidence consistent 
with this structure is found for example by Gropp, Duca & Vesala (2006), who show that small 
banks neither cause nor suffer from cross-border contagion, even though all banks are equally 
likely to experience domestic contagion.  We define large banks as banks with at least $127 
billion in assets, this is the maximum possible bank sset size such that we include at least one 
bank from each country (this cut-off is close to the $170 billion cut-off used in Gropp, Duca and 
Vesala (2006)). There are 193 banks of the total 6392 banks that report to Bankscope, that have 
$127 billion or more total assets. Moreover, we assume that the selected large banks in each 
country act as one unit and hypothetically pool their equity to safeguard against contagion risk. 




the shock. In this case, our assumption about domestic spillovers is more stringent (i.e., the 
failure of large banks leads to the default of all sectors of the recipient country). In general, we 
expect more contagion to take place compared to case 1, as we only include banks’ equity of 
large banks as a cushion for default on foreign claims.  
For brevity, we only discuss the main findings and differences compared to case 1.  We find 
more intense contagion as expected. At 100 percent LGD, all countries except Switzerland and 
Canada, trigger in at least one year contagion that affects at least 15 countries. More specifically, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK and the US trigger contagion throughout the 
sample period, while other countries trigger contagion only occasionally. The US again turns out 
to be a trigger that affects all other countries, while other countries affect all but the US.   
We find that the Italian banking system that is immune to any cross-border shock in case 1, not 
only triggers contagion but is also affected by other triggers. The default of the Italian banking 
system has severe implications for neighboring European countries including Portugal, Austria 
and Germany. Once any of these European countries defaults, then a chain of bank failures starts 
that ultimately leads to the default of all banking systems except the US. However, the speed of 
contagion is low, as it takes several rounds to complete the contagion process.  
With 60 percent LGD, we find that the US affects all countries during each year in the sample 
period. The UK, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, France Germany and Spain also trigger significant 
contagion even at 60 percent LGD. Other countries ar  g ining contagion momentum in recent 
years, especially after 2002. Scandinavian countries gger contagion, but only on a limited scale 
at the regional level.  
Regarding the effects of the non-reporting countries with 100% LGD, Eastern Europe (plus 
Russia and Turkey) and Latin America affect almost all countries throughout our sample period, 
whereas Norway’s contagion impact is limited to the Scandinavian region except for 2003-2005. 
Asia and off-shore centers cause contagion mainly during 1999-2002. With an LGD of 60%, 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and off-shore centers cause global contagion whereas Norway 
causes regional contagion. 




In terms of direct exposure (recipient countries which fail in the first-round), we find a similar 
pattern as the one we observe in case 1. Table 3.4 reports direct cross-border contagion in 2006 
and reveals that the banking systems that are often dir ctly exposed are Portugal (13 times), 
Ireland (6 times), Netherlands (5 times), Sweden (5 times) and Switzerland (5 times). The 
recurrence of Portugal is expected because of the low representation of large banks. We find that 
Italy and the US are not directly exposed to any triggering countries. On the other side, UK and 
the US affect most countries in the first round.  Finally, table 3.5 shows that the total contagion 
effect. US affects all other countries and France, G rmany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and UK 
affect all countries but the US. Again we observe Scandinavian countries affect other countries 
in their region.  
It is important to note that the US remains completely resilient to contagion risk in case 2 as 
well. Moreover, Italy as well as Austria, Finland and Portugal may be classified as less 
vulnerable countries.  
3.4.3 Systemically important country shock/bank  
The recent subprime crisis also raises questions whether a single large bank or a group of banks 
can trigger a chain of dominos that potentially leads to cross-border contagion. We investigate 
this possibility by considering a shock to a fraction of a country’s cross-border exposure only. 
We simulate initial shocks ranging from 5 percent to 100 percent, in steps of 5 percent each. This 
allows us to check the critical magnitude of the initial shock that would potentially cause a 
significant loss of banking assets of recipient countries through cross-border contagion, and 
compare it with the concentration of the triggering countries banking system. There is no clear 
definition of a systemically important bank/shock. For our analysis, we consider a systemically 
important bank/shock to be one affecting 20 percent of o her banking systems assets.  
<please insert figure 3.7 here> 
Figure 3.7 panels, (a), (b), and (c), display the results for our three most important triggers, US, 
UK and Germany, respectively. Figure 3.7 panel (a) shows that, in 2006, an initial shock of as 
low as 25 percent of the US’s foreign exposure would have triggered cross-border contagion, 
eroding 95 percent of the banking assets at 100% LGD, of which 80 percent of banking assets 




assets at 60% LGD. However, an increased initial shock of 60 percent shock could lead to a 
massive erosion of 72 percent of the banking assets.  
A similar analysis for the UK is reported in panel (b) of figure 3.7, again assuming a LGD of 
100%. It reveals that an initial shock of 35 percent of its cross-border exposures lead to an 
erosion of 45 percent of the banking assets of all recipient countries. Compared to this 35 percent 
shock, a 100 percent default of UK would lead to the erosion of 49 percent of the banking assets, 
of which 33 percent would happen in the first round. On the other hand, assuming 60 percent 
LGD, a 75 percent initial shock would have resulted in cross-border contagion eroding 45 
percent of the banking system. Lastly, panel (c) repo ts the results for Germany: an initial shock 
wiping out 60 percent of Germany’s cross-border liabilities affects 50 percent of the banking 
assets assuming 100 percent LGD. However, Germany would not trigger any significant 
contagion assuming 60 percent LGD during our sample period.13  
In sum, based on an LGD of 100% and for 2006, we find that a 25%, 35%, and 60% shock to 
respectively the US, UK and Germany, can be classified as a systemically important shock. This 
compares to three-bank concentration ratios of 20%, 44% and 25% for the US, UK and 
Germany, respectively. This shows that a shock that would affect the liabilities of the three 
largest banks (and an equal fraction of the non-bank and public sector) in the US and the UK has 
the potential to lead to a systemically important shock. In unreported exercises, we also find that 
over time a smaller shock might become a systemically important one. For example, the size of a 
systemically important bank/shock dropped for the US from 45% in 1999 to 25% in 2006, and 
for the UK from 50% to 35%.   
3.4.4 Is contagion a result of high exposures or limited capital? 
Our results show that contagion risk exhibits considerable heterogeneity among countries as well 
as important time variation. We now investigate how sensitive contagion risk is to high cross-
border exposures and to insufficient bank capital during our sample period. We do this by 
employing a probit model where the dependent variable is a binary number that equals one 
whenever a country is a failing recipient after a tiggering country fails, and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables employed in the regression include the ratio of capital to total assets of the 
                                                
13 We have also checked the systemically important shock f r the US, UK and Germany during initial years of the 




recipient, the ratio of foreign claims to total asset  of the recipient and the ratio of foreign claims 
against the triggering country. We also control for year fixed effects in a separate model. 
<please insert table 3.6 and table 3.7 here> 
We report the summary statistics of the capital to asset ratio and the foreign claims to asset ratio 
in table 3.6. We find that financial institutions in Finland, the US, Belgium and Switzerland, on 
average, have 10 percent or more equity capital reltiv  to their total assets. Whereas Canada, 
Japan and Germany are on the lower side of the equity capital ratio, financial institutions around 
the globe have a capital ratio of 8 percent on average. With respect to the foreign claims to assets 
ratio, we find that Japanese institutions are not highly exposed (only 6 percent foreign claims 
relative to total assets), while European institutions have around 40 percent foreign claims 
relative to total assets. The standard deviation of the entire sample is 4% for the capital to asset 
ratio and 16% for the foreign claims to asset ratio. Table 3.7 reports that the variables in the 
probit model (1) explain 38 percent of the variation in the probability of being a recipient 
country. With the addition of year fixed effects, the fit improves to 39 percent. The likelihood 
ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the joint effect of all independent variables is equal to 
zero. We find that both the foreign claims to total assets ratio and ratio of foreign claims to 
trigger are statistically significant at 1 percent, whereas the capital to asset ratio is significant at 5
percent. The marginal effects show that a one standard eviation increase in capital to asset ratio 
decreases the probability of the default of recipient country by 2.2 percentage points. Similarly, 
one standard deviation increase in foreign claims to total assets ratio increases the probability of 
the default of a recipient country by 4.5 percentage points. Moreover, all signs are robust to year 
fixed effects whereas marginal effects slightly decline.    
3.5 ROBUSTNESS 
<please insert figure 3.8 here> 
We investigate the robustness of our results to a set of extensions. The contagion potential is 
evaluated with different loss given default on short and long term liabilities. We also use an 
alternative classification of foreign claims, ultimate risk basis, for robustness check. Finally, we 




study contagion interaction with the other countries we consider (i.e. Canada, Japan, Switzerland 
and the US). 
In case 1 and case 2 we assumed that the idiosyncratic shock affects all exposures equally 
whether short-term or long-term. We understand that t is may be a strong assumption, given that 
it is likely that recovery rates will be higher for l ng-term exposures. Therefore we next assume 
that countries default only on their short-term liabilities (i.e., we assume 100 percent LGD for the 
short-term foreign claims and 0 percent LGD for the long-term). This exercise can be seen as a 
scenario in which a country faces a shortage of liquidity and therefore the shock is mainly due to 
a refinancing problem. 
We refer to short-term liabilities as foreign claims of less than one-year maturity.  This presents 
an extreme scenario when short-term claims have no collateral whereas long-term loans are 
completely secured. The results are shown in Figure 3.8. Panel (a) reveals that the UK is the 
most important triggering country while the US now has very low triggering potential. For 
example, Figure 3.8 panel (a) shows that UK can affect 9 recipient countries while the US affects 
only one country in 2006. The main reason could be the dominance of European countries in our 
sample. Since London is the financial hub for interational banking, UK owes relative more 
short-term claims than long-term claims. Further, Switzerland and Ireland emerge as the most 
directly exposed countries in our sample period. Particularly, in 2006, UK directly affects Ireland 
and Switzerland while the US affects Switzerland only as shown in table 3.8. However, in later 
rounds, UK affects 7 more countries as shown in table 3.9. 
<please insert table 3.8 and table 3.9 here> 
Second, our analysis up to now employed foreign claims on immediate borrower basis (i.e. 
allocation of foreign claims to the country of operations of the contractual counterparty). The 
BIS has started compiling data of foreign claims on ultimate risk basis (i.e. allocation of foreign 
claims to the nationality of the contractual counterparty) in March 2005, but only for eleven 
countries in our sample. These countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, UK and the US. We replicate case 1, where we assumed that 
all banks are internationally exposed, but now with foreign claims on ultimate risk basis for 




Assuming 100 percent LGD, we find contagion results similar to case 1. The US again is the 
most devastating triggering country and may lead to contagion that affects all other reporting 
countries except Italy. Similarly, the default of UK poses contagion threat to 7 other countries, 
Germany is important for 3 other countries, and the Netherlands only affects Belgium. The speed 
of contagion increases in this exercise as all triggering contagion takes at most two rounds. 
The economic impact is also similar to our findings as discussed for case 1: an exogenous default 
to the US may affect 94 percent of total assets of other banking systems. Similarly, the contagion 
triggered by the UK, Germany and Netherlands affect 40.9 percent, 12.8 percent and 3.6 percent 
of total assets of other banking systems respectively. Finally, we observe that the pattern of 
direct exposure is also exactly the same in both cases (i.e. comparing directly exposed contagion 
from ultimate risk basis with immediate borrower basis of the corresponding reporting 
countries).  
The results on direct exposure are also robust: the US causes five recipient countries to fail 
immediately due to cross-border contagion. Similarly, the UK affects three recipient countries, 
while the Netherlands and Germany affect one recipint country each. Further, using cross-
border claims on ultimate risk basis we find the Netherlands to be the most vulnerable recipient 
country for cross-border contagion. This is in line with earlier findings using cross-border claims 
on immediate borrower basis. 
Next, we consider the European Union (EU) or the Euro Area as one banking system, and 
include also Canada, Japan, Switzerland and the US. We assume 100% LGD and all banks to be 
internationally exposed. We find that the US is still immune to contagion. Moreover, the US has 
an impact on Europe, and on all other countries. This contagion pattern is consistent throughout 
all the sample period. These results reflect the fact that the US is less exposed to Europe than 
Europe is to the US. The ratio of US claims against the EU over its domestic banking assets is 
3.7%, less than half the ratio of EU claims against the US over EU’s banking assets (which 
average 8.5% over our sample period). Therefore transatlantic contagion is still important for 
Europe as a whole. Moreover, the financial integration process that Europe has experienced in 
the last decades should lead to larger cross-border exposures among all member countries, 




probability that a US shock that may initially affect only a few countries will end up affecting 
most of the member countries.  
Finally, we also wanted to check the possibility for c ntagion with risk-weighted capital instead 
to total ordinary equity capital as reported in balance sheets on financial institutions. However, 
we find that financial institutions in many countries do not report risk-weighted capital in a 
consistent manner. Therefore, the results would be highly biased towards the countries reporting 
the risk-weighted capital only.  
3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The risk of contagion through the banking system is not limited to domestic boundaries. In recent 
years, foreign claims held by the banking system have increased substantially suggesting that 
cross-border contagion needs further consideration as it may pose serious threats to financial 
stability. We find for 2006 that a shock wiping out 25% (35%) of US (UK) cross-border 
liabilities against non-US (non-UK) banks could lead to bank contagion eroding at least 94% 
(45%) of the recipient countries’ banking assets. We also find that since 2006 a shock to Eastern 
Europe, Turkey and Russia affects most countries. Moreover, our simulations reveal that 
contagion risk and the “speed of propagation of contagion” have increased over time during the 















































































































Figure 3.1:  The Ratio of Foreign Claims to Bank Aggregate Equity  
Figure 3.1 shows the ratio of foreign claims to bank aggregate equity averaged over time for each 









Figure 3.2 shows the contagion process. The red circle on the left represents an initial shock triggered by 
the default of a reporting country. The shock is then multiplied by the Loss Given Default (LGD) to 
determine the effective burden on recipient countries; f that burden is less than the aggregate bank c pital 
then the country survives to the next round though it loses bank capital partially. Such country is 
represented by a green circle and the partially lost capital is represented by the red circle inside. On the 
other hand, if the burden is greater than aggregate b nk capital then the recipient country would also 
default as represented by the red circle on the right. Contagion would continue to the next round if there 
is at least one additional country defaulting in the current round. 
LGD times the 
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Figure 3.3: Contagion Triggered by Reporting Countries - All Banks are 
Internationally Exposed  
Figure 3.3 illustrates the number of countries (on y-axis) that default due to cross-border 
contagion from reporting countries. Each column represents a triggering country during 1999-
2006. Panel (a) is based on 100 percent Loss Given Default (LGD) whereas panel (b) is based on 


























Panel (a): Contagion Effect (Reporting Countries)
LGD=100%, Initial Shock=100%  


























Panel (b): Contagion Effect (Reporting Countries) 
LGD=60%, Initial Shock=100%  










Figure 3.4 illustrates the number of countries (on y-axis) that default due to cross-border contagion 
from non-reporting countries. Each column represents a trigger during 1999-2006. Panel (a) is 



























Panel (b): Contagion Effect  (Non-Reporting Countries)
LGD=60%, Initial Shock=100% 


























Panel (a): Contagion Effect  (Non-Reporting Countries)
LGD=100%, Initial Shock=100% 
Norway Eastern Europe Latin America
Figure 3.4: Contagion Triggered by Non-Reporting Countries - All 





Figure 3.5: Speed of Contagion – All Banks are Internationally Exposed 
Figure 3.5 shows the number of recipient countries in each round. Segments in columns represent 
the number of countries that default in each round. Panel (a) depicts the contagion effect due to 
the US whereas panel (b) reflects contagion that is triggered from UK. The analysis is based on 








































Panel (a): Speed of Contagion Triggered by the US
1999-2006








































Panel (b): Speed of Contagion Triggered by UK
1999-2006
























Figure 3.6: Economic Impact of Contagion -  All Banks are Internationally 
Exposed 
Figure 3.6 shows the economic impact of contagion that is triggered by the US, UK and Germany 
during 1999 and 2006. It is measured as the percentag  of total assets of banking systems recipient 
countries relative to total assets of all banking systems (excluding triggering country). The analysis 


























































Figure 3.7: Systemically Important Shock 
Figure 3.7 shows results for the exercise on a systemically important shock, for the US, UK and 
Germany at 100 percent and 60 percent LGD. The columns show the number of rounds, measured 
on the y-axis (right side). The lines show the percentage of total assets of defaulting banking 
systems relative to total assets of all banking system  (excluding triggering country), measured on 























































Percentage of Initial Shock
US (2006)
LGD=100% LGD=60% 1st round (LGD=100%)























































Percentage of Initial Shock
UK (2006)
LGD=100% LGD=60% 1st round (LGD=100%)

























































Percentage of Initial Shock
Germany (2006)
LGD=100% LGD=60% 1st round (LGD=100%)





Figure 3.8: Contagion Results Considering Only Short-Term Claims  
Figure 3.8 shows the contagion results due to the default of triggering country assuming different 
LGD on short-term liabilities and long-term liabilities. Each column depicts the number of 
recipient countries for the triggering country during 1999 and 2006. Panel (a) evaluates the effect 
with 100 percent LGD on short-term liabilities and 0 percent LGD on long-term liabilities. 
Whereas panel (b) evaluates the similar affect due to 60 percent LGD on short-term liabilities and 



























Panel(a): Contagion Effect (Reporting Countries) 
(ST: LGD=100%, LT:LGD=0%)  



























Panel(b): Contagion Effect (Reporting Countries) 
(ST:LGD=60% , LT:LGD=0%) 














Table 3.1: Foreign Claims of Reporting Banks to all 17 Countries 
Table 3.1 provides the distribution of foreign claims of reporting countries. Each column gives the percentage of 
foreign claims of a reporting country vis-à-vis other reporting countries averaged over time. 
Table 3.2: Directly Exposed Banking Systems when All Banks are Internationally Exposed 
Table 3.2 shows the details of directly exposed banking systems in 2006. For each triggering county (left 
column), the (defaulting) recipient countries are marked with a red box.  The total on the right column gives total 
number of recipient countries for each triggering country. Whereas the total number of times a country defaults in 
the first round is mentioned at the bottom.   
AT BE CA DK FI FR DE IE IT JP NL PT ES SE CH GB US
Austria --- 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 5% 2% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1%
Belgium 2% --- 1% 2% 1% 4% 2% 1% 8% 1% 7% 2% 3% 1% 1% 2% 3%
Canada 1% 0% --- 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 0% 0% 1% 2% 8%
Denmark 1% 1% 0% --- 28% 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 2% 0% 23% 0% 1% 2%
Finland 1% 0% 0% 3% --- 0% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 0%
France 5% 11% 2% 2% 2% --- 7% 5% 14% 6% 6% 16% 8% 2% 3% 9% 7%
Germany 28% 8% 3% 12% 6% 10% --- 24% 14% 10% 14% 7% 10% 24% 4% 7% 16%
Ireland 5% 6% 2% 4% 1% 2% 4% --- 5% 2% 2% 4% 3% 1% 1% 6% 2%
Italy 10% 9% 1% 1% 2% 11% 7% 8% --- 3% 7% 6% 7% 1% 2% 4% 5%
Japan 1% 1% 2% 0% 0% 10% 5% 3% 2% --- 3% 0% 0% 0% 7% 5% 12%
Netherlands 7% 21% 1% 2% 2% 5% 5% 2% 3% 3% --- 5% 4% 2% 2% 4% 7%
Portugal 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 0% 3% 0% 1% --- 11% 0% 0% 1% 0%
Spain 2% 3% 0% 1% 1% 6% 5% 5% 5% 2% 5% 20% --- 1% 1% 4% 3%
Sweden 1% 0% 0% 29% 34% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% --- 0% 1% 1%
Switzerland 5% 1% 0% 2% 0% 3% 3% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% --- 1% 3%
UK 16% 20% 14% 32% 9% 17% 26% 35% 25% 12% 18% 18% 38% 13% 20% --- 30%
US 15% 14% 72% 9% 14% 28% 25% 10% 16% 56% 30% 14% 14% 13% 56% 52% ---



















































Italy (IT) 1 1 3
Netherlands (NL) 2
Spain (ES) 1 2
Switzerland (CH) 1
United Kingdom (GB) 1 1 10
Japan (JP) 2
United States (US) 13
Total 3 2 5 2 4 1 2 6 0 5 13 1 5 1 1 2 0 53













Table 3.3: Contagion Effect when all Banks are Internationally Exposed 
Table 3.3 shows the extent of contagion in 2006 taking into account all round effects when all banks are
internationally exposed. For each triggering country (left column), the (defaulting) recipient countries are marked 
with a red box.  The total on the right column gives total number of recipient countries for each triggering country. 
Whereas the total number of times a country defaults is mentioned at the bottom.   
Table 3.4: Directly Exposed Banking Systems when Only Large Banks (more than $127 bn 
Assets) are Internationally Exposed 









Total 6 6 6 4 5 4 3 4 0 4 4 4 4 3 1 4 0 62














Table 3.4 shows the details of directly exposed banking systems in 2006 when only large banks are interna ionally exposed. 
For each triggering country (left column), the (defaulting) recipient countries are marked with a red box.  The black boxes 
represent additional contagion effect compared to previous case. The total on the right column gives total number of 
recipient countries for each triggering country. Whereas the total number of times a country defaults in the first round is 





















United Kingdom (GB) 15
Japan (JP) 2
United States (US) 16
Total 9 9 9 7 7 6 6 7 6 6 15 6 8 6 7 7 0 121













Table 3.5: Contagion Effect when Only Large Banks (more than $127 bn Assets) 
are Internationally Exposed 
Table 3.5 shows the extent of contagion in 2006 taking into account all round effects when only large banks are 
internationally exposed. For each triggering country (left column), the (defaulting) recipient countries are marked with a 
red box.  The black boxes represent additional contagion effect compared to previous case. The total on the right column 
gives total number of recipient countries for each triggering country. Whereas the total number of times a country defaults 
is mentioned at the bottom.   
Table 3.6: Summary Statistics 
Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics of capital to asset ratio and foreign claims to asset ratio averaged over time.   
Mean Median St. Dev Mean Median St. Dev
Austria 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.35 0.36 0.06
Belgium 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.38 0.38 0.04
Canada 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.21 0.20 0.03
Denmark 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.34 0.33 0.07
Finland 0.17 0.19 0.06 0.76 0.82 0.19
France 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.25 0.24 0.03
Germany 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.22 0.22 0.03
Ireland 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.53 0.53 0.17
Italy 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.39 0.38 0.04
Japan 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.01
Netherlands 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.41 0.40 0.04
Portugal 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.44 0.45 0.06
Spain 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.25 0.24 0.04
Sweden 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.38 0.36 0.07
Switzerland 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.38 0.38 0.05
UK 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.44 0.41 0.07
US 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.33 0.32 0.06
Total Sample 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.36 0.36 0.16








Table 3.8: Directly Exposed Banking Systems when a Country Defaults Only on 
Short-term Liabilities  
Table 3.8 shows the details of directly exposed banking systems in 2006 when a country defaults only o short-
term liabilities. We use the same set of triggering countries (left column) though only UK and the US trigger 
contagion in this case. The (defaulting) recipient countries are marked with a red box.  The total on the right 
column gives total number of recipient countries for each triggering country. Whereas the total number of times 
Table 3.7: Regression Results 
Table 3.7 reports probit regression results. The dependent variable is a binary number being 1 if country defaults and 0 
otherwise.  
** Significant at 5 percent 
*** Significant at 1 percent 
Number of obs 2312 2312
LR chi2(3) 759.94 785.59
Pseudo R2 0.3768 0.3896
Log likelihood -628.35 -615.53
PROBIT REGRESSION    Coef. Std. Err.    Coef. Std. Err.
Constant -2.120 *** 0.111 -2.179 *** 0.158
Capital to Asset Ratio -2.961 ** 1.253 -2.752 ** 1.287
Foreign Claims to Asset Ratio 1.498 *** 0.288 1.267 *** 0.297
Exposure to Trigger 10.127 *** 0.462 10.354 *** 0.470
Year Fixed Effect YES
MARGINAL EFFECTS dF/dx Std. Err. dF/dx Std. Err.
Capital to Asset Ratio -0.557 ** 0.236 -0.504 ** 0.236
Foreign Claims to Asset Ratio 0.282 *** 0.054 0.232 *** 0.054
Exposure to Trigger 1.906 *** 0.113 1.898 *** 0.113
Year Fixed Effect YES
Model 1 Model 2










Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 3
Year 2006 





























Table 3.9: Contagion Effect when a Country Defaults Only on Short-Term Liabilities  
Table 3.9 shows the extent of contagion in 2006 taking into account all round effects when a country defaults only 
on short-term liabilities. We use the same set of triggering counties (left column), though only UK and the US 
trigger contagion in this case. The (defaulting) recipient countries are marked with a red box. The total n the right 
column gives total number of recipient countries for each triggering country. Whereas the total number of times a 
country defaults is mentioned at the bottom.   




























4 DETERMINANTS OF BANKING SYSTEM FRAGILITY - A 
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter focuses on regional banking system fragility and determines how common factors 
and banking system characteristics influence it. We also investigate the possibility of contagion 
within and across regions, and analyze whether banking system characteristics in the host region 
influence the magnitude of cross-regional contagion. We further investigate which banking 
system characteristics at the country level are important for an individual banking system to be in 
the lower tail when other banking systems in the region have joint occurrence of extreme low 
returns. We find that regional banking system characte istics play a significant role in explaining 
regional banking system fragility. We also find significant evidence for within region contagion 
in all regions but its effect is stronger in Latin America than in Asia. For cross-regional 
contagion, we find that the contagion effects of Europe and the US on Asia and Latin America 
are significantly higher compared to the effect of Asia and Latin America among themselves. We 
find that aggregate liquidity significantly reduces the contagion-effect from Latin America in 
Asia and from the US in Latin America. Concentration significantly reduces the contagion-effect 
from Europe in Asia, but it increases the contagion-effect from the US in Latin America. Asset 
diversity reduces the contagion-effect from Europe in Asia only. A better capitalized banking 
system in Latin America helps in reducing the contagion impact from the US. Lastly, we find 
that aggregate liquidity and banking system capitalization significantly reduce the probability of 
an individual country to be in the lower tail when other countries coexceed, both in Asia and 
Latin America.  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Banking system fragility significantly affects the flow of credit to economic agents, and possibly 
forces viable firms into bankruptcy across regions. Further, banking system fragility impairs the 
functioning of the payment system that may ultimately l ad to economic stagnation (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (1997)). A fragile banking system affects neighboring countries in the 
region through cross-border linkages and raises concerns for regional banking system fragility. 
We refer to regional banking system fragility as a ituation when a number of banking stock 
indices have jointly very low returns in the region. The recent financial crisis stresses the need 
for strict evaluation of regional banking system fragility from both policy makers and 




crisis in the future, whereas researchers are more interested in the determinants of regional 
banking system fragility.  
Prudently regulating the banking system is undoubtedly a major objective for financial regulators 
because of the enormous cost of banking system instability. Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2002) 
estimate fiscal costs incurred in the resolution of 24 banking crisis in the last two decades and 
find that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods are 15-20%, on average, of 
annual GDP. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the mechanism that can cause systemic 
banking crisis is a foremost challenge for a prudent financial regulator. In the extant literature on 
banking crisis, there  are various reasons for imbalances that lead to banking crisis (see De Bandt 
and Hartmann (2000) for a comprehensive survey on systemic risk). Admittedly, each banking 
crisis is unique; but at the core they share similarities in the behavior of a number of economic 
variables and banking system characteristics that lead to crisis like situations. To address the core 
issues we need to focus on the behavior of the banking system as a whole because what may 
appear sound at the micro level may be quite fragile and flawed at the macro level (Hellwig 
(1994)). Acharya (2009) endogenously modeled systemic risk with correlation of returns on 
assets held by banks. He argues that the limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative 
externality of one bank's failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting 
incentive where all banks undertake correlated investm nts, thereby increasing economy-wide 
aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy 
requirements that are commonly based only on a bank's own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-
shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk.  
In this regard, there have been concerted efforts to identify and measure the variables that 
determine regional banking system fragility. This is very challenging due to many reasons: 1) the 
extent of damages in the banking system is itself difficult to observe directly because the 
dividing lines between banks and other financial intermediaries have become blurred; 2) the 
spillovers between the banking systems abroad and the omestic economy are hard to assess but 
these spillovers are consistently affecting banking system stability in a region; 3) the strong inter-
linkages of other sectors in the economy with the banking system can easily transmit imbalances 
in other sectors of the economy into the banking system and threaten its stability. 




fragility of banking system through ‘stress testing’ experiments. Their analysis is based on 
autocorrelation and survival time tests using histor cal data on bank failures and controlling 
macroeconomic conditions. The stress testing experiment at individual banks level (called micro 
stress tests) typically assesses a bank’s position (balance sheet/profit) against a given exogenous 
change in a macroeconomic variable, e.g. a sudden ris  in domestic interest rates. For an 
assessment of the banking system fragility, the aggregation of individual bank responses takes 
place without assessing the behavior of the banking system as a whole. Such an aggregation of 
individual responses is unable to incorporate indirect contagion effects due to interlinkages 
among economic agents within the whole economy. Therefore, it is vital to do macro stress test 
that relate to the entire system next to micro stres  t sts of individual banks (Goodhart (2006)). 
Our approach analyzes the determinants of regional banking system fragility while controlling 
for common economic shocks. We are also interested in the extent of banking system contagion 
within region and across regions. Therefore, this capter contributes to the empirical literature on 
cross-border contagion by evaluating contagion across egions.  We define a region as a block of 
dominant banking systems in a continent. We consider four different regions in this chapter: 
these include 10 banking systems in Asia, 7 banking systems in Latin America, the US and 
Europe, each as one entity. It is important to mention here that we are interested in analyzing the 
regional banking system fragility in emerging market regions (i.e. Asia and Latin America). We 
use the US and Europe as triggering regions to evaluate cross-regional contagion from these 
regions on regional banking system fragility in Asia and Latin America. This is important 
because the recent financial crisis shows that the banking crisis in the developed world has 
severe implications for developed economies and emerging markets alike; however, the effect on 
developing countries is far from being thoroughly analyzed in existing literature. 
We are mainly interested in evaluating the determinants of banking system fragility in a region; 
therefore, we do not explore the underlying transmis ion channels and focus on factors that 
determine the incidence of joint extreme negative returns of more than one banking systems in 
the region.  More specifically, we follow Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) to study regional 
banking system fragility through joint occurrences of negative extreme returns in banking system 
indices of multiple countries in the region. The joint occurrences of negative extreme returns are 




whether regional banking system characteristics can explain regional banking system fragility 
(i.e. the number of banking systems having joint occurrences of extreme negative returns on a 
particular day) after controlling for common variables in a multinomial logistics settings. We 
focus on negative coexceedances because of its relevanc  for banking system fragility. Thus we 
evaluate the effect of a common shock within a region through the number of negative 
coexceedances and then extend this analysis for contagi  from a shock in one region to other 
regions. A higher number of coexceedances in our analysis reflects the existence of systemic risk 
in the region. For example, in figure 4.1, we show anecdotal evidence that the number of 
coexceedances has significantly increased during crisis periods (i.e. Asian crisis 1997 and 
subprime crisis 2008). This indicates that our measures of daily coexeedances are also capturing 
the most important crisis periods. This is reassuring as it suggests that our fragility measure (i.e. 
the number of coexceedances) proxies for periods of banking system stress.  
<please insert figure 4.1 here> 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following dimensions: 1) we evaluate 
banking system fragility through co-movements in baking stock indices that are measured on 
daily basis and provide a yardstick for instant evaluation of systemic crisis; 2) we assess the role 
of banking system liquidity, diversification of banki g activities, banking competition, and the 
capitalization of the banking system; 3) we also investigate whether specific banking system 
characteristics in the host region help in reducing the probability of cross-border contagion (by 
interacting them with the number of negative coexcedances in triggering regions); 4) we 
explore another but related issue: under what conditi s an individual banking system is in the 
tail with other countries and which regional and country level banking characteristics help to 
explain this event.  
We find that banking system characteristics play a significant role in predicting banking system 
fragility next to the effects of common macro factors. Among the banking system characteristics, 
liquidity of banking system is the most important factor to reduce the probability of 
coexceedances in all regions, but the effect decreases in magnitude for the higher number of 
coexceedances in Asia and Latin America. The capitaliza ion of the regional banking system also 
plays a significant role in reducing the probability of coexceedances in the region. Its effect is 




competition, our findings are supportive of the competition-stability view in Asia and Latin 
America. We find that an increase in competition in the banking industry significantly reduces 
the probability of joint occurrences of extreme negative returns in both regions. Finally, we find 
that a focus on traditional loan making activities ncreases the likelihood of a single country in 
the bottom tail, but there is no significant impact on joint occurrences of extreme negative 
returns in the region.  
We also find evidence for contagion in all regions. It  effect is stronger in Latin America than in 
Asia. Moreover, we find that contagion within region is higher in emerging market regions, in 
general, compared to developed regions. For cross-regional contagion, we find that the contagion 
effects of Europe and the US on Asia and Latin America are significantly higher compared to the 
effect of Asia and Latin America among themselves. More specifically, in Asia, the marginal 
effect is higher for cross-regional contagion from Europe, whereas in Latin America, the effect 
from Europe and the US is almost identical. Further, we find that the higher level of aggregate 
liquidity in the host region significantly reduces the cross-regional contagion.  
We also explore whether a region’s banking system characteristics help in reducing cross-
regional contagion. We find that aggregate liquidity (in a narrow sense, i.e. cash) and 
capitalization in Asia reduce the impact of cross-regional contagion from Latin America. 
Moreover, diversity and concentration significantly reduce the magnitude of cross-regional 
contagion effect from Europe. For Latin America, wefind that a higher liquidity (cash) and 
capitalization significantly reduce the magnitude of cr ss-regional contagion from the US.  
Lastly, we investigate what banking system characteistics and/or common macro variables 
influence the likelihood of an individual country to coexceed when other countries in the region 
have joint occurrences of extreme negative returns. We find that aggregate liquidity and banking 
system capitalization significantly reduce the probability of that country’s coexceedances in both 
Asia and Latin America.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next Subsection, we discuss our 
empirical hypotheses. Subsection 3 describes the data and variables used in the chapter and 




logistic model. Subsection 5 presents our results. Subsection 6 discusses a few robustness tests. 
Finally, Subsection 7 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 MOTIVATION FOR CONTROL VARIABLES AND REGIONAL CONTAGION  
This chapter focuses on the fragility of the banking system in an entire region. We assess 
regional banking system fragility stemming from economic fundamentals and characteristics of 
the banking system. Following Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), we include three common 
variables as a proxy for economic fundamentals, “regional conditional volatility”, changes in the 
exchange rate, and interest rates. As regional banking system characteristics, we include banking 
system liquidity, diversification of banking activities, banking competition, and the capitalization 
of the banking system. Finally, we discuss the impacts of cross-regional contagion. We motivate 
each of these variables in the following sub-subsections.  
4.2.1 Common shocks and regional banking fragility 
There is an extensive literature that explores the relationship between stock markets and common 
variables. These variables include economic growth, inflation, interest rate level, financial 
leverage, stock trading activity and aggregate risk d versification. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
while analyzing the connection between banking crisis and balance of payment crisis (twin 
crises) reports that the loss of foreign exchange reserves, high real interest rates, low output 
growth and decline in stock prices are leading indicators of twin crises. Stock price volatility is 
closely associated with overall stock market performance. A number of recent studies assert that 
stock market volatility should be negatively correlat d with stock returns (Whitelaw (2000), 
Bekaert and Wu (2000), Wu (2001) and Brandt and Kang (2004) theoretically and empirically 
argue that increases in stock market volatility increase risk and decrease stock returns). 
According to this strand of literature, the higher conditional volatility corresponds to a higher 
probability of a declining market that has a negative impact on portfolio returns in general. In our 
analysis, we expect that an increase in regional conditi nal stock market volatility will result in 
higher number of joint occurrences of extreme negative returns of banking indices. The effect 
comes through two possible channels; first, it may affect returns on banking stocks because of 
the negative relationship between stock market volatility and stock returns as stated earlier; and 
second, it may affect bank profitability through the increased likelihood of non-performing loans 




the relationship between financial leverage and market volatility; and Ghosh (2005) for the 
relationship between financial leverage and banks’ non-performing loans). To evaluate the 
impact of stock market volatility we incorporate regional conditional stock market volatility as 
an explanatory variable in our model. 
Due to globalization, banks often are present in multiple regions along with exposures in 
different currencies. Therefore a sudden sharp depreciation of the domestic currency adds 
vulnerability to regional banking systems. Even though banks are often regulated to limit open 
positions in foreign currencies, sometimes it is not p ssible or desirable to hedge all open 
positions taking into account the cost of hedging. Large multinational banks that raise funds 
abroad and issue domestic loans denominated in foreign currencies, are often at high risk owing 
to an unexpected sharp movement in exchange rate. This notion has been extensively debated in 
the financial literature and there is significant evid nce that exchange rate risk exacerbates 
banking system fragility during crises (Kaminsky (1999), (Kaufman (2000), Hutchison and Glick 
(2000)). We incorporate the average of daily exchange rate changes of all countries in the region 
as an independent variable in our model to check its effect on the probability of coexceedances 
of negative return on banking stock indices. 
Banks mainly borrow funds for short-term and provide loans for long-term. If the maturity 
mismatch is not properly managed, it may significantly increase bank risk. Particularly, an 
increase in interest rates would deteriorate banks’ balance sheets when they are unable to match 
a higher interest rate to depositors in the short run with fixed interest earned on long-term loan 
agreements. Even when banks pass on the higher interest rate to borrowers, their balance sheet 
may be affected because of higher occurrences of non-performing loans. Therefore, ceteris 
paribus, an increase in interest rates is likely to increase banking fragility. The interest rate leve 
generally also controls for the effect of business cycle variables including domestic inflationary 
pressures, increase in foreign interest rates, shift towards tight monetary policy and lax 
regulatory framework owing to financial liberalization (Galbis (1995)). We introduce the interest 




4.2.2 Banking system characteristics and regional banking fragility 
The structural characteristics of the banking sector also could play a role in systemic banking 
sector problems. We now motivate why the following characteristics of banking system are 
important:  
4.2.2.1 Aggregate banking system liquidity 
Banks provide liquidity on demand to both depositor and lenders. Banks exist as they are the 
most efficient liquidity providers in the economy (see e.g. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) or 
Gatev and Strahan (2006)). Individual banks maintain liquidity in order to withstand “normal” 
liquidity withdrawals from their customers. When their individual liquidity holdings are 
insufficient, banks turn to the interbank market or the central bank to obtain liquidity. Banking 
system liquidity in the interbank market therefore s rves as a first line of defense against 
liquidity shocks. From a macro perspective, banks should maintain adequate levels of liquidity 
such that they are able to absorb any shock to banking system as a whole under different market 
conditions (Cifuentes, Shin and Ferrucci (2005)). The lack of aggregate liquidity at the banking 
system level may lead to a channel of contagion across banks and regions (see Allen and Gale 
(2000)). Further, aggregate liquidity effectively mitigates coordination failures in the interbank 
market and ensures financial stability (Karas, Schoors and Lanine (2008)). We therefore include 
aggregate banking system liquidity in our analysis, and investigate its impact on regional 
banking system fragility.  
4.2.2.2 Diversification of banking activities 
The lowered costs of information, advancement in telecommunications and deregulation of 
financial firms (the Second Banking Directive of 1989; and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 
1999) gave rise to financial conglomeration in industrialized countries. The perceived benefits of 
conglomeration include revenue enhancement through product diversification; the ability to offer 
one-stop shopping to corporate clients and economies of scope in the production of financial 
services. De Nicoló, Bartholomew, Zaman and Zephirin (2004) provide evidence that financial 
conglomeration has increased globally between 1995 and 2000 both in terms of the proportion of 
conglomerate firms and of the proportion of assets h ld by financial conglomerates.  Further, the 
financial conglomeration allows banks to move away from traditional commercial banking 




financial conglomeration that allows for diversification in banking activities create or destroy 
shareholders’ value and leads to financial stability or not is an intriguing question addressed in 
many research studies (Laeven and Levine (2007), van Lelyveld and Knot (2009), Schmid and 
Walter (2009) Stiroh (2006); Baele, De Jonghe and Vander Vennet (2007)). Laeven and Levine 
(2007) find evidence for ‘diversification discount’ that financial conglomerates have lower 
market value than if those conglomerates were broken down into financial intermediaries that 
specialize in the individual activities. More recently, De Jonghe (2010) finds that banking system 
fragility, measured through an increase in banks’ tail beta,   aggravates when banks engage in 
non-traditional activities in addition to their core commercial banking activities. Since interest 
income is less risky than other revenue streams, it i  argued that specialization in traditional 
activities result in lower systemic banking risk. In that sense, financial conglomeration is unable 
to reduce systemic risk. Wagner (2006) and Wagner (2010) theoretically argue that multiple 
activities of commercial banks though reduce risk at individual bank level, but from the financial 
system’s point of view it raises the likelihood of systemic crisis because a shock that previously 
affect only a small part of the financial system, now affects a large portion of the system and 
possibly results in failure of the whole financial system. Thus the increase in similarities due to 
diversification facilitates contagion because the failure of one institution increases difficulties for
other institutions with similar portfolios. The joint effect can be even bigger than the sum of 
individual effects. Given all the arguments above, w  test whether diversification in banking 
activities increases or decreases regional banking fragility.   
4.2.2.3 Competition in banking industry 
The relationship between banking competition and fiancial stability is rather complex. Though 
the existing theory is about the competition and individual bank stability, but what we are doing 
here is not drastically different. We aggregate individual bank behavior at country level so that 
banking systems at regional level behave like individual banks at country level. For example, 
Allen and Gale (2004) argue that competition per se is not bad, sometimes it decreases stability 
and sometimes perfect competition is compatible with the socially optimal level of stability. 
Carletti and Hartmann (2003) have surveyed the competition-stability nexus in banking to report 
that the trade-off between competition and stability does not generally hold. The theoretical 




The “Competition-Fragility” theories - based on the idea of ‘charter/franchise value’ of the 
institutions, argue that more bank competition erods market power and results in lower loan rate 
that decreases profit margins. Consequently lower revenues from performing loans, which 
provide a buffer against loan losses, make banks more risky and reduce their charter/franchise 
value. A higher franchise value deters bank risk taking as owners believe that their ownership of 
the bank is at risk in the event of insolvency. Therefore a lower franchise value reduces the value 
of ownership at stake and encourages banks to take on more risk for higher returns. This attitude 
of bank owners increases fragility of the banking system (Marcus (1984); Keeley (1990); 
Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996)). 
Alternatively, the “Competition-Stability” view suggests that more market power in the loan 
market may result in higher bank risk. The reasoning is that when banks charge higher loan rates 
to borrowers, it becomes harder for them to repay loans. This exacerbates moral hazard 
incentives of borrowers to engage in riskier projects and also result in a riskier set of borrowers 
due to adverse selection considerations (e.g. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)). Competition is good 
for financial stability because more competition lead to lower interest rates, which in turn lead to 
lower probability of loan default, and hence safer banks. Furthermore, concentration results in 
few large financial institutions that are possibly engaged in high risk taking activities because of 
the believe that they are too-big-to-fail and are th refore more likely to be explicitly or implicitly 
protected by the government safety nets.   
While presenting the above two views, Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009) argue that the two 
strands of the literature are based on different set of assumptions. They need not necessarily yield 
opposing predictions regarding the effect of competition and market power on stability in 
banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall 
risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity 
capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. Similarly, adequate policies – such as 
risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums – could mitigate any trade-off between competition 
and bank stability. Recently, Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) contribute to this literature and 
argue that there is a U-shaped relationship between competition and the risk of bank failure. In 
particular, they argue that the competition-stability view identified by Boyd and De Nicolo 




in competitive markets. In other words, in very cone trated markets a new entry reduces the 
probability of bank failure, whereas in very competitive markets further entry increases the 
probability of failure. 
On the empirical side, a recent contribution by Jiménez, Lopez and Saurina (2010) supports the 
‘charter-value’ hypothesis using Lerner indexes (based on bank specific interest rates) to 
measure market power in the Spanish banking system. They find a negative relationship between 
market power due to concentration and bank risk i.e. low market power (competitive market) 
lead to high bank risk (banking system fragility). Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) 
provide evidence for competition-fragility view through a dataset from 79 countries and assert 
that crises are less likely in more concentrated banking systems. Other studies provide evidence 
for the competition-stability view that bank risk increase with market power using different 
methodologies. Boyd, De Nicoló and Jalal (2007) andDe Nicolo and Loukoianova (2007) both 
find that the Z-score, an inverse measure of bank ris , decreases with banking market 
concentration (measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index or HHI). Whereas Cihák, 
Schaeck and Wolfe (2006) use logistic model and duration analysis to prove that more 
competitive banking systems (measured using the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic) have lower 
likelihoods of bank failure and a longer time to crisis, and hence are more stable than 
monopolistic systems. To provide support to competition-stability view through comparison 
across countries, Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009) empirically investigate the impact of national 
banking market concentration on financial stability for the 25 Member States of the European 
Union over the period from 1997 to 2005. Using the Z-score, they report that Eastern European 
banking markets exhibiting a lower level of competitive pressure, fewer diversification 
opportunities and a higher fraction of government-owned banks are more prone to financial 
fragility whereas capital regulations have supported financial stability across the entire European 
Union. 
4.2.2.4 Capitalization of the banking system 
Ceteris paribus, a more capitalized banking system should be more stable because a higher 
capital base provides a cushion against insolvency. However, the prudential regulations 
regarding capital adequacy fail to ensure financial stability in an unambiguous manner 




exposures of a single bank with a weak equity base, past regulations did not deal with capital 
adequacy to control for systemic risk of the banking system as a whole. Since capital adequacy 
regulations have a focus on a single bank for impleentation of law, they fail to incorporate the 
systemic risk on account of correlated portfolio positi ns in the banking system and domino 
effects in consequence of interbank exposures. Liu and Mello (2008) argue that fulfilling the 
capital requirements at individual bank level is not sufficient to prevent systemic crisis. They 
provide evidence from the recent subprime crisis, when financial institutions like Northern Rock, 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers collapsed even though these institutions had capital buffers 
that appeared adequate before collapsing. Neverthelss, we expect that a larger capital base 
reduces the likelihood of contagion. We use the capital base of the banking system as a whole 
instead of focusing on bank capital for each bank. I  our case, we evaluate whether the capital 
base of the banking system provide a cushion against regional banking system fragility.  
4.2.3 Cross-regional contagion?  
The re-emergence of crises during the 1990s (Mexican Peso Devaluation of 1994, 1997 Asian 
Crisis and 1998 Russian Crisis) already established t  need for a critical evaluation of cross-
border contagion that spread financial crisis from ne country to another (Claessens and Forbes 
(2001)).  The recent sub-prime crisis further endorses that cross-border contagion is a 
phenomenon that include not only neighboring countries in the region but also countries across 
regions (i.e. cross-regional contagion). The contagion can be fundamental-based (i.e. via trade or 
finance links) or ‘pure’ contagion, which arises when common shocks and all channels for 
potential interconnection are either not present or controlled for (Calvo and Reinhart (1996)). 
The argument in favor of fundamental-based contagion asserts that a higher degree of trade 
provides a transmission channel for contagion. Thoug  we did not test regional integration 
directly in this chapter, it is true that higher level of coexceedances indirectly reflects regional 
integration. Actually the increase in regional integration provides one of the motivations for this 
chapter. We explore this using the bilateral trade mong countries within a region (only exports 
are reported to avoid double counting) from UN Comtrade database. In appendix 4, we report 
that the trade value of total exports to individual countries has increased during our sample 
period except for the year 2008 due to global economic meltdown. We may take this anecdotal 




does incorporate synergies among regional banking systems on one hand, but it also increased 
the risk of regional cross-border contagion. 
In literature we find evidence on the cross-border contagion that transmits an idiosyncratic shock 
in one national banking system to all banking system  in the region and threatens regional 
banking system stability. A shock can be transmitted via direct balance sheet interlinkages 
between financial systems. For example, Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) investigate contagion 
through direct cross-border linkages. They find that t e failure of a banking system (hit by an 
exogenous default on foreign claims that are in excess of aggregate bank equity) can trigger 
domino effects in other countries that raise serious concerns for global financial stability. Bae, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2003) explore cross-regional contagion with focus on Asia and Latin 
America. They find significant evidence for the proagation of large negative returns across 
regions. More specifically, they find that contagion is more important in Latin America than in 
Asia; Latin America triggers more significant cross-regional contagion than Asia; and the US is 
largely insulated from contagion from Asia.  
We also focus on regional cross-border contagion after controlling for common shocks and 
banking characteristics at regional level. There ar empirical studies that explore cross-border 
contagion through co-movement of asset prices and test whether a change in asset prices in 
country A has some effect on asset prices in country B, using a number of econometric 
techniques (Baig and Goldfajn (1999); Forbes and Rigobon (2002); Bae, Karolyi and Stulz 
(2003); Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia (2005)). Some recent studies that concentrate on bank level 
data, also find evidence for cross-border contagion through co-movement of banking stocks 
(Gropp, Duca and Vesala (2009)). We also use co-move ent of asset prices and follow the 
methodology of Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) to extend the previous work on cross-border 
banking contagion towards cross-regional contagion.  
In this chapter, we investigate contagion both within region and across region. We define 
contagion within region as the portion of regional b nking system fragility (joint occurrences of 
extreme negative returns) that is not explained by the banking system characteristics and the 
regional common variables. For contagion across regions, we include indicators of regional 
banking system fragility in another region as an explicit independent variable in our model, 




4.3 DATA , DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Since stock market valuations reflect future economic activity, a simultaneous decline in the 
value of stock indices in many countries in a region reflects an increase in financial fragility. 
Banks represent a major sector of the stock market; th refore, a simultaneous decline in banking 
stocks is a huge setback to regional financial fragility. 14  
The existing literature has complemented or sometimes even substituted traditional accounting 
data with stock market prices in assessing bank fragility (see e.g. Bongini, Laeven and Majnoni 
(2002), Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2004), Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006), Yu-Fu, Michael 
and Kadri (2006)). In our analysis we use several countries’ banking indices from Datastream 
starting from July 1, 1994 to December 31, 2008 (3784 daily observations). Datastream uses 
Industry Classification Benchmarks (ICB) for the construction of these indices. We include 10 
Asian and 7 Latin American countries, following Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003). Moreover, we 
include the United States and Europe (as one entity) in our analysis to study the extent to which 
banking crisis in these regions affect banking system fragility in Asia and Latin America.  
<please insert table 4.1 here> 
Table 4.1 shows the number of banks included in the banking indices from each country. It also 
provides sample statistics including correlations for the full sample period. We find that the 
marginal daily return on banking indices varies across countries. The marginal daily return in the 
US is 0.041% and 0.035% in Europe. In Asia, China has the highest average daily return 
(0.089%), followed by Pakistan (0.073%) and India (0.072%). On the other hand, Indonesia has 
been the most volatile market in Asia with the highest daily return standard deviation i.e. 
3.322%. In Latin America, Mexico led with 0.095% average daily return followed by Venezuela 
(0.085%) and Brazil (0.081%). Mexico and Argentina are among the most volatile markets in 
Latin America with standard deviations of 2.342% and 2.371% respectively. 
Correlations among banking indices daily returns are higher within regions than across regions. 
For example, banking index daily return in Asian countries has 0.10 correlation among 
themselves compared to 0.05 against Latin America, 0.03 against the US and 0.13 against 
Europe. Moreover, we find that correlations are high among neighboring countries and more 
                                                




open economies in Asia. For example, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia have high correlations 
in Asia that averaged around 14%. On the other hand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico 
within Latin America have higher correlations that averaged around 27%. Moreover, because on 
a given day trading starts in Asia and ends in America, the information available in America at 
noon is not available to Asia on the same day. Therefore, in line with Bae, Karolyi and Stulz 
(2003), the previous trading day behavior in Latin America and the US is more relevant for Asia. 
This is evident from high correlation of daily return in Asian markets with the previous day’s 
daily return in Americas. This is particularly signficant for Asia and the US, for which, the 
correlation coefficient has increased from 0.03 to 0.14. For Latin America there is an increase 
from 0.05 to 0.06. 
4.3.1 Exceedances and coexceedances 
We follow the view that extremely low (negative) market returns on banking indices reflect 
fragility of the banking sector. To put things in a quantitative framework, we define an extreme 
event when the banking index return on that day lies b low the 5th percentile of daily return 
distribution and refer to this as an exceedance of the return on the banking index. The 
distribution of the daily banking index return is directly observed from our dataset (3784 daily 
observations). From the distribution of 3784 daily observations of return on banking indices, we 
calculate 5th percentile value for each country and region and then use this value as a standard to 
decide whether a country or region on a particular day exceed or not.  Moreover, we refer to 
coexceedances as a phenomenon when the banking indices of more than 1 country in the same 
region exceed on the same day. In table 4.2(a), we report the number of days for 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 
or more joint occurrences of extreme return (coexcedances) within a region on a particular day. 
We also indentify which countries “participate” in those extreme events and how often.  
<please insert table 4.2(a) here> 
As we are interested in banking system fragility, our focus is on joint occurrences of low extreme 
return (negative coexceedances). We nevertheless start by reporting joint occurrences of both 
low extreme returns (negative coexceedances) and joi t occurrences of high extreme returns 
(positive coexceedances) separately. We have found an asymmetry between negative and 
positive extreme returns distribution in Asia and Latin America. In our sample, we find that there 




when there is no positive extreme return in Asia. Smilarly, there are 908 and 943 trading days 
when only one country witness extreme negative and positive returns in Asia respectively. In 
Latin America, there are 2832 and 2744 trading days of no negative and positive coexceedance 
respectively, whereas there are 719 and 829 trading ays with one country in negative and 
positive tail respectively. The asymmetry in the distribution of extreme return is evident with 55 
trading days when 4 or more countries in Asia are in bottom tail compared to 41 trading days 
when 4 or more countries in top tail. The asymmetry is even more in Latin America where 40 
trading days when 4 or more countries in bottom tail compared to 21 trading days in top tail. 
Thailand has been the most recurring participant of the group of 4 or more countries in bottom as 
well as top tail. In Latin America, Argentina and Brazil are the most recurring countries in the 
group of 4 or more countries in the bottom or top tail. Beside Argentina and Brazil, Mexico often 
included in extreme events. On the other hand, Pakistan appears least number of times in 
negative extreme events within Asia. Venezuela is the least recurring country in extreme events 
in Latin America. We also report the daily return othe day of extreme event (4 or more 
countries coexceed) for all countries in our sample. W  find that, In Asia, Indonesia, Korea, 
Pakistan, Thailand and India have above average negativ  return during negative extreme events. 
In Latin America, Argentina and Mexico have high negative returns during negative extreme 
events. We have also found that the absolute daily return is higher in top tail compared to bottom 
tail both in Asia and Latin America. Moreover, we have found clustering of coexceedances in 
1998 and 2008 for Asia, whereas 1995, 1998 and 2008in Latin America as shown in figure 4.1. 
<please insert table 4.2(b) here> 
Further, we investigate the distribution of coexceedances using Monte Carlo simulations in order 
to understand whether the existence of coexceedances can be explained by conditioning on large 
absolute value returns. To perform this task, we assume that the covariance matrix of returns is 
stationary over the sample period and that the returns follow a multivariate normal distribution. 
Using the observed covariance matrix, we simulate 1000 random realizations of the time series 
of 3784 daily returns for Asian and Latin American countries. For each realization we identify 
the extreme events in the same non-parametric count manner and then take average of all 
realizations. Results are shown in table 4.2(b), wherein we provide the actual and simulated 




that the actual values of extreme events are greater than simulated mean, which indicates the fat-
tail behavior of extreme events. 
<please insert table 4.2(c) here> 
In this discussion, another relevant question would be whether banks have higher interlinkages 
than stock markets in general. As banks are more interconnected in international markets and 
therefore return on country banking indices should be more interdependent than the rest of the 
market, and therefore, we expect that banks have relativ ly more coexceedances than the market 
as a whole. In order to investigate whether the coex e dances in banking indices are in excess of 
the coexceedances in total market indices, we subtract he number of coexceedances in total 
market indices from the number of coexceedances in banking system indices for each daily 
observation in both Asia and Latin America as reported in table 4.2(c). We find that, in Asia, 
there are 520 days when the number of coexceedances i  total market indices is greater than 
coexceedances in banking system indices; whereas 595 days when the number of coexceedances 
in banking indices is greater than coexceedances in total market indices. Similarly, in Latin 
America, 459 days when coexceedances in total market indices are higher; compared to 524 days 
when coexceedances in banking indices are higher. So, in general, we find that there are 
relatively more number of days when coexceedances in banking indices are higher than 
coexceedances in total market indices in both Asia and Latin America. This evidence is 
consistent with our conjecture that banks are more interconnected in the international market and 
hence returns on banking stocks tend to coexceed more than other stocks. Moreover, we have 
included the BIS data related to European and US banks foreign exposure on developing 
countries (that are included in our sample) to show the linkages of banking systems in developed 
and developing world. Please see appendix 2 for evidence on banks’ foreign claims on regional 
countries. 
4.3.2 Common variables 
As we discussed in section 2, stock market volatility is expected to have an influence on regional 
banking system fragility. To investigate this econometrically, we estimate regional stock market 
volatility through indices that are representative of the capitalization of stocks that foreign 
investors can hold. More specifically, we use the Int rnational Finance Corporation (IFC) indices 




International Europe Index for Europe in order to examine stock market volatility in each of 
these regions. For each region, we estimate the conditi al volatility of the respective stock 
indices using a GARCH (1, 1) model of the form: 
    σ,  α  β
ε,
  βσ,
     (1) 
using maximum likelihood, where σ,  represents the conditional variance of the stock market 
index in country c in period t, and ε represents stock market returns in that market. In first 
column of table 4.3, we report the mean and standard eviation of conditional volatility of all 
countries in the region as well as regional conditional volatility over the entire sample period. 
Individual countries conditional volatility is calculated through their respective total market 
stock indices, whereas the regional conditional volatility is computer through IFC indices, S&P 
500 and Datastream International Europe Index as report d earlier. We find that Korea has the 
highest and Sri Lanka has the lowest conditional volatility in Asia. In Latin America, Venezuela 
has the highest and Chile the lowest conditional volatility. At regional level, we find that the 
stock market in Latin America is more volatile with conditional volatility of 23.39 percent 
compared to 21.19 percent in Asia, 15.84 percent in the US and 15.03 percent in Europe.  
<please insert table 4.3 here> 
The second common factor that affects regional banking system fragility is the daily change in 
exchange rate. We calculate the daily change in exchange rate against US dollar for each country 
in Asia and Latin America. In case of the US, we usa basket of four currencies (i.e. GBP, JPY, 
CHF and EUR) to evaluate exchange rate changes. For Eur pe, since EUR and GBP are the two 
major currencies, we take equal-weighted average of EUR and GBP exchange rates changes 
against USD.15 We find that all currencies except Chinese Yuan in Asia and Latin America 
depreciated in our sample period. The most depreciated currency in Asia is Pakistani Rupee 
(0.026% daily) and Venezuelan Bolivar is the highly depreciated currency (0.080% daily) in 
Latin America. We use equal-weighted average of the daily changes in exchange rate of all 
countries in the region to get the regional change i  exchange rate on that particular day. We find 
that Asian currencies, on average, depreciated less compared to currencies in Latin America, 
                                                
15 Since our sample starts from June 1994; therefore, we use country-weighted average of exchange rate against 




whereas, the US dollar and European currencies are appreciated, on average, during the sample 
period.  
Finally, we explore the impact of the interest rate on regional banking system fragility. For 
regional interest rate, we compute equal-weighted average of 1-year interbank interest rate in 
countries within each region.16 We find a high degree of heterogeneity in interest ates across 
countries in Asia and Latin America. In Asia, the lowest interest rate is observed in Taiwan 
(3.938% on average) and highest in Indonesia (13.36% on average). In Latin America, the 
interest rate is 0.498% in Chile and 21.488% in Argentina. At regional level, we find that interest 
rate is higher in Latin America than in Asia.  
<please insert figure 4.2 here> 
Figure 4.2 compares the trend of common factors in the sample period for Asia and Latin 
America. We find that conditional volatility increases significantly in both regions during the last 
two years, which is expected on account of turbulence i  stock markets after the sub-prime crisis. 
The average change in exchange rate remains under 5 p cent for most of time in our sample 
except for the crisis period (Asian crisis 1997 and Argentina crisis 2002). Lastly, we witness a 
general decline in interest rates in both regions till 2004 and then a slight increase during the last 
two years.   
4.3.3 Banking system characteristics 
Banking system fragility may hinge upon various banking characteristics including aggregate 
banking system liquidity, diversity in banking activities, competition in the banking sector and 
the capitalization of the banking system. We evaluate the effect of these banking characteristics 
on regional banking system fragility using annual blance sheet data for banks in each individual 
country from Bankscope.17 We use consolidated banking statements because they are net of 
inter-office transaction between head-office and subsidiaries (inter-office transactions are not 
relevant for solvency of banks). Moreover, in chapter 2 of this thesis we use consolidated 
                                                
16 There exist high correlation between 1-year interbank market rate and policy rates (mainly discount rate but for 
some countries discount rate is not available so then use treasury bills rate as policy rates). The correlation 
coefficient is close to 0.9 for all economies except Chile and Venezuela with correlation coefficient is around 0.7. 
17 From Bankscope, we retrieve data for all banks from 1994 to 2008 for each region. We find that some banks 
report both consolidated and unconsolidated accounts in he bank scope. Therefore, in order to eliminate double 




accounting statements of all reporting financial institutions in Bankscope. If the consolidated 
statement is not available, then we use the unconsolidated/aggregate accounting statement, 
whatever is available. Similarly, if accounting statements are available on both IFRS and Local 
GAAP reporting conventions, then we use the former convention. In order to remain consistent 
we use the same approach in our calculation for aggegate equity in subsequent chapters. These 
variables are available on annual basis; therefore, we use the annual value of the preceding year 
for all daily observations of the current year. More ver, the regional values are calculated by 
averaging individual country level data. For regional banking system characteristics we use the 
ratio of total banking assets of a country to the total banking assets of the region as weight. This 
captures the relative size and strength of a country’s banking system in the region, therefore, the 
bigger the banking system of a country the more influe ce it should have at the banking regional 
level. Also, the large banking systems in the region should be more critical for the resilience of 
the regional banking system. On the other hand, we assign equal weights to macro shocks within 
a region, given that for country macro shocks, inter-country linkages can amplify or moderate the 
impact on the other countries real economy and therefore banking systems. Therefore we do not 
make any specific assumption.  
In order to gauge the effect of banking system liquidity we use a narrow definition of liquidity, 
which is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent assets to total assets. We call this variable 
‘liquidity’ hereafter. We find that banking system in India and Pakistan are holding high cash 
reserve relative to total assets. The cash holdings of India and Pakistan are 12.55 percent and 
11.56 percent of the total assets respectively compared to 2.8 percent on average in Asia. 
Similarly, in Latin America, Venezuela holds 10.6 percent of the total asset as cash or cash 
equivalent compared to regional average of 2.88 percent. Secondly, we evaluate whether banking 
systems that are primarily involved in traditional loan-making activities are more or less prone to 
regional banking system stability. In order to measure the extent to which banks are involved in 
traditional loan-making activities compared to non-traditional activities, we calculate net loans to 
total earning assets for each country and label it as ‘loans’ in our results. We find that net loans 
are about half of the total earning assets in almost all countries; however, the focus on loan-
making activities is slightly higher in Asia (53.96%) compared to Latin America (44.40%). In 
order to measure competition in banking industry, we use the ratio of total assets of biggest five 




‘concentration’ in our analysis. The regional measure of concentration is the weighted average of 
individual country’s concentration measure in the region using banking system total assets as 
relative weights. We find that banking systems in Asia are, on average, relatively more 
concentrated than the ones in Latin America. Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan are among most 
concentrated banking systems in Asia, whereas Peru, Venezuela and Chile are highly 
concentrated banking systems in Latin America. Lastly, the ability of banking systems to absorb 
foreign shocks depends on the degree of capitalization of the banking system. Our measure of 
capital is the total equity that includes common shares and premium; retained earnings; reserves 
for general banking risks and statutory reserves; loss absorbing minority interests; net revaluation 
of AFS securities; FX reserves included in equity and revaluations other than securities deemed 
to be equity capital. We find that banking systems in Asia, on average, maintain low capital to 
total asset ratio compared to Latin America. 
<please insert table 4.4 here> 
Table 4.4 shows the mean and standard deviation for banking characteristics for each country as 
well as at regional level during the whole sample period. We find that Latin America has more 
liquid asset as percentage of total assets compared to Asia. Moreover, Asia focus more on 
traditional banking activities (loan business), higher concentration in banking activities and 
relatively lower capital ratio compared to Latin America at regional level. As far as the time 
dimension is concerned, figure 4.3 shows that there is an increasing trend in liquid asset to total 
asset ratio in both Asia and Latin America. We also observe a decline in traditional banking 
activities (loan business) in both regions over time. There is no particular trend in concentration 
of the banking industry. Lastly, capital ratio has increased from around 8 percent to 10 percent in 
Latin America and hovered around 5 percent in Asia.  
<please insert figure 4.3 here> 
4.4 METHODOLOGY  
The central question in the financial contagion litera ure is whether financial markets become 
more interdependent during a financial crisis. Formally, financial contagion occurs when a shock 
to one country (or a group of countries) results in propagation of the shock to a wide range of 




fundamentals. During the nineties, researchers primarily investigated whether cross-market 
correlation increased significantly during financial crisis (Bertero and Mayer (1990), King and 
Wadhwani (1990), Calvo and Reinhart (1996), Baig and Goldfajn (1999)). Boyer, Gibson and 
Loretan (1999) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) challenge the approach of contagion based on 
structural shifts in correlation. They argue that the estimated correlation coefficient between the 
realized extreme values of two random variables will likely suggest structural change, even if the 
true data generation process has constant correlation. They also point out the biases in tests of 
changes in correlation that do not take into account conditional heteroskedasticity. This 
motivates researchers to study contagion as a nonlinear phenomenon and introduce new 
techniques as for example, markov switching models (Ramchand and Susmel (1998) and Ang 
and Bekaert (2002)); extreme value theory (Longin and Solnik (2001) and Hartmann, Straetmans 
and Vries (2004)); and multinomial logistics model (Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003)). Markov 
switching models provide a consistent model to accomm date structural breaks in variance 
without any ad-hoc determination of the crisis period, but these models fail to converge when a 
number of explanatory variables are included (Abiad (2003)). On the other hand, extreme value 
models study the asymptotic distribution of conditional tail correlation that is characterized by 
very few parameters regardless of actual distribution. But to be asymptotically dependent, the 
random variables must be associated in the very tails of the distribution. Poon, Rockinger and 
Tawn (2004) could not find evidence of asymptotic dependence in daily stock market returns for 
the US, Japan, Germany and France after filtering the series from GARCH effects. An important 
conclusion of this work is that assuming asymptotic dependence can lead to serious 
overestimation of financial risks. Further, extreme value models do not allow control variables 
that are conditional on attributes and characteristics of the extreme events. On the other hand, the 
multinomial logistics models allow for the control variables that are measured with information 
available up to the previous day. These control variables are fundamental in analyzing contagion 
while conditioning the attributes and characteristics of the extreme events.  
We use multinomial logistics models to assess how various banking systems are affected 
simultaneously following an external shock. This methodology has some advantages over 
correlation based methodology. It is focused on coex e dances that basically capture the 
comovement in extreme events (or in other words it reflects the correlation in volatility of 




contagion is based on linear measures of association for macroeconomic or financial markets 
events. There is ample evidence that crises increase both correlation and volatility (see Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) for references), but correlation is a linear measure of dependence. In fact, 
extreme bad event leads to irrational outcomes, excess volatility and even panics; therefore, 
correlations based on linear association fails to capture these effects. Moreover, correlation gives 
equal weights to small and large returns; however, anecdotal evidences suggest that investors in 
panic like situation tend to behave irrationally while ignoring economic fundamentals and 
blindly following the market trends (i.e. large negative returns are more contagious than small 
negative returns). In short, correlation that gives same weight to large and small negative returns 
does not reflect the true market phenomenon. In fact, if extreme bad event lead to irrational 
outcomes, excess volatility and even panics; correlations based on linear association fail to 
capture these effects. Our study overcomes this problem. It focuses on coexceedances that 
basically capture the comovement in extreme events. 
We are mainly interested in evaluating the determinants of banking system fragility in a region. 
We define fragility as the number of coexceedances in that region. A higher number of 
coexceedances (i.e. joint occurrences of extreme negativ  returns in banking indices) reflect 
more banking system fragility. Therefore, the dependent variable in our model is the number of 
coexceedances of banking systems in a region on a given day, which is a count variable. Given 
the evidence and arguments in Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and Gropp and Moerman (2004), 
we use a multinomial logistics model to explain thenumber of coexceedances in one region (the 
number of banking systems simultaneously in the tail) s a function of banking system 
characteristics while controlling for macro shocks. We also use the number of coexceedances in 
other regions (to capture cross-regional contagion effect) in our models. The general multinomial 
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where  is the vector of covariates and  the vector of coefficients associated with the 
covariates,   is a logistic distribution and ! is the number of categories in the multinomial 
model. The model is estimated using maximum log-likelihood function for a sample of "
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where '( is an indicator variable whose value is equal to 1 if the ,-. observation falls /-. 
category and 0 otherwise. In our case, we have five cat gories i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 or more 
banking systems coexceed in a region. Following the convention we define category 0 (i.e. no 
banking system exceed on a given day) as the base category and all coefficients are estimated 
relative to this base category. For the simplest case of constants only, we estimate four 
parameters. We introduce additional variable like conditional volatility, exchange rate changes, 
interest rate level, bank liquidity, diversity, conce tration and capital ratio etc. in various models. 
But for each additional variable introduced in the model, we need to estimate four additional 
parameters. Moreover, the coefficients from discrete choice models are difficult to interpret, 
therefore, we report marginal effect that are obtained by differentiated the probability for each 
outcome with respect to unit change in independent covariate on a given day being evaluated at 
unconditional mean value of the independent variables. Since marginal effects in non-linear 
models are different for each set of data points in explanatory, we need to be careful in making 
inferences based on single set of observations (see Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) for recent 
discussion on this issue). The marginal effect can sometimes even change signs; therefore, we 
compute the response of probability measures to the full range on values of independent 
variables. The sum of probabilities of all five categories must equal to 1 and we show the 
responses of probabilities across whole range of independent variables through “coexceedances 
response curve”. 
In order to evaluate the cross-border contagion across egions, we introduce the number of 
coexceedances in other region as an independent variable. After controlling for the common 
shocks, a positive impact of coexceedances in other region would signal cross-regional 
contagion. We further investigate whether banking characteristics in the host region help in 
alleviating cross-regional contagion. We do this through interaction of the banking 
characteristics with the coexeedances in other regions.  
4.5 RESULTS 
We evaluate the state of banking system fragility in a region through the number of 




extreme negative returns in banking indices) reflect more banking system fragility. In section 3 
we reported the number of coexceedances in Asia and L tin America. We now assess how 
banking system characteristics and macro factors affect the occurrence of such coexceedances. 
We also explore the extent of contagion within region and across regions. Lastly, we investigate 
what makes it more likely that an individual country will experience extreme negative returns 
together with other countries.  
<please insert table 4.5 here> 
Table 4.5 provides estimation results of the number of coexceedances within a region with macro 
control covariates using a multinomial logistic model. The left panel provides estimates for Asia 
and the right panel shows results for Latin America. In the first column we report the number of 
negative coexceedances and relative frequencies. Since there are no covariates, the relative 
frequencies represent the probabilities of the respective outcomes. We find that during our 
sample time period there is a probability of 65.99% that no Asian country has extreme negative 
return on a given day, whereas the extreme event when 4 or more countries coexceed has a 
probability of 1.45%.  Latin America, where negative extreme returns are relatively low, has 
slightly higher probability of no exceedances (i.e. 74 84%) and relatively lower probability of 4 
or more coexceedances (i.e. 1.06%). We should be cautious with comparing the number of 
coexceedances in Asia and Latin America as the number of countries included in our analysis is 
different for the two regions (i.e., we have 10 countries from Asia and 7 countries from Latin 
America). Moreover, we find that the joint occurrenc s of extreme negative returns are clustered 
in the period of financial crisis (i.e. Asia crisis in 1998 and sub-prime crisis in 2008).  
4.5.1 Effect of common factors on regional banking system fragility 
A higher number of coexceedances reflect banking system fragility, but in this section we try to 
explain banking system fragility through changes in common covariates. In relation to whether 
volatility drives coexceedances, our regressions in table 4.5, show that conditional volatility is 
one of the determinants of coexceedances. We add conditional volatility at the regional level as a 
common covariate. The results are shown as ‘Model 1’ for each region in table 4.5. We find that 
an increase in the conditional volatility significantly increases the probability of all exceedances 
in all regions and the effect decreases for higher number of joint occurrences. Moreover, we find 




to the fact that we are focusing on banking indices that are more volatile compared to general 
stock market indices. We find that a 1 standard deviation increase in conditional volatility (see 
table 4.3 for the magnitude of standard deviation) ncreases the probability of 1 exceedance by 
0.046% and the probability of four or more coexceedances by 0.009% in Asia. All the partial 
derivatives are significant at 1% level and pseudo-R2 is 4.37%. Similarly, in Latin America, 1 
standard deviation increase in conditional volatility increase the probability of 1 exceedance by 
0.028% and the probability of four or more coexceedances by 0.004%. All marginal probabilities 
are significant at 1% level and pseudo-R2 is 4.08%. It shows that the economic significance of 
the effect of conditional volatility on joint occurrences of extreme negative returns is much 
higher in Asia compared to other regions.  
The exchange rate mechanism and monetary policy conditi s (being translated through interest 
rate level) are crucial elements for banking system stability. We include the average exchange 
rate change in the region and the average interest rate level in the region as independent variables 
to check the significance of these variables on banking system fragility. More specifically, we 
test the hypothesis that the fall in domestic currenci s and higher interest rate level, on average, 
indeed lead to more coexeedances in the region. The estimates are shown as ‘Model 2’ in table 
4.5. We find that currency depreciation aggravates banking system fragility in all regions; 
however, the economic magnitude of currency depreciation is much higher in emerging regions 
(Asia and Latin America). We find that 1 standard deviation fall in domestic currency value 
would increase the probability of 1 exceedance by 0.018% and 0.025% in Asia and Latin 
America. Similarly, for the extreme event of four or more coexceedances, a 1 standard deviation 
increase in average exchange rate in the region would increase the probability by 0.003% and 
0.001% in Asia and Latin America respectively. Also, tight monetary policy in the region tends 
to deteriorate banks’ balance sheets.  Therefore, we would expect that higher level of interest 
rates increases the probability of joint occurrences of negative extreme returns in banking 
indices. Our results are in line with our expectations in Asia and Latin America. In terms of 
economic magnitude, we find that 1 standard deviation increase in interest rate level increases 
the probability of 1 exceedance by 0.032% and 0.027% in Asia and Latin America respectively. 
It increases the probability of four or more coexceedances by 0.004% and 0.001% in Asia and 




interest rate level increases the pseudo-R2 from 4.37% and 4.08% to 6.58% and 5.55% in Asia 
and Latin America respectively.  
In sum, we find that an increase in regional conditional stock market volatility, a fall in 
currencies and a rise in interest rate levels significantly increase banking system fragility in Asia 
and Latin America. In terms of economic significance, we find that banking system fragility in 
Asia has been affected most by these covariates. Moreover, we find that the common variables 
collectively explain very little variation of joint occurrences of extreme negative return in less 
developed regions (pseudo-R2: 6.58% and 5.55% in Asia and Latin America respectively). 
Moreover, we find that the effect of common shocks on regional banking system fragility has the 
same directions as we find in Bae at al (2003); however, the magnitude of the marginal effects 
are different for banking coexceedances and total market coexceedances. More specifically, by 
comparing our results with Bae et al (2003) results that use coexceedances in total market 
indices, we find that the marginal effects of conditional volatility and exchange rate are higher 
for total market indices (Bae et al (2003)); whereas, the marginal effect of interest rate is higher 
on banking system fragility compared to total market indices.  
4.5.2 Effect of banking system characteristics on regional banking system fragility 
The central question of this chapter is whether the regional banking system characteristics matter 
in safeguarding banking system stability. In particular, we assess the role of banking system 
liquidity, diversification in banking activities, competition in the banking industry and 
capitalization of the banking system. These characte istics are obtained from banks’ balance 
sheets on an annual basis and we repeat the values of the preceding year in all daily observations 
in the current year. We include these regional banking system characteristics in our multinomial 
logistic regressions and also control for the effect of common macro factors. We use the number 
of coexceedances in the region as dependent variable nd introduce banking system 
characteristics one by one in successive models while controlling for common macro factors. For 
reasons mentioned earlier, we are more interested in the analysis of banking system fragility in 
emerging markets of Asia and Latin America. In table 4.6 we report our estimation results, 
wherein panel (a) provides estimates for Asia and panel (b) shows results for Latin America.  




4.5.2.1 Aggregate Banking System Liquidity 
In Subsection 2.2., we have argued that banking system liquidity serves as a buffer against 
liquidity shocks. A reasonable level of aggregate banking system liquidity is important for 
individual banks to get funds from the market without paying extraordinary premiums. This also 
discourages parking of funds for short-term benefits and improves market-participants resilience 
on interbank activities. Resultantly, this improves the efficiency of interbank market at country 
and regional level, thus reduces the chances of coexceedances. We test this hypothesis by 
investigating whether the banking system liquidity significantly affects the probability of joint 
occurrences of extreme negative returns. We use a narrow definition of liquidity that includes 
cash and cash equivalent as percentage of total assets (we label it as ‘narrow liquidity’ in our 
analysis). In model 1 of table 4.6, we report the effect of the narrow liquidity on joint 
occurrences of extreme negative return while controlling for all common macro factors. We find 
that a higher liquidity significantly reduces the probability of coexceedances in all regions. But 
the effect decreases in magnitude for a higher number of coexceedances. Moreover, the effect in 
Latin America, in comparison to Asia, is higher for1 exceedance but is lower for 2 or more 
coexceedances. Our results are in line with Karas, Schoors and Lanine (2008) argument that 
availability of liquid assets at aggregate level can effectively mitigate coordination failures in the 
interbank market and ensure financial stability. More specifically, we find that 1 standard 
deviation increase in liquidity of banking system decrease the probability of 1 exceedance by 
1.713% and 3.221% in Asia and Latin America respectiv ly. The same change decreases the 
probability of 4 or more coexceedances by 0.443% and 0.276% in Asia and Latin America 
respectively. With the inclusion of liquidity of banking system, the pseudo-R2 has increased to 
from 6.5% and 5.5% to 8% and 7% in Asia and Latin America respectively. We also check the 
robustness of our results employing a broader definition of liquid assets (that includes cash and 
cash equivalents, listed securities, treasury bills, other bills, bonds and equity investments). We 
label it as ‘broader liquidity’. We find that bankig systems in Latin America, on average, are 
more liquid compared to banking systems in Asia. Liquid assets represent 32 percent of total 
assets in Latin America and 21 percent in Asia. Theeff ct of broader liquidity on regional 
banking system fragility is significant for up to 3 coexceedances in Asia and up to 2 




because Asian banking systems have relatively high securities investments that are volatile 
during period of market turbulences and raise the probability of extreme low returns. 
4.5.2.2 Diversification in Banking Activities 
Prior research provides significant evidence for a ‘diversification discount’, which means that 
financial conglomerates have lower market value than if those conglomerates were broken down 
into financial intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities (Laeven and Levine 
(2007)). Moreover, banking system stability reduces when banks engage in non-traditional 
activities in addition to their core commercial banking activities (De Jonghe (2010)). Noninterest  
income, particularly trading, is quite  volatile  and  the  correlation  between  net  interest  income  
and  noninterest income is rising as product  lines blur  and  banks  increasingly  substitute  
nontraditional sources of income for interest  income. This means  that  the banking  industry 
may not realize the reduction in volatility and risk that some are expecting (Stiroh (2004)). 
Therefore, it is argued that specialization in traditional activities results in lower systemic 
banking risk. In that sense, financial conglomeration is unable to reduce systemic risk similar to 
Wagner (2006) theory that diversification reduces risk at individual institution level, but from the 
financial system’s point of view it just reallocate risks among institutions within the financial 
system and tend to expose each institution to the same external shocks.  
In our analysis, we started with the Laeven and Levine (2007) measure of diversity in banking 
activities in our multinomial logistics model. We label it as ‘asset diversity’ in our analysis. They 
define asset diversity as follows: 
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where other earning assets include securities and investments and total earning assets is the sum 
of net loans and other earning assets. This measure can take values between 0 and 1 with higher 
values indicating greater diversification. In the extr me case with net loans equal to other earning 
assets, this measure is equal to 1 representing full diversification. On the other extreme, the no 
diversification case is a bit tricky as the measure takes 0 values when the banking system is 
either completely specialized in loan activities or issues no loans at all. In short, the measure 
gives the overall level of diversification in bankig activities but does not provide information 




concept of financial conglomerate has tremendously increased the scope of financial services that 
banks offer nowadays. This measure gives diverging results in our analysis. We find that a 
higher degree of asset diversity reduces the probability of coexceedances in Asia, and increases 
the probability of coexceedances in Latin America (model 2, table 4.6). These diverging results 
are not necessarily surprising because this measure, in the case of low diversification, is unable 
to differentiate whether a banking system concentrates on loan-making activities or other 
activities. Our conjecture for the different signs of asset diversity measure in Asia and Latin 
America is that banking systems in Asia are more center d on loan-making business than in 
Latin America. We already reported that Asian banking systems, on average, have higher net 
loans relative to other earning assets (i.e. 54 percent of total earning assets); whereas banking 
systems in Latin America, on average, have lower net loans relative to other earning assets (i.e. 
44 percent of total earning assets). Therefore, it can be argued that banking systems in Latin 
America are relatively less involved in loan-making activities, so further diversification tends to 
increase loan making activities and thus increase the likelihood of a banking system being in the 
bottom tail. Therefore, based on our findings, we cannot support the argument that 
diversification tends to increase banking system fragility when banks have low net loans 
compared to total earning assets. But our findings are based on regional analysis, while other 
studies use country level data to corroborate that traditional banking activities result in lower 
systemic banking risk.  
As an alternative to the asset diversity measure suggested by Laeven and Levine (2007), we use 
loan to total earning assets ratio as a proxy for banks’ focus on traditional loan-making activities 
(i.e. level of diversification).We label it as ‘loan-ratio’ in our analysis.  In that sense, it is 
expected that an increase in loan making activities as percentage of total earning assets would 
reduce the probability of fragility in the financial system. In model 2A of table 4.6, we report the 
effect of diversification in a particular region on the joint occurrences of extreme negative 
returns in that region. We find that an increasing focus on traditional loan making activities 
increase the likelihood of a single country exceeding. However, it has no significant impact on a 
higher number of coexceedances. Wagner (2006) further argues that similarities among financial 
institutions unambiguously raises the likelihood of systemic crisis because a shock that 
previously affect only a small part of the financial system, now affecting a large portion of the 




similarities due to diversification facilitates contagion because the failure of one institution 
increases difficulties for other institutions with similar portfolios. The joint effect can be even 
bigger than the sum of individual effects. To investigate this issue further, we incorporate the 
heterogeneity in focus on banking activities across countries in a region as explanatory variable. 
This heterogeneity is measured through the standard eviation of loan/total earning assets ratio 
across countries for each individual trading day. We label it as ‘country heterogeneity’ in our 
analysis. We find that more heterogeneity in the loan/total earning assets ratio deteriorates 
regional banking system stability in Latin America (model 2B, table 4.6). 
4.5.2.3 Competition in Banking Industry 
Similar to diversification activities, the literature on the effect of banking competition on banking 
system stability is inconclusive. As discussed in Subsection 2.2, two views exist, the 
competition-fragility view and the competition-stability view. One may argue that these views 
are about competition and individual bank stability, but not regional banking system stability. 
Indeed the theory is not specifically about the effect of competition and bank stability at the 
regional level. But what we are doing here is not drastically different from those models. We 
aggregate individual bank behavior at the regional level. If the aggregation is correct, banking 
systems at the regional level should behave as theory predicts.  
Our findings are supportive of the competition-stability view. We gauge competition in banking 
industry through C5 measure of the level of concentration, which is the ratio of total assets of the 
largest five banks to total assets of all banks. We lab l it as ‘concentration’ in our analysis. The 
estimates are shown in model 3 of table 4.6. We find that higher level of concentration in 
banking industry significantly increases the probability of 1 and 2 coexceedances in both Asia 
and Latin America. Moreover, in Latin America, the increase in concentration also increases the 
likelihood of four or more coexceedances. In terms of economic magnitude, we find that 1 
standard deviation increase in concentration will increase the probability of 1 and 2 
coexceedances by 4.106% and 1.012% respectively in As a; and by 4.338% and 0.958% 
respectively in Latin America. These findings are true for both Asia and Latin America, but the 
impact is higher in Latin America. Our support for competition-stability view in Asia and Latin 
America may still be consistent with Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) U-shaped relationship 




identified by Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) tends to dominate in monopolistic markets; whereas 
competition-fragility view dominates in competitive markets. We find that the monopolistic 
market structure in these regions (the five largest banks in the majority of the countries in Asia 
and Latin America hold 60 percent of total assets of the banking system), requires an increase 
competition for banking system stability, but we may be unable to identify the upward leg of the 
U-shaped relationship.   
4.5.2.4 Capitalization of the Banking System 
Bank capital provides a cushion against insolvency at individual bank level. But from a macro 
perspective, the capital adequacy regulations for indiv dual banks fail to incorporate the systemic 
risk on account of correlated portfolio positions i the banking system and potential domino 
effects as a consequence of interbank exposures (Liu and Mello (2008)). With this notion we 
investigate whether regions with a higher aggregate degree of bank capital exhibit less banking 
system fragility. We use the total equity of the region-wide banking system instead of focusing 
on bank capital for each bank. We label it as ‘capitalization’ in our analysis. The results are 
reported as model 4 in table 4.6. We find that greater capital significantly reduces the probability 
of 2 coexceedances in Asia and up to three coexceedanc s in Latin America. However, we do not 
find any significant effect of greater degree of capit lization of the banking system on the 
probability of four or more coexceedances in Asia and Latin America. In sum, it seems that a 
better capitalized system reduces the likelihood of a l wer number of coexceedances. In contrast, 
it does not dampen the likelihood of an extreme number of coexceedances. We also investigate 
whether the heterogeneity in bank capitalization among countries play a role in regional banking 
system fragility. Results are shown as model 4a in table 4.6. In Asia, we find that the 
heterogeneity in bank capitalization across countries would significantly increase the probability 
of banking system fragility in the region. However, in Latin America, there is no significant 
impact of heterogeneity in bank capitalization on regional banking system fragility. 
4.5.2.5 Summary of the Effect of Banking System Characteristics18 
We now summarize the effects of banking system characte istics on regional banking system 
fragility. We find that liquidity of banking system is the most important factor to reduce the 
                                                
18 We are cautious in interpreting these result (whether e deteriorating banking system characteristics in reases the 
probability of coexceedances or higher coexceedances lead to the deterioration of banking system characte istics, the 




probability of coexceedances in all regions, but the effect decreases in magnitude for the higher 
number of coexceedances in Asia and Latin America. The result is consistent with alternative 
definition of liquidity as well. The banking system capital also plays significant role in reducing 
the probability of coexceedances in the region; however, we find that the effect of capitalization 
is more significant in Latin America as compared to Asia. From the industry point of view, our 
findings are supportive of the competition-stability view in the monopolistic market structure in 
Asia and Latin America. We find that increase in competition in banking industry significantly 
reduces the probability joint occurrences of extreme negative return in both regions. The result is 
consistent with Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) argument that competition-stability view is 
dominant in monopolistic market structure. We also find that focus on traditional loan making 
activities though increase the likelihood of single country in bottom tail, but no significant 
impact on joint occurrences of extreme negative returns in multiple countries in the region. The 
inclusion of banking characteristics increases explanatory power of model in all cases, which 
suggest that these characteristics can predict banking system fragility in the region. The pseudo-
R2 is around 0.08 in Asia and 0.07 in Latin America for most of the regressions reported in this 
section.  
4.5.3 Contagion within region and across regions 
We now investigate whether there is any evidence for contagion within region and across 
regions. We define contagion within region as the portion of regional banking system fragility 
(joint occurrences of extreme negative returns) that is not explained by the region’s banking 
system characteristics and common variables. Contagion across regions is the portion of a host 
region’s banking system fragility that is explained by the joint occurrences of extreme negative 
returns in other triggering regions, after controlling for the host region’s common factors and 
banking system characteristics. We capture the impact of cross-regional contagion by including 
the number of coexceedances in the triggering region as an explanatory variable. Its marginal 
change reflects the extent of cross-regional contagion through an increase in probability of joint 
occurrences of extreme negative returns in host region by a unit increase in regional banking 
system fragility in triggering region.  
In table 4.6, we also reported that McFadden pseudo-R2 with our estimations for the effect of 




8% in Asia and 7% in Latin America. This gives some idea that there is a considerable portion of 
joint occurrences of extreme negative return that is not explained by banking characteristics and 
common macro factors together. We find similar evidnce of contagion within region as reported 
in Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) that contagion differs across regions and it is stronger in Latin 
America than in Asia. Moreover, we find that the pseudo-R2 is substantially lower in the 
emerging market regions (Asia and Latin America); therefore, we argue that contagion within 
region is higher in emerging market regions, in general. 
<please insert table 4.7 here> 
For cross-regional contagion, we include the number of coexceedances in the triggering region as 
an explanatory variable. If the coefficients of these variables are positive and significant, after 
controlling for the host region’s banking system characteristics and common macro factors, then 
we interpret this as the evidence of contagion from that particular triggering region. In order to 
evaluate the extent of contagion we take marginal ch nge in coexceedances probabilities of the 
host region with respect to change in coexceedances i  triggering region at the unconditional 
mean of the covariates. Following Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), we use 1 day lag for the US 
and Latin American coexceedances in case of Asia, otherwise all coexceedances are 
contemporaneous. The results are reported in table 4.7. The upper panel reports the contagion 
effect to Asia from coexceedances in other regions. We find significant cross-regional contagion 
in Asia. The contagion effects in Asia from Latin America, Europe and the US are reported as 
Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 respectively. Model 4 reports contagion effect from all triggering 
regions simultaneously. The cross-regional contagion effect is significant at 1 percent level for 
all number of coexceedances when it is triggered from the US; whereas, the contagion triggered 
from Latin America and Europe have significant effect on 2 or more coexceedances in Asia. For 
economic significance, we find that the US, on averg , has the highest contagion effect to Asia. 
Similarly, the contagion effect to Latin America is reported in lower panel of table 4.7. The 
cross-regional contagion from all regions is significant for any number of coexceedances in Latin 
America at 1 percent level. However, the economic ipact is low in case of contagion from Asia 
compared to the US and Europe, which makes sense due to geography and economic ties of 
Latin America with the US and Europe. In short, we find that a significant cross-regional 




effects of Europe and the US on Asia and Latin America are significantly higher compared to the 
effect of Asia and Latin America among themselves. More specifically, in Asia, the marginal 
effect is higher for cross-regional contagion effect from Europe, whereas in Latin America, the 
effect from Europe and the US is almost identical.  
4.5.4 Response curves of the effect of regional and contagion variables on banking system 
fragility 
In line with Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) we analyze “coexceedances response curves” to 
assess the impact of covariates on the probability of coexceedances. These response curves 
provide a complete picture of the effect of changes in covariates on the probability of 
exceedances compared to the above-mentioned partial der vative that are estimated at the means 
of the regressors because the probabilities are not linear functions of the regressors. We examine 
the effect of common/macroeconomic variables on negative coexceedances of banking systems 
in a region. We separately plot the probability of c exceedances as a function of each common 
factor and banking system characteristic over the wole relevant range. These plots permit us to 
better assess how the probability of coexceedances are affected by changes in regressor. The 
different areas of the plot correspond to different coexceedances levels. Plotting the probability 
of exceedance as a function of the regressor over the whole relevant range of the regressor. 
Figure 4.4a and 4.4b provide coexceedances response curv s of Asia for common factors and 
banking system characteristics respectively. Similarly, figure 4.5a and 4.5b show the 
coexceedances response curves for Latin America.  
<please insert figure 4.4 and figure 4.5 here> 
We find that the curves are highly nonlinear that support the use of a multinomial logistic model. 
The increase in conditional volatility strongly increases the probability of all coexceedances 
throughout the continuum both in Asia and Latin America. The exchange rate changes play a 
significant role only if it exceeds a certain threshold level. The subtle increase in exchange rate 
has negligible impact on the probability of coexceedances, whereas the effect on probability of 
coexceedances increases exponentially with the incrase in magnitude of exchange rate changes. 
Lastly, the increase in interest rate level has almost a linear effect on the probability of 
coexceedances. As far as the magnitude is concerned, we find that only higher interest rate level 




characteristics, we find that aggregate liquidity will reduce the probability of all coexceedances 
in the entire range in Asia and Latin America. We observe a flat curve for the effect of banking 
system capitalization in Asia; whereas in Latin America, it will significantly reduce the 
probability of coexceedances. The non-linearity in coexceedance curve is due to the probability 
response of changes in common factors are dependent upo  the current level of the common 
factors. This is important because the banking system fragility is an extreme event and the effect 
of macro factors under extreme condition is not thesame as it could be under normal 
circumstances.      
4.5.5 Banking characteristic in host region and cross-regional contagion 
We reported earlier that contagion within region has higher likelihood in emerging market 
regions than in developed regions. The next interesing question to ask is whether the banking 
system characteristics in emerging market regions have any influence on the cross-regional 
contagion effect. We specifically investigate whether the host region’s level of aggregate 
liquidity, diversification, competition, and capital zation dampen cross-regional contagion. We 
expect that higher liquidity and capitalization of the host region provide better support against 
cross-regional contagion; whereas the effect of diversification in banking activities and 
competition in banking industry on cross-regional contagion is ambiguous. In order to test 
econometrically, we extend our multinomial logistic model of cross-regional contagion with 
interactions of the cross-regional contagion variable and the host region’s banking system 
characteristics in successive models.  
The measurement of interaction effect in nonlinear models is not straightforward as Ai and 
Norton (2003) argue that it is not equal to the marginal effect of interaction term. They provide 
an alternative measure, but the magnitude of interac ion effect as well as its standard error is 
different for every data point and is generally nonzero even for a model with no interaction term. 
This makes it impossible to draw an overall statistical inference for the sample using the Ai and 
Norton measure (Greene (2010)). Similarly, there is a disagreement among applied 
econometricians about interpretation of the interaction effect. Some use interaction term 
coefficient alone to draw inference about interactive effect while others find it incorrect. They 
argue that the cross partial derivative of the probability of occurrence with respect to interacted 




coefficient. However, Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) show that this sign flip results from a 
mechanical saturation effect that, in many cases, is of no importance to researchers primarily 
concerned with proportional, rather than absolute marginal effects.  For such researchers, the 
interaction term coefficient provides a more meaningful measure of interactive effects than does 
the cross-partial derivative of the probability itself.   
<please insert table 4.8 here> 
Hence we report both the interaction term coefficient as well as the Ai and Norton (2003) 
measure without going into technical complexities. The upper panel of table 4.8 reports the 
results for Asia, whereas the lower panel provides evidence for Latin America when including 
interaction terms between contagion and regional host banking system characteristics. In general, 
we find that banking system characteristics in Asia tend to affect the magnitude of cross-region 
contagion when it is triggered from Latin America and Europe; whereas in Latin America, 
banking characteristics will affect the magnitude of cross-regional contagion from the US only. 
Moreover, liquidity and capitalization in the host region have more significant affect on the 
magnitude of cross-regional contagion compared to diversification and concentration. For 
example, aggregate liquidity (narrow) and capitalization in Asia will reduce the magnitude of the 
cross-regional contagion effect from Latin America; however, the interaction effects are 
statistically significant for 1 and 4 banking system coexceedances in Asian region. Moreover, 
diversity and concentration will significantly reduce the magnitude of cross-regional contagion 
effect from Europe. For Latin America, we find that a higher liquidity (cash) and capitalization 
will significantly reduce the magnitude of cross-regional contagion from the US.  
In order to evaluate the behavior of interaction effect over the entire range of explanatory 
variable we construct the Ai and Norton (2003) measure (See appendix 1 for the details of Ai 
and Norton (2003) interaction effects and how to read their graphs). We construct a binary 
dependent variable that has value 1 when 2 or more coexceedances occur in the host region else 
0. We check the interaction effects of all possible combinations of banking system characteristics 
and cross-regional contagion variables, but for the sake of brevity we report only significant 
interactions effects using graphs in figure 4.6. Wefind that the graphical evidence though 
support our earlier conclusion about the effect of banking system characteristics on the 




probabilities of cross-regional contagion from triggering region to host region. This implies that 
when there is a strong likelihood of cross-regional contagion then banking system characteristics 
in the host region fail to affect its magnitude. More specifically, we find that liquidity in Asia 
will reduce the magnitude of cross-regional contagion effect from Latin America; whereas 
diversity and concentration will reduce the magnitude of cross-regional contagion effect from 
Europe (see panel (a) of figure 4.6). For Latin America, we find that banking system 
characteristics (liquidity, concentration and capitlization) will reduce the magnitude of cross-
regional contagion effect from the US only (see panel (b) of figure 4.6).  
<please insert figure 4.6 here> 
4.5.6 Do individual country banking characteristics matter? 
Acknowledging the fact that banking system stability at country level is as important as regional 
banking system stability, we investigate what banking system characteristics and/or common 
macro variables influence the likelihood of an indivi ual country to be part of a coexceedance. 
For this analysis, we construct a binary dependent variable whose value is 1 when the country 
also coexceed with at least one other country in the region; else the binary dependent variable 
takes value 0. We use the same set of independent variables (macro variables as well as banking 
characteristics) as before but now these variables ar  observed both at country level and at the 
regional level. We use a probit model to estimate th  probability of a country being part of 
coexeedances and control for common variables and bking characteristics at regional level. 
The upper panel of table 4.9 presents results for Asia and the lower panel shows results for Latin 
America. We find that the effect of common variables at country level is similar to the effect at 
regional level but their economic magnitude is much smaller.19  
<please insert table 4.9 here> 
In Asia, we find that aggregate liquidity20 is the most important factor that reduces the 
probability of an individual country to coexceed provided other countries are already 
coexceeding on a particular day. The results are consistent with aggregate liquidity both at 
regional level and at country level. Apart from aggregate liquidity, a higher level of banking 
                                                
19 We do not report these results for the sake of brevity. 




system capital at country level also significantly reduces the probability of that country’s 
coexceedance even though regional banking system capitalization is insignificant. Moreover, we 
find that the concentration in banking industry at country level reduces the probability of that 
country to be included in the joint occurrence of extr me low returns. This is different from our 
earlier result that supports competition-stability view at regional level. At country level, our 
results are in favor of competition-fragility view that intense competition among banking 
institutions in a country will increase the chances of that country to be included among the 
countries have joint extreme negative return on a particular day. On the other hand, the emphasis 
on loan-making activities at regional level increas the probability of individual country to 
coexceed when other countries have joint occurrence of extreme low returns.  
In Latin America, we find that increase in aggregat liquidity and/or banking system 
capitalization at regional and country level significantly reduce the probability of an individual 
country to coexceed with at least one another country i  the region. The concentration in banking 
industry though significant at both regional and country level, but has opposite signs. We find 
that higher concentration at regional level increase the likelihood of an individual country to be 
part of the countries that have joint extreme negative returns, but at the country level it reduces 
the likelihood in similar fashion as in Asia. Regarding diversification, we find that the increase in 
focus on traditional loan-making activities at country level has a significant positive effect on 
probability of an individual country to coexceed with others in the region. This result is different 
from the incidence of significant positive effect of the same variable, but at regional level in 
Asia.    
<please insert table 4.10 here> 
Beside factors within region, we also explore whether the cross-regional contagion effect can 
influence the likelihood of an individual country to coexceed. To achieve this task we introduce 
cross-regional contagion effect through binary variable whose value is 1 when two or more 
countries coexceed in the triggering region. Table 4.10 reports cross-regional contagion effect 
from triggering region in Asia and Latin America. We find that contagion effects in Asia are 
statistically significant at 1 percent from all triggering regions, but the economic significance is 
minimal in case of the United States. However, the contagion effect from the US is statistically 




4. Similarly, in lower panel, we find that contagion effects in Latin America from all triggering 
regions are also significant at 1 percent level. Moreover, the contagion effect from all triggering 
regions remain significant at 1 percent level even when they are included simultaneously in 
model 4. 
4.6 ROBUSTNESS 
In this section we analyze the robustness of earlier analysis using alternative model 
specifications. First, we check robustness of our dependent variable using alternative measures 
for regional banking system fragility. In our initial analysis we define banking system fragility 
through the number of coexceedances in the region on a particular day. We have five categories 
that are 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 or more; which represents the number of countries having joint extreme 
negative returns on that day. Higher number of coexe dances is thus referred to more fragile 
regional banking system. Due to the nature of our dependent variable we use multinomial 
logistics model. Now let assume that we are not interested in actual number of coexceedances on 
a particular day; rather we are interested in the qu stion whether regional banking system is 
stable or fragile under given values of common factors and banking system characteristics. We 
construct a binary variable with value 1 when 2 or more countries coexceed in the region 
(represents fragility of regional banking system) else 0 (represents stability in regional banking 
system). For this analysis we use probit model with the same set of independent variables. We 
find that all common variables and banking characteristics significantly affect the probability of 
banking system fragility in the region. We report es imation results in table 4.11, wherein it is 
evident that conditional stock market volatility, currency depreciation, and increase in interest 
rate level will increase the probability of regional banking system fragility in Asia and Latin 
America. Similarly, we find that the increase in aggregate liquidity and competition will reduce 
the probability of regional banking system fragility n both regions; whereas capitalization will 
diminish the probability of regional banking system fragility in Latin America only. 
Diversification in banking activities fails to affect the probability of banking system fragility in 
any region. We also investigate the cross-regional contagion and results are reported in table 
4.12. Once again we find that both Asia and Latin America are affected significantly by cross-
regional contagion from all other regions. The economic magnitude of cross-regional contagion 





<please insert table 4.11 and table 4.12 here> 
Second, we check robustness with respect to our measur  of cross-regional contagion. In our 
previous analysis, we follow Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and use the number of 
coexceedances in triggering region as contagion indicator. But we have multiple countries from 
Asia and Latin America; whereas the US and Europe are treated as single entities. Resultantly, 
we have different cross-regional contagion variable for emerging market regions (Asia and Latin 
America have variable with values from 0 to 4) and developed regions (the US and Europe have 
binary variable). In order to be consistent among all cross-regional contagion variable we 
construct a binary cross-regional contagion variable for Asia and Latin America, whose value is 
1 when 2 or more countries coexceed, else 0. We use this indicator variable to re-investigate the 
cross-regional contagion that is triggered from Asia or Latin America in multinomial logistics 
model and results are reported as ‘2 or more coexceedances’ in table 4.13. We find that cross-
regional contagion that is triggered from Asia or Latin America is significant for all number of 
coexceedance in the host region. In terms of economic magnitude we find that cross-regional 
contagion has the highest effect on 2 coexceedances i  host region. Alternatively, we construct a 
binary variable for Asia and Latin America directly from regional banking indices through 
Datastream (a similar approach is used for the construction of binary variable for the US and 
Europe). This variable has value 1 when daily total m rket return lies below 5th percentile on a 
particular day. The cross-regional contagion through this binary variable is reported as ‘Regional 
Index’ in table 4.13. We find that cross-regional contagion effect is robust to all specifications of 
indicator variables. 
<please insert table 4.13 here> 
4.7 CONCLUSION  
In this chapter we investigate regional banking system fragility and explore contagion within and 
across regions. We define regional banking system fragility through the number of joint 
occurrences of extreme negative returns in banking system indices. We use common macro 
variables and banking system characteristics as explanatory variables of regional banking system 
fragility. We find that an increase in regional conditional stock market volatility, a fall in 
currencies and a rise in interest rates significantly i crease banking system fragility in Asia and 




system liquidity is the most important factor to reduce the probability of coexceedances in all 
regions, but the effect decreases in magnitude for the higher number of coexceedances. The 
banking system capital also plays significant role in reducing the probability of coexceedances in 
the region; however, we find that the effect of capitalization is more significant in Latin America 
as compared to Asia. Regarding the impact of banking competition, we find that an increase in 
competition significantly reduces the probability of j int occurrences of extreme negative returns 
in both regions. Furthermore, we find that a focus on traditional loan making activities though 
increase the likelihood of a single country in the bottom tail, has no significant impact on joint 
occurrences of extreme negative returns in multiple countries in the region. 
We also explore contagion within and across regions. We define contagion within region as the 
portion of regional banking system fragility (joint occurrences of extreme negative returns) that 
is not explained by the region’s banking system characteristics and common variables. We find 
similar evidence of contagion within region as reported in Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) that 
contagion differs across regions and it is stronger in Latin America than in Asia. Moreover, we 
find that the pseudo-R2 is substantially lower in the emerging market regions (Asia and Latin 
America); therefore, we argue that contagion within region is higher in emerging market regions, 
in general, compared to developed regions. For cross-regional contagion, we find that, in Asia, 
the effect is significant at the 1 percent level for all number of coexceedances when it is triggered 
from the US, whereas contagion triggered from Latin America and Europe have significant effect 
on 2 or more coexceedances. In terms of economic magnitude, in Asia, the cross-regional 
contagion effect that is triggered from the US is highest.  In Latin America, the cross-regional 
contagion effect from all regions is significant for any number of coexceedances at 1 percent 
level. However, the economic significance is low in the case of contagion from Asia compared to 
the US and Europe. In short, we find that cross-regional contagion is significant but differs in 
magnitude across regions. The cross-contagion effects of Europe and the US on Asia and Latin 
America are significantly higher compared to the effect of Asia and Latin America among 
themselves.  
We also explore whether banking system characteristics in emerging market regions have any 
influence on the cross-regional contagion effect. We find that aggregate liquidity significantly 




Banking concentration significantly reduces the contagion effect from Europe in Asia, but it 
increases contagion-effect from the US in Latin America. Asset diversity reduces cross-regional 
contagion effect from Europe in Asia only. Capitaliz t on works only in Latin America in 
reducing contagion effect from the US.  
Lastly, we investigate what banking system characteistics and/or common macro variables 
influence the likelihood of an individual country to coexceed when other countries in the region 
have joint occurrences of extreme negative returns. We find that aggregate liquidity and banking 
system capitalization significantly reduces the probability of that country’s coexceedances in 
both Asia and Latin America.  
A natural conclusion of this research for policy makers is that the policy coordination at the 
regional level is needed to ensure financial stabili y in the global framework of multinational 
financial conglomerates. Banks are the most fragile institutions in the financial industry and their 
instability is most costly because of the interlinkages with other banks and the real sector of the 
region. Therefore, central banks that are responsible for monetary and financial stability to 
ensure sustainable economic growth, should cautiously evaluate economic and banking 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHN -4.69% 19 17 41 113 2497 2451 121 45 17 7 7.32%
KOR -7.40% 28 34 54 74 2497 2451 78 61 27 24 7.42%
PHL -4.16% 33 31 54 72 2497 2451 89 57 21 23 3.35%
TWN -4.66% 30 26 42 92 2497 2451 109 47 16 18 5.52%
INA -5.74% 25 22 53 90 2497 2451 97 56 23 14 6.83%
IND -7.77% 29 22 52 87 2497 2451 84 57 26 23 10.07%
MAL -4.21% 35 41 55 59 2497 2451 74 59 28 29 5.29%
PAK -7.18% 11 18 38 123 2497 2451 100 58 20 12 5.43%
SRI -3.87% 12 8 43 127 2497 2451 115 55 14 6 3.70%
THA -6.06% 38 33 48 71 2497 2451 76 57 27 30 8.58%
Total -5.57% 55 84 240 908 2497 2451 943 276 73 41 6.35%
0
ARG -7.07% 33 29 41 87 2832 2744 102 55 16 17 8.39%
BRA -4.91% 33 30 48 79 2832 2744 97 56 19 18 6.25%
CHI -3.34% 25 17 39 109 2832 2744 103 55 16 16 4.30%
COL -4.00% 19 17 41 113 2832 2744 136 39 7 8 4.03%
MEX -6.28% 32 23 44 91 2832 2744 121 38 17 14 6.87%
PER -3.66% 24 15 39 112 2832 2744 122 41 13 14 3.74%
VEN -4.67% 11 13 38 128 2832 2744 148 34 5 3 3.94%
Total -4.85% 40 48 145 719 2832 2744 829 159 31 21 5.36%
Number of Negative Coexceedances Number of Positive Coexceedances
Table 4.2(a): Coexceedances in Banking Indices   
The dataset consist of 3784 daily returns from each country during the sample period (July 01, 1994 to December 31, 2008). 
When daily returns are sorted in ascending order, th  lowest five percent data points correspond to Negative coexceedances and 
highest five percent are labeled as Positive coexceedances. Coexceedance represents the joint occurrenes of coexceedances 
across countries by day. A 0 coexceedance means no country exceed on that day in the whole region. Similarly, any number (1, 
2, …n; where n is the total number of countries in the region) of coexceedances can be observed on a given day. We report 
negative (left panel) and positive (right panel) coexceedances separately. For example, in Asia, therear  2497 days when no 
country has negative coexceedance but it is possible that a number of countries have positive coexceedances during those days. 
We have stratified the number of coexceedances into four groups (1, 2, 3, and >=4). At the bottom of each block, the total 
number of days is reported for each number of coexce dance. For example, out of 3784 trading days, we hav  observed 908 
days when only 1 country negatively exceeds in Asia. S milarly, we find 240 days when 2 countries coexceed (negative) and 55 
days when 4 or more countries coexceed in Asia. Within each region, we also mention how often a particular country exceeds. 
For instance, we find that China is the only country on 113 days out of 908 days when 1 country has lowest extreme return. 
Similarly, there are 19 days out of 55 days when China is among those 4 or more countries that have joint occurrences of 
negative coexceedances. The first (last) column gives mean returns when 4 or more countries have negativ  (positive) 
coexceedance. The bottom row ‘Total’ provide mean return irrespective of which countries are included, whereas numbers 
associated with country are mean return of that particular country when it is among those 4 or more countries. For example, in 
Asia, the average daily return of all countries in those 55 days is -5.57 percent. Whereas, the average d ily return for China in 







>=4 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 >=4
Panel A: Asia
Actual 55 84 240 908 2497 2451 943 276 73 41
Multivariate Normality 0
Simulated Mean 19.38 70.31 289.64 1020.09 2385.06 2385.26 1019.65 289.81 70.52 18.76
Standard Deviation 5.62 7.25 14.10 26.01 15.69 15.27 25.04 13.27 7.35 5.48
5th Quantile 10 59 267 980 2358 2361 979 268 59 10
95th Quantile 31 83 313 1067 2410 2411 1062 313 83 31
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.405 0.245 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Latin America
Actual 40 48 145 719 2832 2744 829 159 31 21
Multivariate Normality
Simulated Mean 6.68 35.57 181.39 825.88 2734.48 2734.42 826.27 180.94 35.54 6.83
Standard Deviation 3.48 5.41 11.18 21.51 12.41 12.54 21.28 10.88 5.45 3.56
5th Quantile 2 27 162 790 2714 2714 791 164 27 2
95th Quantile 13 44 200 862 2755 2756 861 200 45 13
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.397 0.973 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Negative (co-)exceedances Number of Positive (co-)exceedances
Table 4.2(b): Monte Carlo Evidence on Coexceedances in Banking Indices  
Table 4.2(b) presents Monte Carlo evidence on the distribution of coexceedances in banking indices using covariance matrix 


























Table 4.2(c): Frequency distribution of the number of excess coexceedance in banki g relative to total market indices 
Excess exceedances in baking indices are measured by subtracting the number of coexceedances in total market indices from 
the number of coexceedances in banking system indices for each daily observation in both Asia and Latin America. Each 










% Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
CHN 29.289 13.844 -0.006 0.056 4.345 3.093
KOR 33.741 18.996 0.016 0.959 7.619 3.678
PHL 21.974 6.977 0.017 0.561 10.370 3.820
TWN 24.230 6.969 0.006 0.304 3.938 2.075
INA 23.034 8.617 0.012 0.283 8.392 2.630
IND 26.331 11.182 0.011 0.876 13.361 7.504
MAL 18.157 12.171 0.011 0.659 4.785 2.225
PAK 26.635 9.733 0.026 0.436 9.600 3.909
SRI 17.617 20.879 0.022 0.257 13.319 3.721
THA 27.627 9.358 0.012 0.606 9.191 3.145
Asia 21.188 9.949 0.013 0.226 8.492 2.838
ARG 24.744 8.816 0.043 1.667 21.488 22.034
BRA 24.047 10.137 0.032 0.935 1.072 0.770
CHI 12.544 4.960 0.015 0.807 0.498 0.210
COL 14.418 7.278 0.028 0.568 16.399 10.325
MEX 19.380 7.427 0.042 0.974 16.485 10.714
PER 18.431 6.591 0.010 0.337 12.793 2.934
VEN 38.986 19.974 0.080 1.869 17.529 9.145
Latin America 23.389 10.842 0.036 0.458 12.140 4.863
Conditional Volatility Exchange Rate Changes Interest Rate Level
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of Common Macro Variables 
Table 4.3 reports mean and standard deviation of macro variables during the sample period for each country from July 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob
Constant YES YES YES YES
Control for Common Factors YES YES YES YES
Control for Banking Characteristics YES YES YES YES






























































Contagion from Other Regions
Constant YES YES YES YES
Control for Common Factors YES YES YES YES
Control for Banking Characteristics YES YES YES YES









































































 Denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% repectively.
Cross-Border Contagion to ASIA
Cross-Border Contagion to LATIN AMERICA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4Model 3Contagion from Other Regions
 
Table 4.7: Cross-Border Contagion Effect and Regional Banking System Fragility 
We use the number of coexceedances of daily return as dependent variable in multinomial logistic model. We define five 
categories for number of coexceedances i.e. 0, 1, 23 and >=4 on a given day.  In addition to common variables and banking 









Table 4.8: Banking System Characteristics in Host Region and Cross-Regional Contagion
Characteristics in Host Region -->
Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err
Contagion from Other Regions
Constant YES YES YES YES
Control for Common Factors YES YES YES YES
Control for Banking Characteristics YES YES YES YES
Latin America 1 -26.330
a
(9.33) -2.860 (2.45) 0.279 (1.50) -56.530
a
(20.33)
2 -10.120 (12.49) 3.043 (3.65) 2.780 (2.20) -14.580 (29.28)
3 -17.810 (17.36) -1.508 (4.67) -0.523 (2.71) -39.520 (37.83)
>=4 -38.160
c
(22.24) 4.856 (5.03) 0.731 (2.88) -105.500
a
(39.33)
US 1 0.722 (36.83) 1.010 (6.63) -2.764 (3.86) 41.810 (81.64)
2 13.680 (45.72) 3.151 (8.52) -3.668 (5.01) 26.700 (96.49)
3 13.850 (70.80) 12.600 (11.95) -0.642 (7.12) 10.340 (141.10)





Europe 1 -14.430 (44.45) -6.358 (7.19) -6.545 (4.27) -83.810 (80.11)
2 -29.670
b
(13.49) -4.141 (9.24) -9.395
c
(5.44) -82.050 (96.80)










Contagion from Other Regions
Constant YES YES YES YES
Control for Common Factors YES YES YES YES
Control for Banking Characteristics YES YES YES YES
Asia 1 -14.260 (10.50) -0.232 (2.06) -0.707 (1.16) -9.589 (6.36)
2 -12.381 (17.03) -3.025 (3.27) -1.405 (1.74) 10.490 (10.35)
3 -33.384 (25.71) -3.840 (4.86) -3.000 (2.51) -16.260 (15.33)
>=4 -30.053 (29.95) -3.811 (5.34) 0.256 (2.72) -9.224 (17.81)
US 1 -16.112 (47.37) -1.864 (6.67) -1.373 (4.38) 13.560 (30.75)
2 -108.704
c














(103.60) 6.998 (14.85) 10.490 (8.38) -105.700
c
(60.46)
Europe 1 -17.396 (41.92) -5.113 (6.98) -6.137 (4.64) 25.580 (26.95)
2 -28.424 (56.24) 1.867 (9.68) -0.528 (6.01) -6.707 (36.82)
3 -0.624 (77.45) -14.760 (14.50) -2.896 (8.05) 19.080 (49.61)
>=4 -95.420 (99.41) -25.220 (16.74) -5.432 (8.76) 62.700 (60.35)
The interaction effects between cross-regional contagion and banking system characteristics in regional host are estimated by
using an algorithm developed by King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2003) when including interaction terms.
a, b, c
Denotes significance
levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% repectively.
Cross-Border Contagion to LATIN AMERICA
Cross-Border Contagion to ASIA
























Capitalization (Regional) -6.807 0.307
Loan Ratio 0.173 0.008






Concentration (Regional) 0.550 0.025
Cond. Volatility YES YES YES YES
Cond. Volatility (Regional) YES YES YES YES
Exchg Rate Chg YES YES YES YES
Exchg Rate Chg (Regional) YES YES YES YES
Interest Rate Level YES YES YES YES
Interest Rate Level (Regional) YES YES YES YES
Log-Likelihood -3577.59 -3580.03 -3581.02 -3565.16
Pseudo-R
2
































Cond. Volatility YES YES YES YES
Cond. Volatility (Regional) YES YES YES YES
Exchg Rate Chg YES YES YES YES
Exchg Rate Chg (Regional) YES YES YES YES
Interest Rate Level YES YES YES YES
Interest Rate Level (Regional) YES YES YES YES
Log-Likelihood -2010.62 -2042.63 -2051.12 -2049.68
Pseudo-R
2
0.1672 0.1544 0.1505 0.1512
We use a binary dependent variable whose value is 1 when the country coexceeds with at least one more country in the
region using probit model. We use previous set of independent variables but they are now observed at country level as
well as regional level.
 a, b, c
 Denotes significance levels at the 1%, 5% and 10% repectively.






Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob
Constant YES YES YES YES
Control for Common Factors YES YES YES YES
Control for Banking Characteristics YES YES YES YES





Neg. Coex. In the US 0.368
a
0.027 0.013 0.001





Log-Likelihood -3849.19 -3896.36 -3752.38 -3727.86
Pseudo-R
2
0.0847 0.0735 0.1080 0.1140
Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob
Constant YES YES YES YES
Control for Common Factors YES YES YES YES
Control for Banking Characteristics YES YES YES YES















Log-Likelihood -2462.63 -2380.08 -2338.03 -2258.69
Pseudo-R
2
0.0888 0.1194 0.1353 0.1642
CROSS-BORDER REGIONAL CONTAGION TO ASIA
CROSS-BORDER REGIONAL CONTAGION TO LATIN AMERICA
Negative Coexcedances
Negative Coexcedances
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model 4
 
Table 4.10: Individual Country Characteristics and Cross-Regional Contagion 
We use probit regression with common variables and banking characteristics as control variables. The contagion effect is 
measured by coefficient of a binary variable whose value is 1 when at least 2 countries in other region c exceed else 0. a, b and c 



















































Log-Likelihood -992.96 -996.24 -994.88 -996.54
Pseudo-R
2














































Log-Likelihood -632.41 -644.85 -641.48 -639.43
Pseudo-R
2
0.1609 0.1449 0.1508 0.1529
Dependent Variable is 1 when 2 or 
more coexceedances else 0
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Table 4.11: Common Factors and Banking System Characteristics using Alternative Definition of Regional Banking System 












Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob
Constant YES YES YES YES
Control for Common Factors YES YES YES YES
Control for Banking Characteristics YES YES YES YES















Log-Likelihood -969.19 -965.29 -965.02 -943.04
Pseudo-R
2
0.1841 0.1821 0.1819 0.2009
Contagion from Other Regions
Constant YES YES YES YES
Control for Common Factors YES YES YES YES
Control for Banking Characteristics YES YES YES YES















Log-Likelihood -613.21 -602.00 -599.44 -571.84
Pseudo-R
2
0.1897 0.2031 0.2029 0.2408
Dependent Variable is 1 when  or more 
coexceedances else 0
Cross-Regional Contagion to ASIA
Model 1 Model 4
Cross-Regional Contagion to LATIN AMERICA
Model 2 Model 3
Table 4.12: Cross-Regional Contagion using Alternative Definition of Regional Banking System Fragility 









Cross-Regional Contagion Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob
Constant YES YES YES YES
Control for Common Factors YES YES YES YES

















































2 or more Coexceedances Regional Index
Asia Latin AmericaAsia Latin America
Table 4.13: Cross-Regional Contagion using Alternative Definitions of Triggering Shock 











































































































East-Asian Crisis Subprime Crisis
Figure 4.1: Clustering of Negative Extreme Events in Banking Indices   
We define negative extreme event when 4 or more countries have lowest 5 percent returns. Out of 
total 3784 trading days, we observe 55 and 40 negative extreme events in Asia and Latin America 
respectively. On y-axis, we measure the number of extreme events during each year in our sample 




















































































































































Figure 4.2: Trend in Common Variables 








































































































































































































































Conditional Volatility of Regional  Index Returns
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Average Interest Rate Level (%)
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Liquid Asset as percentage of Total Asset





















































Loan to Total Earning Assets Ratio
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Conditional Volatility of Regional Index Returns
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Liquid Asset to Total Asset Ratio
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5 AN INVESTIGATION OF INTER-INDUSTRY CONTAGION: 
BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INSTITUTIONS 
Chapter 5 investigates the intra-industry and inter-industry contagion among banking and 
financial services industries. We use multinomial logistics regressions to explain the occurrences 
of 2 or more coexceedances in banking, financial servic s or both indices with common factors 
and banking system characteristics. We explore the pot ntial of intra-industry and inter-industry 
cross-regional contagion after controlling for common factors and banking system 
characteristics. We find that the cross-regional intra-industry contagion is more prominent in 
banking institutions than in financial services institutions. Banks are more prone to receive cross-
regional contagion as compared to financial services institutions. Cross-regional contagion is 
higher in Asia than in Latin America. In Asia, the economic magnitude of inter-industry 
contagion from financial services indices is highest when it is triggered from Europe. In Latin 
America, the inter-industry contagion effect from financial services indices is highest when it is 
triggered from the US, but is only slightly lower when the contagion is triggered from Europe. 
However, in general, the cross-regional effect from Europe is more dominant than the cross-
regional effect from the US. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
The wave of market integration during the last deca has brought both advantages and 
disadvantages due to much stronger linkages of domestic conomies with the international 
financial environment. The financial markets have become more inter-connected which results in 
a higher degree of co-movements in financial indices. This phenomenon has been studied by 
researchers  with the aim of better understanding financial contagion (for example, Bae, Karolyi 
and Stulz (2003); Gropp, Duca and Vesala (2009)). These studies limit their analysis either to 
general financial indices or to the same industry (i.e. intra-industry contagion). But there is very 
little evidence on the effects of shocks in one industry to another industry (i.e. inter-industry 
contagion). The inter-industry contagion is important because financial liberalization has blurred 
the distinction between various types of financial activities. Resultantly, the emergence of 
financial conglomerates has paved the way for contagion from one industry to another. For 
example, many banks own special purpose vehicle/entities (SPV/SPE) to cater the niche demand 
for mortgage, insurance and underwriting services. Though banks do not lend significantly to 




Therefore, there are several direct channels throug which these subsidiaries might affect their 
parent institutions: i.e. via reductions in banks’ operating incomes, via the cost of re-
capitalization and via the direct effect on banks’ Tier 1 capital of any change in the ‘embedded 
value’ of a life insurance subsidiary (Stringa and Monks (2007)). Similarly, write-offs on the 
portfolio of sub-prime mortgages through mortgage firms. Furthermore, these subsidiaries have 
the potential to indirectly affect banks through capit l markets and consumer confidence 
channels.  
Since the banking sector is a cornerstone of the financial system in any country, the crisis in the 
banking sector has serious effects on the domestic and international economy. Therefore, it is 
important to identify likely channels of contagion, i  order to monitor them and help mitigate the 
risk of financial crises. That is why, a number of studies focus on the nature and the causes of co-
movements in equity prices/financial indices of banking systems to evaluate contagion (for 
example, Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010)). The recent sub-prime crisis further stresses the need 
to evaluate the contagion not only within the banking sector, but also contagion across industries. 
Banks involvement in mortgage activities through special purpose vehicles also increase the 
likelihood of an idiosyncratic risk in the mortgage market spread through the whole financial 
system at home and abroad in no time. Contagion from the non-banking financial sector to the 
banking system may potentially have relevant implications for financial stability. Consequently, 
it is important to identify the inter-industry contagion potential together with intra-industry 
contagion potential, in order to monitor them and help mitigate the risk of financial crises.  
In this chapter, we focus on both the intra-industry and inter-industry contagion effects in Asia, 
Latin America, the US, and Europe. Our intuition for inter-industry contagion follows Lang and 
Stulz (1992)  that firms using similar input to produce similar output are affected by the same 
shock irrespective of their industrial classification (SIC codes). More specifically, all financial 
institutions including banks are competing for the financial liquidity and sell similar financial 
products with different brands. Therefore, the inter-industry contagion may be as costly and 
important as the intra-industry contagion and need similar treatment to limit their adverse 
consequences. 
The transmission channel for intra-industry contagion within banking is bank lending. This 




customers. Beside bank lending channel the internal capital markets also provide channel for 
intra-industry contagion. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) using quarterly information from all US 
banks have shown that globalized banks activate internal capital markets with their overseas 
affiliates to insulate themselves partially from changes in domestic liquidity conditions. The 
existence of these internal capital markets directly contributes to an international propagation of 
domestic liquidity shocks to lending by affiliated banks abroad. On the other hand, the 
transmission channel for intra-industry contagion within financial services is rather weak. 
Financial services institutions are more connected with banks than among themselves. That is 
why; we find a higher degree of inter-industry contagion in financial services industry. The 
financial services institutions often have credit lines from banking institutions, these credit lines 
form transmission channel for inter-industry contagion. 
Inter-industry contagion has been assessed before when studying the significance of spillovers 
from life insurance to the banking system in an extant literature [see Brewer and Jackson (2002) 
for the US and Stringa and Monks (2007) for UK]. Our analysis however is unique in terms of 
using a set of financial institutions. We include assets managers, consumer finance, specialty 
finance, investment services, mortgage finance, equity investment services and non-equity 
investment services in our analysis. Moreover, our analysis uses an explicit multinomial logistic 
framework to gauge the degree of intra-industry andinter-industry contagion while previous 
studies rely on event study methodology. Our method employs an approach to assess the 
significance of spillovers from either directions between the financial services sector and the 
banking system during times of stress. The spillovers are originated from direct channels – i.e. 
counterparty exposures – and/or from indirect channels via the impact of adverse and unexpected 
news on financial markets (Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000)) and consumers’ confidence 
(Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). Even though accounting data provide accurate information about 
interlinkages via direct channels (counterparty exposures) they are not useful in estimating 
spillovers through indirect channels. In contrast, equity price co-movements capture contagion 
effect through all possible channels.  
We find that the cross-regional intra-industry contagion is more prominent in banking 
institutions than in financial services institutions. Banks are more prone to receive cross-regional 




Asia than in Latin America. In Asia, the economic magnitude of inter-industry contagion from 
financial services indices is highest when it is triggered from Europe. In Latin America, the inter-
industry contagion effect from financial services indices is highest when it is triggered from the 
US, but is only slightly lower when the contagion is triggered from Europe. However, in general, 
the cross-regional effect from Europe is more dominant than the cross-regional effect from the 
US. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In the following Section, we illustrate our 
data set and discuss dependent and control variables. Section 3 deals with methodology. Section 
4 presents results and finally we conclude in Section 5.  
5.2 DATA , DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND CONTROL VARIABLES  
Stock prices in addition to accounting data have ben xtensively used to assess fragility of 
financial markets (see e.g. Bongini, Laeven and Majnoni (2002), Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes 
(2004), Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006), Yu-Fu, Michael and Kadri (2006)). Stock market 
valuations reflect future economic activity; therefor , a simultaneous decline in banking indices 
in a region reflects an increase in regional banking system fragility. We use stock prices of 
banking institutions and financial services institutions from Datastream starting from July 1, 
1994 to December 31, 2008 (3784 daily observations). Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) provide 
all details on the construction of banking indices and coexceedances at regional level in order to 
assess banking system fragility. In this chapter, we construct financial services indices and use 
banking system indices from Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) for inter-industry analysis.  
<please insert table 5.1 here> 
Datastream uses Industry Classification Benchmarks (ICB) for the classification of financial 
services institutions. These institutions exclude all b nking, insurance and real estate firms; that 
is, we include assets managers, consumer finance, specialty finance, investment services, 
mortgage finance, equity investment services and non-equity investment services.21 Following 
Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) we use data from 10 Asian and 7 Latin American countries in 
addition to the United States and Europe (Europe is considered as one region in this analysis). 
We construct value-weighted indices of financial services institutions (excluding banks, 
                                                




insurance and real estate) for each country. Table 5.1 shows the number of institutions from each 
country and also provides sample statistics including correlations for the full sample period. In 
total, we have 366 institutions from Asia, 104 from Latin America, 45 from the US and 204 
financial services institutions from Europe. We find that the marginal daily return on financial 
services indices varies across countries and over time. The average marginal daily return is 
highest in Asia with 0.114% followed by 0.077% in Latin America, 0.044% in the US and 
0.034% in Europe. We also observe that cross-country va iation in marginal daily return is 
higher in Asia than in Latin America.  
More specifically, In Asia, Pakistan has the highest average daily return (0.202%), followed by 
India (0.174%) and China (0.155%). On the lower side, Taiwan has the lowest average daily 
return (0.029%). Moreover, China, Korea and Thailand are highly volatile markets in Asia. 
Whereas In Latin America, Brazil and Venezuela are found to be on the higher side of average 
daily returns with 0.145% and 0.139% respectively. The daily marginal returns on financial 
services indices are also very volatile in these countries with standard deviations of 2.685% and 
2.171% in Venezuela and Brazil respectively.  
Correlation among financial services indices daily returns is higher within Asia (i.e. 0.077) than 
in Latin America (i.e. 0.053). Beside within region correlations, we also calculate correlations 
across regions. We find that financial services industry in Latin America is more connected with 
the United States and Europe as compared to Asia. The correlation coefficients for Latin 
America with the United States, Europe and Asia are 0.141, 0.146 and 0.036 respectively. On the 
other hand, the daily marginal return on financial services indices in Asia are more aligned with 
marginal daily returns in Europe (with correlation coefficient equal to 0.132) and marginal daily 
return of the preceding day in the United States (with correlation coefficient equal to 0.115). 
Moreover, we find that correlations are high among neighboring countries and more open 
economies in Asia. Specially, marginal daily return in Malaysia has high correlations with most 
other countries in Asia and the marginal financial services industry Pakistan has highest 
correlation with marginal daily return in India. Similarly in Latin America, marginal daily 
returns of financial services in Brazil have highest correlation coefficients with all other 
countries except for Venezuela, which has high correlation with Argentina and Chile. Since 




America at noon is not available to Asia on the same day. Therefore, in line with Bae, Karolyi 
and Stulz (2003), we also report correlation coefficients of marginal daily returns in financial 
services indices in Asia with the previous trading day behavior in Americas. We find a higher 
correlation of daily return in Asian markets with te previous day’s daily return in the United 
States.  
5.2.1 Tail behaviour of banking and financial services indices 
Since our main interest is on the fragility of banking and financial services institutions, we focus 
on the behavior of negative tail of the distribution f daily returns on banking and financial 
services indices. We follow the view that extremely low (negative) market return reflects 
problems in the financial sector on each day. We define extreme low return as the returns that are 
below the 5th percentile of daily return distribution and refer to this as an exceedance of the 
return on the financial services index. Since we have 3784 daily observations of financial 
services index for each country; therefore the lowest 5% returns (or 5th percentile) is the 190th 
observation during the entire sample period for each country when returns are arranged in 
ascending order. We use the 5th percentile observation as a threshold to decide whther a country 
on a particular day exceed or not.  Then we construct a count variable indicating the number of 
countries in lower tail for each trading day in our sample. We also right trim the count variable 
and limit its range from 0 to 4, where 0 means no country in the region has negative extreme 
return on that trading day and 4 indicates 4 or more countries in the region have negative return 
simultaneously on a given trading day. When multiple countries have negative extreme return on 
a given day then we refer this phenomenon as egative coexceedance of that industry in those 
countries.  
<please insert table 5.2 here> 
Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) report coexceedance in banking indices during the same period. 
We use the same coexceedances in banking indices in this chapter. Moreover, in table 5.2, we 
report the frequency of count variable for 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 or more joint occurrences of extreme 
low returns (coexceedances) within a region on a particular day. We also indentify which 
countries “participate” in those extreme events and how often. There are more negative 
coexceedances in Asia compared to Latin America. The higher coexceedances in Asia are 




American countries). In our sample, we find that there are 2462 trading days when there is no 
negative extreme return in Asia compared to 2745 trading days when there is no negative 
coexceedances in Latin America. Similarly, there ar 934 and 815 trading days when only one 
country witness extreme negative returns in Asia and Latin America respectively. On the 
extreme side, we find that there are 39 trading days when 4 or more countries coexceed in Asia 
compared to 14 days in Latin America. Malaysia has been the most recurring participants (30 out 
of 39 trading days) of the extreme event when 4 or m e countries in bottom tail on a given day. 
On the other hand, Pakistan and China seldom participate in the extreme event trading days. In 
Latin America, Brazil, Chile and Mexico participate 13 times of the total 14 trading days when 4 
or more countries in the bottom tail. Whereas, Venezuela has never been a country among 4 or 
more countries coexceed on a given trading day. We also report the daily return on the day of 
extreme event (4 or more countries coexceed) for all countries in our sample. We find that, in 
Asia, Korea has the highest negative returns (-7.32%, on average) whenever it is one of the 
countries that coexceed on a particular day. In Latin America, Brazil has the highest negative 
return (-6.27%, on average) if it includes in countries that coexceed. We have also found that the 
negative daily return is higher in Asia (-4.81%, average over all countries) compared to Latin 
America (-3.38%, average over all countries). Moreover, we have found clustering of 
coexceedances in financial services indices during 2008 for Asia and Latin America as shown in 
figure 5.1. 
<please insert figure 5.1 and figure 5.2 here> 
It is interesting to mention here that the coexceedances in financial services are highly correlated 
with the coexceedances in banking services indices from Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010). We 
first make a visual investigation for inter-industry interdependence and check whether the 
coexceedances in banking indices lead to coexceedanc s i  financial services indices or the vice 
versa. Figure 5.2 reports how often the coexceedances in banking indices are matched with 
coexceedances in financial services indices in the four regions. Blue columns represent the 
percentage of matched coexceedances against coexceedan s in banking indices on the same 
day. The red columns show the percentage of coexceedanc s in banking indices that lead to 
coexceedances in financial services indices on the same day or the following day. The green 




coexceedances in banking indices on the same day or the following day. To better understand 
these percentages we discuss one in detail. For example, in Asia, we investigate how often the 
coexceedances in banking indices are followed by coex eedances in financial services indices. 
We find that there are 379 trading days when 2 or me coexceedances are observed in banking 
indices. Out of 379 trading days, there are 179 trading days (about 47.2%) when 2 or more 
coexceedances in banking indices are matched with 2 or more coexceedances in financial 
services indices on the same trading day. It is also possible that the coexceedances in banking 
indices has an influence on financial services indices on the following day, therefore, we 
investigate further and find that there are 225 trading days (about 59.4%) when 2 or more 
coexceedances in banking indices are matched with 2 or more coexceedances in financial 
services indices either on the same day or the following day. Similarly, we check the occurrences 
of coexceedances in financial services indices that are followed by coexceedances in banking 
services indices. We find that there are 220 trading days (about 56.7%) when 2 or more 
coexceedances in financial services are matched with 2 or more coexceedances in financial 
services indices. 
A similar analysis has been conducted for Latin America, the US and Europe as reported in 
figure 5.2. We find that the matching percentages ar  highest in the US that represents higher 
degree of inter-industry interdependence in the US;whereas these percentages are lowest in 
Latin America. However, the percentage of matching coexceedances is lower compared to other 
regions. Another interesting feature is that the inter-industry interdependence is higher from 
financial services to banking institution in all regions except Asia.  
<please insert figure 5.3 here> 
5.2.2 Dependent variable for inter-industry interdependence 
In this case we refer to the state of financial fragility through the number of coexceedances in 
financial services as well as banking services indices. We consider four possible scenarios; first, 
when neither banking indices nor financial services indices has 2 or more coexceedances in a 
region (i.e. financial stability in banking and fina cial services industries); second, when there 
are 2 or more coexceedances in only the banking services indices (i.e. fragility in banking 
industry only); third, when 2 or more coexceedances in only financial services indices (i.e. 




coexceedances in both banking services and financial services indices (when both banking and 
financial services industries are fragile). Now we construct a category variable that takes value 1, 
2, 3, and 4 to represent the state of financial fragility on that particular day in the region. Figure 
5.3 illustrates how often each of these possible scenarios occurs in each region. In Asia, we find 
that 588 trading days (16% of total trading days in our sample) have 2 or more coexceedances in 
banking services or financial services indices or bth. Out of 588 trading days, there are 179 
trading days when both banking services and financial services have more than 2 coexceedances. 
Whereas in Latin America, there are 378 trading days when 2 or more coexceedances are 
observed in any of the banking or financial services indices; of which, only 79 trading days have 
both. This reiterates the low interdependence of banking and financial services in Latin America. 
On the other hand, in the US, we have observed the least number of trading days with 2 or more 
coexceedances (i.e. 246 trading days); however, the banking and financial services indices often 
have exceedances together. In other words, we can say that the banking and financial services 
have high degree of interdependence in the US. In Europe, we have similar result to the US; 
there are 258 trading days with exceedances and 122 trading days when both banking and 
financial services indices have exceedances simultaneously.  
 
5.2.3 Motivation for control variables 
In this chapter we are particularly interested in the evaluation of the fragility of financial services 
industry as a result of changes in common variables oth within region and across regions. Since 
banks are not only closely inter-linked with financial industry but also provide major resources 
through special-purpose-vehicles, we assess regional fragility of financial services industry 
through regional economic fundamentals and characteristics of the banking system. We include 
three common variables as a proxy for economic fundamentals, “regional conditional volatility”, 
changes in the exchange rate, and interest rates in line with Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003). From 
regional banking system characteristics, we include banking system liquidity, diversification of 
banking activities, banking competition, and the capitalization of the banking system as control 




5.2.3.1 Common shocks 
Stock market volatility is negatively associated with overall stock returns (Whitelaw (2000), 
Bekaert and Wu (2000), Wu (2001) and Brandt and Kang (2004)). The higher conditional 
volatility corresponds to a higher probability of a declining market that has a negative impact on 
portfolio returns in general. Therefore, we expect that increase regional stock market volatility 
will result in higher number of joint occurrences of extreme negative returns in banking as well 
as financial services institutions. To evaluate the impact of stock market volatility we incorporate 
regional conditional stock market volatility as an explanatory variable in our model. Secondly, a 
sudden sharp depreciation of the domestic currency adds vulnerability to regional financial 
system. Large financial institutions that are usually operated in multiple regions with various 
currencies; often at high risk owing to an unexpected sharp movement in exchange rate. This 
notion has extensively debated in financial literatu e and report significant evidence that 
exchange rate risk exacerbate banking system fragility during crises (Kaminsky (1999), 
(Kaufman (2000), Hutchison and Glick (2000)). We incorporate the average of daily exchange 
rate changes of all countries in the region as an independent variable in our model to check its 
effect on the probability of coexceedances. Lastly, an increase in interest rate level would have a 
negative impact on profitability of financial institutions because of higher occurrences of non-
performing loans. Therefore, ceteris paribus, an increase in interest rate level is likely to increase 
banking fragility. The interest rate level generally control the effect of business cycle variables 
including domestic inflationary pressures, increase in foreign interest rates, shift towards tight 
monetary policy and lax regulatory framework owing to financial liberalization (Galbis (1995)). 
We introduce interest rate level as a control variable in our model in order to isolate the effect of 
business cycle. In general, we expect that banking institutions are more inter-linked to the rest of 
the economy than other financial services institutions; therefore, banking institutions are more 
receptive of the common shocks. Moreover, the effect of the three common factors is not same 
for banks and other financial services institutions. For example, interest rate level has more 
importance in banking industry because of its immediat  impact on banks’ core activities. 
Similarly, the effect of exchange rate depends upon the magnitude of operations in other 
currencies, which are typically dominated by banks.  




In order to implement these control variables we usfollowing definitions. For stock market 
volatility, we estimate the conditional variance of the stock market indices using a GARCH (1,1) 
and then take average of the all countries in a region for the regional conditional volatility. We 
use the International Finance Corporation (IFC) indices from Asia and Latin America for 
gauging stock market volatilities in these regions a d the S&P 500 index for the United States 
and Datastream International Europe Index for Europe. In first column of table 5.3, we report 
mean and standard deviation of conditional volatility over the entire sample period. We find that 
stock market in Latin America is more volatile with conditional volatility of 23.39 percent 
compared to 21.19 percent in Asia. The second common factor that we control for is the change 
in exchange rate. We calculate the daily change in xchange rate against US dollar for each 
country in Asia and Latin America. In case of the US, we use a basket of four currencies (i.e. 
GBP, JPY, CHF and EUR) to valuate exchange rate changes. For Europe, since EUR and GBP 
are the two major currencies, we take equal-weighted average of EUR and GBP exchange rates 
changes against USD.22 Similarly daily change in exchange rate is also on the higher side in 
Latin America compared to Asia as shown in column 2. Finally, we use the 1-year interbank 
interest rate level as third common factor. For regional representations, we compute equal-
weighted average of interest rate level in countries within each region. We also find a high 
volatility including higher interest rate level in Latin America (4.86 percent) compared to Asia 
(2.84 percent). Figure 5.4 compares the trend of comm n factors in the sample period for Asia 
and Latin America. We find that conditional volatility increases significantly in both regions 
during the last two years, which is expected on account of turbulence in stock markets after sub-
prime crisis. We find that daily exchange rate changes though volatile but remain under 5 percent 
in our sample except for the crisis period (Asian crisis 1997 and Argentina crisis 2002). Interest 
rate level declines in both regions till 2004 and then a moderate increase in recent years.   
<please insert figure 5.4 here> 
5.2.3.2 Banking system characteristics and regional financil system fragility 
Following are the banking characteristics that play a role in determining the fragility of the 
financial system including financial services institutions. We compute these banking 
                                                
22 Since our sample starts from June 1994; therefore, we use country-weighted average of exchange rate against 




characteristics based on annual balance sheet data of b nks in each individual country from 
Bankscope.23 Since these variables are available on annual basis, we use the annual value of the 
preceding year for all daily observations of the current year. Moreover, the regional values are 
calculated by averaging individual country level data. The regional banking system 
characteristics are weighted-average of individual countries. 
5.2.3.2.1 Aggregate banking system liquidity 
Aggregate banking system liquidity is the first line of defense against liquidity shocks. Financial 
services institutions also park corporate funds through interbank markets; therefore, from a 
macro perspective, adequate levels of liquidity should be maintained to absorb any sudden 
shock. The lack of aggregate liquidity at the banking system level may lead to a channel of 
contagion that not only affects banking system but also financial services industry across regions. 
We therefore include aggregate banking system liquid ty in our analysis, and investigate its 
impact on regional fragility of financial services institutions. We use a narrow definition of 
liquidity, that is, the ratio of cash and cash equivalent assets to total assets. We call this variable 
‘liquidity’ hereafter. We find that banking system in India and Pakistan are holding high cash 
reserve relative to total assets. The cash holdings of India and Pakistan are 12.55 percent and 
11.56 percent of the total assets respectively compared to 2.8 percent on average in Asia. 
Similarly, in Latin America, Venezuela holds 10.6 percent of the total assets as cash or cash 
equivalent compared to regional average of 2.88 percent.  
5.2.3.2.2 Diversification of banking activities 
De Nicoló, Bartholomew, Zaman and Zephirin (2004) provide evidence that the increase in 
financial conglomeration encourages banks to move away from traditional commercial banking 
activities and offer a range of financial instruments that directly compete with the offerings of 
financial services institutions. Whether the resulting overlap between banks and financial 
services institutions would increase fragility or provide stability to the financial system as a 
whole is an intriguing question. More recently, De Jonghe (2010) finds that banking system 
fragility, measured through an increase in banks’ tail beta,   aggravates when banks engage in 
non-traditional activities in addition to their core commercial banking activities. Since interest 
                                                
23 From Bankscope, we retrieve data for all banks from 1994 to 2008 for each region. We find that some banks 
report both consolidated and unconsolidated accounts in he bank scope. Therefore, in order to eliminate double 




income is less risky than other revenue streams, it i  argued that specialization in traditional 
activities result in lower systemic banking risk. In that sense, financial conglomeration is unable 
to reduce systemic risk. Wagner (2006) and Wagner (2010) theoretically argue that multiple 
activities of commercial banks though reduce risk at individual bank level, but from the financial 
system’s point of view it raises the likelihood of systemic crisis because a shock that previously 
affect only a small part of the financial system, now affects a large portion of the system and 
possibly results in failure of the whole financial system. In this strand of literature we find a tilt 
that banks should focus on their core loan-making business because diversification increases 
banking system fragility. However, in this analysis, we are also interesting in testing the 
hypothesis whether diversification in banking activities increases or decreases regional fragility 
of financial services industries. Our conjecture is that the diversification in banking would give  
more resources to non-bank financial services firms and hence provide stability in the financial 
services industry. In order to measure the extent to which banks are involved in traditional loan-
making activities compared to non-traditional activities, we calculate net loans to total earning 
assets for each country and label it as ‘diversification’ in our results. We find that net loans are 
about half of the total earning assets in almost all countries; however, the focus on loan-making 
activities is slightly higher in Asia (53.96%) compared to Latin America (44.40%). 
5.2.3.2.3 Competition in banking industry 
The existing literature on the relationship between competition and stability is inconclusive. 
There exists “Competition-Fragility” view that more competition leads to lower loan rate and 
lower profit margins. Consequently lower revenues from performing loans makes banks 
operations more risky and ultimately increases fragility of the whole financial system (Marcus 
(1984); Keeley (1990); Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1996)). Alternatively, the 
“Competition-Stability” view suggests that competition lead to lower interest rates, which in turn 
lead to lower probability of loan default, and henc safer banks (e.g. Boyd and De Nicolo 
(2005)). In order to evaluate how competition affect fragility of banking and financial services 
institutions, we use the ratio of total assets of biggest five banks to total assets of all banks as a
measure of competition (i.e. C5 measure) for each country in the region. We label it as 
‘concentration’ in our analysis. The regional measure is the weighted average of individual 
country in the region using banking system total assets as relative weights. We find that banking 




Lanka, China and Pakistan are among most concentratd b nking systems in Asia, whereas Peru, 
Venezuela and Chile are highly concentrated banking systems in Latin America.  
5.2.3.2.4 Capitalization of the banking system 
Lastly, the ability of banking systems to absorb foreign shocks depends on the degree of 
capitalization of the banking system. Ceteris paribus, a more capitalized banking system should 
be more stable because a higher capital base provides a cushion against insolvency. Liu and 
Mello (2008) argue that fulfilling the capital requirements at individual bank level is not 
sufficient to prevent systemic crisis. We use the capital base of the banking system as a whole to 
evaluate whether the capital base of the banking system provides a cushion against regional 
fragility of financial system including banks and financial services institutions. Our measure of 
capital is the total equity that includes common shares and premium; retained earnings; reserves 
for general banking risks and statutory reserves; loss absorbing minority interests; net revaluation 
of AFS securities; FX reserves included in equity and revaluations other than securities deemed 
to be equity capital. We label it as ‘capitalization’ in our results. We find that banking systems in 
Asia, on average, maintain low capital to total asset ratio compared to Latin America. 
<please insert table 5.4 here> 
Table 5.4 shows the mean and standard deviation for banking characteristics for each country as 
well as at regional level during the whole sample period. We find that Latin America has more 
liquid asset as percentage of total assets compared to Asia. Moreover, Asia focus more on 
traditional banking activities (loan business), higher concentration in banking activities and 
relatively lower capital ratio compared to Latin America at regional level. As far as the time 
dimension is concerned, figure 5.5 shows that there is an increasing trend in liquid asset to total 
asset ratio in both Asia and Latin America. We also observe a decline in traditional banking 
activities (loan business) in both regions over time. There is no particular trend in concentration 
of the banking industry. Lastly, capital ratio has increased from around 8 percent to 10 percent in 
Latin America and hovered around 5 percent in Asia.  




5.2.3.3 Inter-industry and intra-industry contagion  
We evaluate intra-industry and inter-industry contagion after controlling for common variables. 
Inter-industry contagion is important because both banks and other financial services institutions 
are trading the same stuff; therefore, they are jointly exposed to the same junk products. 
Moreover, the non-bank financial institutions have different roles in different regions. For 
instance, in the US, since the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in 1999, non-bank 
financial institutions have very similar operations a  banks, so much so that they can raise 
deposit directly from the public. However, in other r gions, non-banks financial institutions are 
not allowed to raise deposit directly. These differences in operational environment may have an 
impact on inter-industry cross-regional contagion. 
In this context we differentiate intra-industry and i ter-industry contagion by origin of shock and 
its consequence. When the triggering and recipient industries are same, it is called intra-industry 
contagion. We refer intra-industry contagion when the change in probability of banking system 
fragility is due to shock in the banking system. On the other hand, when triggering and recipient 
industries are different, it is called inter-industry contagion. For example, if probability of 
banking system fragility is affected due to shock in financial services industry, then we call it 
inter-industry contagion. For contagion within region, we are interested in intra-industry 
contagion of financial services institutions; however, across regions, we investigate inter-
industry contagion as well as intra-industry contagion among financial services and banking 
institutions. 
5.3 METHODOLOGY  
In existing literature, there are very few studies that specifically investigate inter-industry 
contagion. We find that Brewer and Jackson (2002) and Stringa and Monks (2007) study inter-
industry contagion between banks and life insurance companies in the US and UK respectively. 
These research papers use event-study methodology to investigate cumulative abnormal returns 
around some given announcement events. The inferenc through event study methodology is 
based on strict assumptions about modeling the abnormal returns. More recently, Bernoth and 
Pick (2009) use panel data estimation to forecast the financial fragility of banks and insurance 
companies. We use multinomial logistics models to assess how fragility of banking and financial 




regional contagion. The dependent variable in our model is a count variable that is linked to the 
number of coexceedances in financial services and banking services indices in a region on a 
given day. Our methodology is an extension of Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) and Gropp and 
Moerman (2004), wherein we use a different specification of dependent variable that explains the 
tail behavior of both banks and financial services indices using number of coexceedances in the 
region. We estimate financial fragility in banks, financial services indices or both as a function of 
common macro variables and banking system characteristics. The general multinomial logistics 





     (1) 
where x is the vector of covariates and βB the vector of coefficients associated with the 
covariates, GβB x is a logistic distribution and m is the number of categories in the multinomial 
model. The model is estimated using maximum log-likelihood function for a sample of n
observations as follows: 
logL  ∑ ∑ IBRlogPBRSR*
TB*
     (2) 
where IBR is an indicator variable whose value is equal to 1if the iV observation falls jV category 
and 0 otherwise. In our case, we have four categoris i.e. 1, 2, 3, and 4; each representing the 
state of financial fragility in banking and financial services industries as mentioned in section 
5.2.2.  
For the simplest case of constants only, we estimate four parameters. We introduce additional 
variables like conditional volatility, exchange rate changes, etc. in various models. But for each 
additional variable introduced in the model, we need to estimate additional parameters; therefore, 
we opt for parsimonious specification as much as posible. Moreover, the coefficients from 
discrete choice models are difficult to interpret, therefore, we report marginal effect that are 
obtained by differentiating the probability for each outcome with respect to unit change in 
independent covariate on a given day being evaluated at unconditional mean value of 
independent variables. Since marginal effects in no-linear models are different for each set of 
data points in explanatory, we need to be careful in making inferences based on single set of 




effect can sometimes even change signs; therefore, we compute the response of probability 
measures to the full range on values of independent variables. The sum of probabilities of all 
four categories must equal to 1 and we show the responses of probabilities across whole range of 
independent variables through “coexceedances response curve”. 
In order to evaluate the inter-industry cross-regional contagion, we introduce the number of 
coexceedances in banking and financial services indices in other regions in separate models. 
After controlling for the common shocks and banking system characteristics, the marginal 
change of coexceedances in other region would signal cross-regional contagion in the same 
industry as well as other industry.  
5.4 RESULTS 
A higher number of coexceedances indicate fragility of the financial system. In this chapter, we 
evaluate the potential of inter-industry contagion through the number of coexceedances in 
financial services and banking indices within region and across regions. We label regional 
fragility when two or more coexceedances occur in Asia or Latin America (the definition applies 
to both financial services industry and banking system). In the case of the US and Europe, the 
regional fragility refers to the exceedance of banking or financial services indices. Our dependent 
variable captures the state of regional fragility in financial services industry and/or banking 
system. We assess how banking system characteristics and macro factors affect the regional 
fragility.  
<please insert table 5.5 here> 
Table 5.5 provides estimation results using a multinomial logistic model. We report the 
estimation result for Asia and Latin America. In the first column, we report the relative 
frequencies for all categories of our dependent variables. Since there are no covariates, the 
relative frequencies represent the probabilities of the respective outcomes. In Asia, the 
probability of no regional fragility in banking or financial services industry is 84.46%. We also 
find that the probability of regional fragility in banking system and financial services industry are 
5.29% and 5.52% respectively. However, the probability of worst event that both banking system 
and financial services industry have more than two coexceedances on a particular day is 4.73%. 




regional fragility of banking system is 4.07%, probability for regional fragility of financial 
services industry is 3.83% and the probability for regional fragility in both banking system and 
financial services industry is 2.09%. We find that the probability of regional fragility in either 
industry is higher in Asia compared to Latin America.  
5.4.1 Common factors and regional fragility in banking and financial services  
In model 1 of table 5.5, we explain regional fragility in banking and financial services industry 
by including conditional volatility, changes in daily exchange rates and interest rate level at 
regional level. We report marginal effects to evaluate the impact of a unit increase in control 
variable for each category of our dependent variable. We find that an increase in the conditional 
volatility adds fragility in the banking system and financial services industry in all regions. The 
effect of an increase in conditional volatility is positive for all cases; however, the economic 
significance is highest for the fragility in financial services industry. The 1% increase in 
conditional volatility increases the probability of regional fragility of banking systems by 0.23%; 
regional fragility of financial services industry b 0.27% and 0.25% increase in probability of 
regional fragility of banking system and financial services industry together. We also check in 
the same model whether the fall in currencies, on average, increase the probability of financial 
fragility in banking and financial services industry. We find that an increase in daily exchange 
rate has the highest economic magnitude among all common factors in Asia. The 1% 
depreciation of domestic currencies, on average, increase the probability of regional fragility of 
banking system and financial services industry by 3.79% and 4.33% respectively. On the 
extreme case, a same depreciation of domestic currencies would lead to increase in probability of 
higher coexceedances in banking system and financial services industry together by 6.98%. 
Moreover, we evaluate the effect of monetary policy on financial fragility by inserting interest 
rate level as control variable in the same model. We find that the increase in interest rate level 
would significantly increase financial fragility inall cases. The 1% increase in interest rate level 
would increase the probability of regional fragility in banking by 0.98%, the probability of 
regional fragility in financial services industry b0.39%, and the probability of regional fragility 
in both banking and financial services by 0.36%. All partial derivatives are significant at the 1% 




Similarly, in Latin America, we find that the increase in conditional volatility increases the 
probability of the regional fragility of banking sytem and financial services industry. The 
depreciation of domestic currencies, on average, has significant impact on the probability of 
regional banking system fragility but fails to affect the probability of regional fragility in the 
financial services industry. It also affects the probability of fragility in both banking and 
financial services industry together. Last but not the least; interest rate level has a significant 
impact on the probability of regional banking system fragility only. In terms of economic 
magnitude, the 1% increase in conditional volatility would increase the probability of regional 
fragility in banking system by 0.13%, the probability of regional fragility in financial services by 
0.11% and the probability of regional fragility in both industries together by 0.08%. The 
marginal effects are significant at the 1% level and the pseudo-R2 is 10%.  
To summarize, we find that all common factors have  significant impact on banks and financial 
services in Asia. An increase in regional conditional stock market volatility, a fall in currencies 
and a rise in interest rate levels significantly increase financial fragility in both banking and 
financial services industries in Asia. In Latin America, conditional volatility affects both 
industries but exchange rate depreciation and interes  rate level affect only the banking system. 
This is in line with our expectation that interest ra e and exchange rate would have higher 
implications for banking system than financial services institutions. In terms of economic 
significance, we find that exchange rate depreciation has the highest impact in Asia and Latin 
America. Moreover, we find that the common variables collectively explain around 10% 
variation of the regional fragility in banking and financial services industries (pseudo-R2: 11% in 
Asia and 10% in Latin America). 
5.4.2 Banking system characteristics and regional financial fragility  
Beside common factors there are banking system chara teristics that affect both banks and 
financial services institutions in a similar fashion. Because our main focus is to investigate the 
inter-industry contagion, we also study the effect of banking system liquidity, diversification in 
banking activities, competition in the banking industry and capitalization of the banking system. 
We include these regional banking system characteristics in our previous multinomial logistic 




one by one in successive models while controlling for common macro factors. In Model 2 to 
Model 5 of table 5.5, we report our estimation results for Asia and Latin America.   
5.4.2.1 Banking System Liquidity 
Banking system liquidity is important not only for individual banks to get funds from the money 
market without paying extraordinary premiums, but also provide opportunity to non-bank 
financial services institutions to manage their liquidity. The sufficient level of aggregate banking 
system liquidity would improve the efficiency of interbank market. We test the hypothesis 
whether the increase in aggregate banking system liquidity would reduce the probability of 
financial fragility in banking or financial services industry. We use cash and cash equivalent as 
percentage of total assets as a measure of liquidity. In model 2 of table 5.5, we report the effect 
of the liquidity on the probability of financial fragility in banking and financial services industry. 
The results are in line with Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) that increase in liquidity would 
reduce financial fragility.  
In Asia, we find that a higher liquidity significantly reduces the probability of financial fragility 
of banking, financial services and both. But in terms of economic magnitude, the effect is much 
higher for banking system than the financial services industry. We find that 1 standard deviation 
increase in liquidity would decrease the probability of 2 or more coexceedances in banking 
indices by 0.439%, 2 or more coexceedances in financ al services indices by 0.106% and 2 or 
more coexceedances in both by 0.192%. But in Latin America, liquidity significantly reduce the 
fragility of banking system only (i.e. 1 standard deviation increase in liquidity reduce the 
probability of 2 or more coexceedances in banking system by 0.104%). Liquidity does not have 
any significant impact on financial service industry or both industries together. With the 
inclusion of liquidity of banking system, the pseudo-R2 has increased from 11% and 10% to 12% 
and 11% in Asia and Latin America respectively. The eff ct of liquidity is more significant in 
Asia compared to Latin America. Moreover, among industries, we find that the liquidity has 
higher impact on banking system compared to financial services industry.  In Asia, the banking 
system provide more liquidity to the financial services institutions, that is why, we observe that a 
liquidity shock that affect banking system would have higher likelihood of affecting the financial 
fragility of financial services institutions as well. In Latin America, liquidity affects only the 




5.4.2.2 Diversification in Banking Activities 
There is an inconclusive debate about the role of diversification in banking activities on fragility 
of the banking system. Recently, De Jonghe (2010) argue that financial stability reduces when 
banks engage in non-traditional activities in addition to their core commercial banking activities. 
But Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) find no significant impact of bank’s focus on traditional 
loan making activities on the regional fragility of banking systems. In this analysis, we use loan 
to total asset ratio in order to investigate whether  banks inclination towards traditional loan-
making activities would affect the probability of financial fragility in banking and financial 
services industries. We use loan to total earning assets ratio as a proxy for banks’ focus on 
traditional loan-making activities (i.e. level of diversification). In model 3 of table 5.5, we report 
the effect of the focus on loan-making activities on the financial fragility of banking and 
financial services industries in Asia and Latin America. We do not find any significant effect of 
an increasing focus on traditional loan making activities on financial fragility in banking or 
financial services in Asia. However, in Latin America, we find that traditional loan-making 
activities increase the probability of fragility in banking system only. In term of economic 
magnitude, we find that 1 standard deviation increase in traditional loan-making activities would 
increase the probability of banking system fragility by 0.640%.  
Our findings are in line with Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) surveys about the impact of bank 
regulation on bank performance and financial stability. They conducted three surveys during the 
last decade and reported key characteristics of banking environment in each country. These 
surveys report that, in general, bank’s ownership in non-financial firms is more restricted in Asia 
than in Latin America, which means that there is less scope for diversification in Asia compared 
to Latin America. Moreover, the percentage of foreign-owned banking system assets to total 
banking assets is comparatively low in Asia as well. These restrictions provide less room for 
diversification in banking activities, and hence, this variable fails to affect the fragility of either 
banking system of financial services in Asia.  
5.4.2.3 Competition in Banking Industry 
Similar to the effect of diversification in banking activities, there exist divergent views on the 
effect of competition on regional fragility of banki g system and financial service industries (i.e. 




(2010) use similar methodology to provide evidence i  support of the competition-stability view 
for banking systems at regional level.  
Bikker and Haaf (2000) discuss 15 different measures of concentration and their relationship. 
The most widely used measures remain k banks concentratio  ratio (CRk) and Herfindahl-
Hirchman index (HHI). The k bank concentration ratio is a discrete measures, which are simple 
and requires limited data. Supporters of discrete measures maintain the view that the behavior of 
a market that is dominated by a small number of large-sized banks is very unlikely to be 
influenced by the small-sized in the market; therefor , the calculation of concentration indices on 
the basis of the entire bank size distribution would be unnecessarily large-scale, while only 
marginally changing the final results. Critics adhere to the view that every bank in the market 
influences market behavior and stress a severe disadvantage of discrete indexes: they ignore the 
structural changes in those parts of the industry which are not encompassed by the index of 
concentration. On the other hand, HHI accounts for all banks according to their market share and 
thus explains the entire size distribution of banks. Such measures stress that structural changes in 
all parts of the distribution influence the value of the concentration index.  
In our analysis, we mainly focuses on the cross-regional contagion that is often transmit through 
large financial institutions. Small financial institutions neither have reach nor expertise to extend 
international operations. Therefore, banks’ concentration ratio better serves our purpose; 
however, we use HHI as a robustness check. We find that the results from HHI are very similar 
to C5 measure of concentration. The estimates are shown in model 4 of table 5.5. For banking 
industry, we find similar result to Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) that a higher level of 
concentration significantly increases the probability of financial fragility in banking industry in 
both Asia and Latin America; however, the level of c ncentration does not have any significant 
impact of financial fragility of financial services industry in either region. The 1 standard 
deviation increase in concentration would increase the probability of banking system fragility by 
0.612% and 1.444% in Asia and Latin America respectiv ly. Moreover, in line with Degryse, 
Elahi and Penas (2010), we find that the impact of concentration is higher in Latin America than 




5.4.2.4 Banking System Capitalization 
Finally, we explore how banking system capitalization affects regional fragility of banking 
system and financial services institutions. Our measure of capital is the region-wide total equity 
that includes common shares and premium; retained earnings; reserves for general banking risks 
and statutory reserves; loss absorbing minority interests; net revaluation of AFS securities; FX 
reserves included in equity and revaluations other an securities deemed to be equity capital. 
We find that an increase in capitalization would reuce banking system fragility in both regions 
and financial fragility of financial services in Latin America only. Degryse, Elahi and Penas 
(2010) assert that greater capital though significantly reduces the probability of banking system 
fragility in Asia and Latin America, but the economic magnitude is higher in Latin America. We 
find a similar results that 1 standard deviation increase in capitalization would reduce the 
probability of regional fragility of banking system by 0.360% and 1.430% in Asia and Latin 
America respectively; whereas the same increase in capitalization would reduce the probability 
of regional fragility of financial services industry by 1.232% in Latin America only. Here also, 
our findings are in line with Degryse, Elahi and Penas (2010) that the impact of capitalization on 
regional fragility is higher in Latin America than i  Asia.  
5.4.2.5 Summary  
In summary, we find that the increase in liquidity reduce the regional fragility of both banking 
system and financial services institutions in Asia; whereas, in Latin America, the increase in 
liquidity decreases the regional fragility of bankig systems only. The increase in capitalization 
significantly reduces the probability of financial fragility of banking system in Asia; whereas, it 
reduces the probability of financial fragility of both banking and financial services in Latin 
America. Our findings are supportive of the competition-stability view that increase in 
competition would significantly reduce the probability of banking system fragility; however, it is 
not significant for financial fragility of financial services institution in both Asia and Latin 
America. We also find that focus on traditional loan making activities increase the likelihood of 
regional banking system fragility in Latin America only. Lastly, we also observe that regional 
fragility of banking systems is reduced with the increase in liquidity and capitalization and is 
increased with the increase in concentration but divers fication fails to affect banking system 
fragility in Asia. In Latin America, an increase inliquidity and capitalization would reduce 




increase banking system fragility. The regional fragility of financial services is reduced by 
increase in liquidity in Asia and by capitalization in Latin America. Other factors do not have 
any significant effect on regional fragility of fina cial services in these regions. 
 
5.4.3 Coexceedance response curves of the common factors and banking system 
characteristics 
The Coexceedance response curves provide a complete picture of the effect of changes in 
independent variables on the probability of coexceedances. These curves are important because 
probabilities are not linear functions of the regressors. We plot the probability of coexceedances 
as a function of the common factor and banking system characteristic at the entire range. The 
different areas of the plot correspond to different coexceedances levels. Figure 5.6(a) and 5.6(b) 
provide coexceedances response curves of the common factors and banking system 
characteristics respectively.  
<please insert figure 5.6 here> 
We find that the curves are highly nonlinear that support the use of a multinomial logistic model. 
At low level of conditional volatility, there is high probability of no coexceedances in either 
industry. The economic magnitude of the increase in co ditional volatility on banking system 
fragility is higher in Asia than in Latin America. On the other hand, the exchange rate changes 
and interest rate level has higher impact on banking system characteristics in Latin America than 
in Asia. Among the banking system characteristics we find that aggregate liquidity will reduce 
the probability of all coexceedances in the entire range in Asia and Latin America. We observe a 
flat curve for the effect of banking system diversification in Asia; whereas in Latin America, it 
will significantly reduce the probability of no coexceedances.  
5.4.4 Intra-industry and inter-industry cross-regional contagion  
We also evaluate intra-industry and inter-industry cross-regional contagion after controlling for 
common variables. Intra-industry contagion exists when financial fragility in one industry affects 
the probability of financial fragility in same the industry; whereas, inter-industry contagion refers 
to the phenomenon when financial fragility in one idustry affects the probability of financial 




variable for each industry in other regions as explanatory variable in separate models. For 
example, we have a binary variable for banking industry in Latin America, whose value is 1 
when banking system in Latin America is fragile (i.e. 2 or more coexceedances of banking 
indices in Latin America on that day) otherwise thevalue is zero. We can call this variable a 
‘trigger’ that reflect fragility in an industry for each region. We have 4 triggers from each region: 
1) there are 2 or more coexceedances in either banking or financial services indices 2) there are 2 
or more coexceedances in banking only 3) there are 2 or more coexceedances in financial 
services only 4) there are 2 or more coexceedances i  both banking and financial services 
industry simultaneously. From each triggering region, we use 1 trigger at a time to evaluate the 
impact of the financial fragility of that industry on banking, financial services and ‘both 
industries together’ in the host region. Therefore, w  have three marginal effects for each trigger 
in one regression beside control variables.  
<please insert table 5.6 here> 
In Table 5.6, we report the impact of cross-regional i tra-industry and inter-industry contagion in 
Asia and Latin America. The first column shows the impact on banking system only, the second 
column presents the effect on financial services only a d the third column illustrates the effect on 
both industries simultaneously. The intra-industry cross-regional contagion is marked with 
shaded area. In general, after controlling for the eff ct of common factors and banking system 
characteristics, we find that the 2 or more coexceedances in either banking or financial services 
indices from all regions would significantly increase the probability of financial fragility of 
banking and financial services industries. Banks are more prone to receive cross-regional as 
compared to financial services institutions. Intra-industry contagion is more prominent in 
banking institutions than in financial services institutions. Cross-regional contagion is higher in 
Asia than in Latin America. Banks from all regions tend to affect banking systems in both Asia 
and Latin America. Financial services in Latin America are completely immune to any shock 
from Asia. Banks do not affect financial services industry in other regions; the only exception is 
the European banking system that affects financial services industry in Asia. In Asia, the 
economic magnitude of inter-industry contagion from financial services indices is the maximum 
when it is triggered from Europe. Whereas in Latin America, the inter-industry contagion effect 




slightly lower when the contagion is triggered from Europe. However, in general, the cross-
regional effect from Europe is more dominant than the US.24  
More specifically, the banking institutions dominate financial systems in all major economies; 
therefore, the economic magnitude of inter-industry cross-regional contagion effect that triggers 
through banking system is higher than financial servic s industry. For example, in Asia, 2 or 
more coexceedances in banking indices in Europe would increase the probability of fragility of 
financial services by 5.5%. Whereas, 2 or more coexe dances in financial services indices in 
Latin America, the US and Europe would increase the probability of fragility of banking system 
by 2.6%, 0.6% and 5.9% respectively. In Latin America, we find that the inter-industry cross-
regional contagion effect when 2 or more coexceedances in financial services indices in the US 
and Europe would significantly reduce the probability of banking system fragility by 7.6% and 
7.2% respectively.  
We also explore the effect of the same trigger from all triggering regions simultaneously in one 
model but do not report results for the sake of brevity; however, we find that the results are 
robust. 
5.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter investigates the effect of common macro factors (conditional volatility, exchange 
rate changes and interest rate level) and banking system characteristics (liquidity, diversification, 
concentration and capitalization) on financial fragility. We also explore the intra-industry and 
inter-industry contagion among banking and financial services industries. We refer Intra-industry 
contagion when financial fragility in one industry affects the probability of fragility of the same 
industry; whereas, inter-industry contagion exists when financial fragility in one industry affects 
the probability of fragility in other industry. We use stock prices of banking institutions and 
financial services institutions at regional level in order to assess fragility in banking and financial 
services industries. The negative coexceedances in fina cial services are highly correlated with 
the coexceedances in banking services indices, which motivates the investigation of inter-
industry contagion. 
                                                
24 In order to check that the inter industry effect we find is something particular within the finance sector; we have 
done a similar exercise with banking indices and the food sector indices (instead of the financial servic s sector 
indices). We find that inter-industry cross-regional contagion is not significant in this case. We do not report these 




 We find that an increase in regional conditional stock market volatility, a fall in currencies and a 
rise in interest rate levels significantly increase financial fragility in both banking and financial 
services industries in Asia. In Latin America, conditional volatility affects both industries but 
exchange rate depreciation and interest rate level aff ct only the banking system. This is in line 
with our expectation that interest rate and exchange rate would have higher implications for the 
banking system than financial services institutions. I  terms of economic significance, we find 
that exchange rate depreciation has the highest impact in Asia and Latin America. Among 
banking system characteristics, we find that the increase in liquidity reduce the regional fragility 
of both banking system and financial services institutions in Asia; whereas, in Latin America, the 
increase in liquidity decreases the regional fragility of banking systems only. The increase in 
capitalization significantly reduces the probability of financial fragility of banking system in 
Asia; whereas, it reduces the probability of financi l fragility of both banking and financial 
services in Latin America. We also find that a focus on traditional loan making activities increase 
the likelihood of regional banking system fragility n Latin America only. We find that the cross-
regional intra-industry contagion is more prominent in banking institutions than in financial 
services institutions. Banks are more prone to receiv  cross-regional contagion. Cross-regional 
contagion is higher in Asia than in Latin America. In Asia, the economic magnitude of inter-
industry contagion from financial services indices is highest when it is triggered from Europe. In 
Latin America, the inter-industry contagion effect from financial services indices is highest when 
it is triggered from the US, but is only slightly lower when the contagion is triggered from 
Europe. However, in general, the cross-regional effect rom Europe is more dominant than the 









CHN KOR PHL TWN INA IND MAL PAK SRI THA ARG BRA CHI COL MEX PER VEN USA EUR
No. of Institutions 16 85 34 41 66 33 20 20 17 34 2 23 29 13 8 19 10 45 204
Mean (%) 0.155 0.121 0.123 0.029 0.108 0.174 0.070 0.202 0.094 0.069 0.022 0.145 0.080 0.079 0.028 0.045 0.139 0.044 0.034
Std. Dev. (%) 2.911 2.841 1.988 1.934 1.743 2.434 2.162 1.854 1.446 2.763 1.472 2.171 0.897 1.812 0.791 0.728 2.685 1.749 0.988
Median (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.028 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.014 0.051
Minimum (%) -14.895 -14.175 -12.157 -10.095 -10.990 -25.091 -15.273 -9.688 -13.491 -15.469 -9.166 -19.319 -7.970 -13.793 -16.634 -8.859 -35.706 -15.799 -9.202
Maximum (%) 35.597 24.575 17.939 13.837 14.715 36.581 28.263 26.321 23.644 23.673 10.198 20.414 15.006 17.798 12.772 22.850 35.318 16.717 10.132
Correlations CHN KOR PHL TWN INA IND MAL PAK SRI THA ARG BRA CHI COL MEX PER VEN USA EUR
CHN 1.000 0.047 0.052 0.050 0.036 0.020 0.025 0.022 0.051 0.047
KOR 0.047 1.000 0.019 0.117 0.054 0.033 0.020 -0.013 -0.018 0.190 0.131
PHL 0.045 0.121 1.000 0.066 0.137 0.086 0.069 0.030 0.005 0.001 0.190 0.148
TWN 0.043 0.224 0.085 1.000 0.033 0.134 0.037 0.044 0.027 0.019 -0.010 0.199 0.140
INA 0.056 0.159 0.090 0.147 1.000 0.019 0.133 0.071 0.071 0.050 0.004 0.026 0.150 0.103
IND 0.024 0.054 0.066 0.056 0.078 1.000 0.009 0.034 -0.004 0.020 0.018 -0.019 -0.034 0.050 0.029
MAL 0.063 0.179 0.145 0.168 0.144 0.125 1.000 0.030 0.079 0.084 0.049 0.010 -0.018 0.035 0.168 0.082
PAK 0.017 0.024 0.012 0.021 0.053 0.030 0.032 1.000 -0.013 -0.006 -0.010 0.017 0.020 0.001 -0.006 -0.015 0.002
SRI -0.010 0.013 0.032 0.039 0.007 0.017 0.054 -0.006 1.000 0.011 0.015 0.020 0.008 0.019 0.023 0.007 0.049 0.061
THA 0.049 0.193 0.120 0.133 0.113 0.093 0.245 0.058 0.023 1.000 0.030 0.058 0.037 0.035 0.017 -0.007 0.018 0.120 0.080
Asia 0.115 0.083
ARG 0.016 0.044 0.045 0.035 0.025 0.030 0.067 -0.002 0.028 0.053 1.000
BRA 0.045 0.101 0.098 0.077 0.104 0.022 0.072 0.018 0.048 0.074 0.148 1.000
CHI 0.011 0.055 0.055 0.064 0.077 0.028 0.116 -0.004 0.021 0.083 0.082 0.182 1.000
COL 0.026 0.082 0.061 0.064 0.114 0.028 0.080 0.028 0.013 0.059 0.023 0.124 0.070 1.000
MEX 0.031 0.035 0.022 0.022 0.045 0.028 0.034 0.028 0.004 0.037 0.046 0.083 0.062 0.034 1.000
PER 0.031 0.027 0.052 -0.016 0.045 -0.004 -0.008 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.057 0.037 -0.001 0.050 1.000
VEN -0.004 -0.012 -0.002 0.018 -0.003 0.024 0.021 0.018 -0.005 0.010 0.035 0.014 0.037 0.026 -0.003 0.013 1.000
Latin America
United States -0.012 0.089 0.035 0.054 0.110 0.005 0.031 0.000 0.018 0.070 0.143 0.376 0.158 0.120 0.124 0.058 0.011 1.000








Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of Daily Returns on Financial Services Indices for a Period from Jul 01, 1994 to Dec 31, 2008   
We report data from 10 Asian countries, 7 Latin American countries, the USA and European block. Asian countries include 
China (CHN), Korea (KOR), Philippines (PHL), Taiwan (TWN), India (INA), Indonesia (IND), Malaysia (MAL), Pakistan 
(PAK), Sri Lanka (SRI) and Thailand (THA). Whereas, Latin American countries include Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), Chile 
(CHI), Colombia (COL), Mexico (MEX), Peru (PER) and Venezuela (VEN).We report number of firms offering financial 
services that are included from each country/region. Summary statistics include mean, standard deviation, median, minimum, 
maximum and correlations of daily banking index retu ns as reported in Datastream. The correlations in upper right matrix are 
between daily returns of Asian countries in day t nd those of Latin America, the United States and Europe in day t-1. Averages 










when >=4 >=4 3 2 1 0
CHN -1.26% 8 9 43 130 2462
KOR -7.32% 23 36 58 73 2462
PHL -5.00% 26 28 59 77 2462
TWN -4.66% 23 25 68 74 2462
INA -5.26% 24 31 49 86 2462
IND -5.31% 13 26 60 91 2462
MAL -5.80% 30 33 60 67 2462
PAK -3.68% 6 10 51 123 2462
SRI -3.20% 12 14 34 130 2462
THA -6.62% 23 28 56 83 2462
Total -4.81% 39 80 269 934 2462
ARG -3.02% 3 8 64 115 2745
BRA -6.27% 13 21 52 104 2745
CHI -2.36% 13 24 57 96 2745
COL -4.74% 9 9 39 133 2745
MEX -1.78% 13 20 48 109 2745
PER -2.10% 10 15 39 126 2745
VEN --- 0 5 53 132 2745
Total -3.38% 14 34 176 815 2745
Number of Negative (co-)exceedances
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of (Co-) exceedances for Financial Services Indices from Jul 01, 1994 to Dec 31, 2008  
The dataset consist of 3784 daily returns for financi l services institutions from each country. When daily returns are sorted in 
ascending order, the lowest five percent data points correspond to Negative exceedances and highest fiv  percent are labeled as 
Positive exceedances. Coexceedance represents the joint occurrences of exceedances across countries by day. A zero 
exceedance means no country exceed on that day in the whole region. Similarly, any number (1, 2, …n; where n is the total 
number of countries in the region) of coexceedances can be observed on a given day. We report negative coexceedances i.e. in 
Asia, there are 2462 days when no country has negativ  exceedance but it is possible that a number of countries have positive 
exceedances during those days. We have stratified th  number of coexceedances into four groups (1, 2, 3 and >=4). At the 
bottom of each block, the total number of days is repo ted for each number of coexceedance. For example, out of 3784 trading 
days, we have observed 934 days when only 1 country negatively exceeds in Asia. Similarly, we find 269 days when 2 
countries coexceeds and 39 days when 4 or more countries coexceeds in Asia. Within each region, we also mention how often a 
particular country exceeds. For instance, we find that China is the only country on 130 days out of 934 days when 1 country has 
lowest extreme return. Similarly, there are 8 days out of 39 days when China is among those 4 or more c untries that have joint 
occurrences of negative coexceedances. The first column gives mean returns when 4 or more countries have negative 











Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
CHN 0.2929 0.1384 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0434 0.0309
KOR 0.3374 0.1900 0.0002 0.0096 0.0762 0.0368
PHL 0.2197 0.0698 0.0002 0.0056 0.1037 0.0382
TWN 0.2423 0.0697 0.0001 0.0030 0.0394 0.0208
INA 0.2303 0.0862 0.0001 0.0028 0.0839 0.0263
IND 0.2633 0.1118 0.0001 0.0088 0.1336 0.0750
MAL 0.1816 0.1217 0.0001 0.0066 0.0478 0.0222
PAK 0.2663 0.0973 0.0003 0.0044 0.0960 0.0391
SRI 0.1762 0.2088 0.0002 0.0026 0.1332 0.0372
THA 0.2763 0.0936 0.0001 0.0061 0.0919 0.0315
Asia 0.2119 0.0995 0.0001 0.0023 0.0849 0.0284
ARG 0.2474 0.0882 0.0004 0.0167 0.2149 0.2203
BRA 0.2405 0.1014 0.0003 0.0094 0.0107 0.0077
CHI 0.1254 0.0496 0.0001 0.0081 0.0050 0.0021
COL 0.1442 0.0728 0.0003 0.0057 0.1640 0.1033
MEX 0.1938 0.0743 0.0004 0.0097 0.1648 0.1071
PER 0.1843 0.0659 0.0001 0.0034 0.1279 0.0293
VEN 0.3899 0.1997 0.0008 0.0187 0.1753 0.0915
Latin America 0.2339 0.1084 0.0004 0.0046 0.1214 0.0486
United States 0.1584 0.0791 0.0000 0.0044 0.0413 0.0172
Europe 0.1503 0.0766 0.0000 0.0054 0.0443 0.0148
Common Factors Conditional Volatility Change in Exchange Rate Interest Rate Level
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev.
CHN 0.1552 0.0503 0.8479 0.1244 0.5381 0.0923 0.8000 0.0835 0.0355 0.0117
KOR 0.3095 0.0394 0.8318 0.0680 0.5841 0.0340 0.4637 0.0640 0.0508 0.0108
PHL 0.2789 0.0991 0.8377 0.0931 0.4318 0.0651 0.5972 0.0486 0.1182 0.0115
TWN 0.1503 0.0583 0.9227 0.0509 0.4920 0.0486 0.4901 0.1102 0.0768 0.0098
INA 0.3063 0.0379 0.8576 0.0742 0.4799 0.0798 0.4952 0.0624 0.0647 0.0062
IND 0.3167 0.1569 0.7847 0.1612 0.5357 0.1325 0.6927 0.0956 0.0791 0.0916
MAL 0.2882 0.0200 0.7979 0.0708 0.6011 0.0354 0.4420 0.0627 0.0882 0.0151
PAK 0.3414 0.0644 0.8553 0.0616 0.4746 0.0766 0.7886 0.1375 0.0616 0.0396
SRI 0.3947 0.0448 0.9135 0.0572 0.5322 0.0414 0.8248 0.1184 0.0774 0.0249
THA 0.2613 0.0408 0.7265 0.0992 0.6367 0.0496 0.6032 0.0655 0.0646 0.0223
Asia 0.2134 0.0370 0.9073 0.0909 0.5396 0.0518 0.6254 0.0425 0.0528 0.0035
ARG 0.1901 0.0599 0.7483 0.1527 0.4686 0.1474 0.5929 0.0749 0.1114 0.0128
BRA 0.3975 0.0669 0.7101 0.0640 0.3550 0.0320 0.5446 0.0726 0.0783 0.0067
CHI 0.3067 0.0570 0.7456 0.1052 0.6170 0.0737 0.7464 0.0761 0.0471 0.0130
COL 0.3028 0.1337 0.7803 0.2051 0.5762 0.1312 0.5713 0.0850 0.2009 0.0456
MEX 0.1971 0.0748 0.7389 0.1622 0.6291 0.0835 0.6484 0.1326 0.0867 0.0240
PER 0.2398 0.0955 0.8924 0.0906 0.4720 0.0657 0.8074 0.0467 0.0732 0.0141
VEN 0.3623 0.0819 0.6531 0.1568 0.3623 0.1345 0.7581 0.0846 0.1582 0.0597
Latin America 0.3244 0.0563 0.8879 0.0624 0.4440 0.0312 0.5928 0.0529 0.0873 0.0089




Concentration (C5) Capital RatioLiquid Assets/ Total Assets Asset Diversity Loan / Total Earning Assets
Table 5.4: Summary Statistics of Banking Characteristics from 1994 to 2008 
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics of Common Variables from Jul 01, 1994 to Dec 31, 2008 
Summary statistics include mean and standard deviation of 3784 daily observations for each country. 





Table 5.5: Multinomial Logistics Regression with Regional Common Factors and Regional Banking System Characteristics
Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob
Base Case 1 3196 0.8446



















































































































































Log-Likelihood -1918.1 -1908.9 -1917.9 -1914.5 -1914.8
Pseudo-R
2
0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
Base Case 1 3406 0.9001




































































3 0.282 0.0083 0.297
c




















0.0022 0.036 0.0010 0.030
b
0.0009
3 -0.013 -0.0005 -0.047 -0.0015 -0.016 -0.0006 -0.012 -0.0004 -0.080 -0.0025























Log-Likelihood -1245.2 -1238.9 -1243.1 -1236.3 -1232.9
Pseudo-R
2
0.1 0.11 0.1 0.11 0.11
ASIA
LATIN AMERICA
Table 5 shows multinomial regressions with dependent variable is a count variable with four categories i.e. whose value of 1, 2, 3 and 4. The value is 1 when
there is neither banking indices nor financial services indices have 2 or more coexceedances in a region. This variable has value 2 when there are 2 or more
coexceedances in only the banking services indices. Similarly, the variable gets value 3 when 2 or more coexceedances in only financial services indices.
Finally, the value 4 represents that there are 2 or more coexceedances in both banking services and financial services indices.
a, b, c
Denotes significance levels












Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob Coeff Chg Prob
Control for common macro factors YES YES YES YES YES YES
Control for banking system characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES
Trigger (2 or more coexceedances)
ASIA
Either Banking or Financial Services Indices 0.699
a
0.023 -0.152 -0.005 1.764
a
0.022
Banking Index only 0.770
a
0.029 -0.201 -0.006 1.641
a
0.026
Financial Services Index only -0.392 -0.010 0.202 0.007 0.194 0.002
Both Banking and Financial Services indices 0.918
a











Banking Index only 0.673
b
0.029 0.449 0.019 1.077
a
0.050





Both Banking and Financial Services indices 1.548
a

















Banking Index only 0.480
a




0.029 0.456 0.013 1.236
c
0.018






0.076 0.510 0.016 -0.293 -0.003
Both Banking and Financial Services indices 1.124
a































0.027 0.186 0.004 0.991
c
0.013






























Banks Financial Srv. Both Banks
Table 5.6: Inter-Industry and Intra-Industry Cross- Regional Contagion    
Table 5.6 reports the potential of cross-regional itra-industry and inter-industry contagion in Asia and Latin America. The first 
column shows the impact on banking system, the second lumn presents the effect on financial services and the third column 
illustrates the effect on both industries simultaneously. We investigate four cases from each triggering egion: 1) there are 2 or 
more coexceedances in either banking or financial services indices 2) there are 2 or more coexceedances i  banking only 3) there 







































































































Figure 5.1: Clustering of Negative Extreme Events in Financial Services Indices   
We define negative extreme event when 4 or more countries have lowest 5 percent returns. Out of 
total 3784 trading days, we observe 39 and 14 extreme vents in Asia and Latin America 
respectively. On y-axis, we measure the number of extreme events during each year in our sample 


















Asia Latin America USA Europe
Inter-Industry Interdependence
Banks and Fin. Srv. On the Same Day
Banks to Fin. Srv.
Fin. Srv. To Banks
Figure 5.2: Interdependence of  Banking and Financial Services Indices 
Figure 5.2 reports how often the coexceedances in ba king indices are matched with 
coexceedances in financial services indices in the four regions. Blue columns represent the 
percentage of matched coexceedances against coexceedan s in banking indices on the same day. 
Whereas red columns show the percentage of coexceedanc s in banking indices that are matched 
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No Coexceed. Coexceed. in Banks
Coexceed. in Fin. Serv. Coexceed. In Both
The dark blue area represent the number of days in the whole sample when there is no extreme negative return in any of the 
banking and financial services industry. The column on the right shows the number of days when banking industry or 
financial services industry or both have 2 or more j int extreme negative return in the region.  





















































































































































The regional common factor is the simple average of all countries in the region. We calculate these factors for each trading 
day in our sample. 










































































































































































Figure 5.5:  Trend in Banking Characteristics 
The regional banking system characteristics are weight d average of individual countries  in the region using total assets of 
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Ai and Norton (2003) provide a correct way to estimate the magnitude and standard errors of 
interaction effects in non-linear models as follows: 
Let y denote the raw dependent variable for a general non-li ear model. Let the vector X be a 
Y Z 1 vector of independent variables, so X,  
, , [ \ ]. The expected value of y given x 
is 
 
^_`|Xbc  d,  
 
where the function F is known up to  and is twice continuously differentiable. Let Δ denote 
either the difference or the derivative operator, depending on whether the regressors are discrete 

















where h  is a consistent estimator of . The continuity of F and consistency of h  ensures the 
consistency of  f́
 to f
. They also provide standard error and asymptotic variance of the 
estimated interaction effect f́
. Moreover, they argue that the magnitude and statistical 
significance of the interaction effect varies by observation. It can even change sign for variant 
observations of the same independent variables; therefor , it is advised to draw graphs for 
relevant inference. The graphs in the text are drawn using their methodology. The continuous 
concave line is the marginal effect of the interaction term computed by standard procedure; 
whereas, dots show the correct interaction effect. The statistical significance of the interaction 
effect is shown in adjacent graph, i.e. whenever th z-value lies above or below the confidence 






Consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks - immediate borrower basis
On individual countries by nationality of reporting banks / Amounts outstanding
In millions of US dollars
Jun.1994 Jun.1995 Jun.1996 Jun.1997 Jun.1998 Jun.1999 Jun.2000 Jun.2001 Jun.2002 Jun.2003 Jun.2004 Jun.2005 Jun.2006 Jun.2007 Jun.2008
EUROPE
All countries 790731 923557 1060306 1286411 1429315 5968119 6529632 6965324 8139558 10074284 11765896 14456466 16793137 21952861 25085466
Developed countries 90065 110529 125823 151531 190415 4750731 5276802 5617721 6710670 8492067 9875734 12051088 13916823 17994403 19958070
Europe 40304 52222 61289 64836 85094 3057116 3293750 3461620 4203006 5286346 6193284 7684411 8864463 11860538 13754119
United States ... ... ... ... ... 1227024 1454298 1668156 1955626 2517742 2865744 3493894 4087123 4966754 4767750
Asia & Pacific 90359 123419 160045 200455 184934 191624 190345 173752 192807 224247 276762 365213 470779 658289 817780
11,43% 13,36% 15,09% 15,58% 12,94% 3,21% 2,92% 2,49% 2,37% 2,23% 2,35% 2,53% 2,80% 3,00% 3,26%
China 15737 20222 25458 30122 32592 29407 28314 25694 27258 30819 38847 45031 73237 124189 160067
Chinese Taipei 12467 17063 16803 17687 16878 15132 18499 14391 18755 24930 41363 41216 46876 66682 78254
Philippines 2218 3165 5267 9436 11537 10272 10853 9940 11418 12263 14217 14704 16111 17439 17428
South Korea 14993 22615 30448 41550 31505 31086 32105 30353 37889 47001 54785 114970 154669 192325 227272
India 6800 10625 11345 13721 14536 19706 20031 21286 21116 28221 37898 42912 58560 87388 126698
Indonesia 9520 14347 20177 25566 22397 23789 23834 20096 20146 22221 20933 23939 25726 35050 35824
Malaysia 5495 6330 8485 15285 12257 10467 21526 20973 22067 24715 28296 38620 41115 49868 59827
Pakistan 1751 2912 3457 3685 3934 4211 4402 4452 4807 3904 3787 3745 4513 11025 11460
Sri Lanka 408 635 701 701 659 1214 1280 1562 1312 1436 1684 2049 2525 3013 4217
Thailand 9001 12425 21205 23650 17086 18570 20079 15999 17103 15632 16427 14134 16019 19034 20582
Latin America/Caribbean 106753 119691 140153 197914 264981 264721 296137 347573 303090 297042 309482 378260 430062 559243 733860
13,50% 12,96% 13,22% 15,38% 18,54% 4,44% 4,54% 4,99% 3,72% 2,95% 2,63% 2,62% 2,56% 2,55% 2,93%
Argentina 18161 22480 23350 32563 47805 53623 56992 55119 26988 26552 24373 21090 21437 26901 29197
Brazil 31283 32673 41584 64258 95129 76065 85357 92774 80610 67733 72854 105834 132999 199972 297520
Chile 6873 8687 11280 15714 19532 32657 31903 32204 30574 30880 33304 39129 46966 53272 70419
Colombia 4352 5511 6821 11334 14150 12566 11077 10636 9797 7976 7903 9078 10846 17061 17982
Mexico 25316 26204 30654 44550 48775 48963 68145 113201 115427 127581 132119 158255 170523 202873 242836
Peru 1986 3781 6170 6897 8863 9134 12431 12906 11578 10599 10379 11021 7770 9530 15569
Venezuela 8339 7098 6802 10919 13036 12339 14720 16187 13832 13383 14747 17756 21118 25343 27037
USA
All countries 191920 206579 243407 308914 310586 659730 709522 778682 799446 788623 972818 1026596 1275295 1720241 1722788
Developed countries 24674 27758 32232 36725 36782 387525 429602 496449 491283 512541 637850 642364 813630 1107930 1037229
Europe 6035 5989 6306 8342 8747 287411 327976 351078 366016 382631 492382 497823 642079 842522 773421
United States ... ... ... ... ... ... - - - - ... - ... ... ...
Asia & Pacific 40191 47397 59340 74794 60053 62764 66003 63860 74674 68343 117725 131867 148940 208050 221295
China 656 1176 2251 3592 2932 3535 2979 4790 6298 4670 6861 11199 17660 29766 30565
Chinese Taipei 7022 9273 9889 11799 10659 11072 11707 11569 16690 15471 19601 19431 16287 16130 26848
India 3863 4049 4427 5483 5273 5997 6508 7289 7633 10392 13759 17866 22924 44351 43171
Indonesia 3232 3413 5071 6992 4425 5394 5039 3763 3016 2951 2637 3243 4360 8368 8534
Malaysia 5503 4978 6140 7622 4942 6462 7281 7482 7997 8243 10490 11804 11340 13511 14047
Pakistan 1680 1706 2123 2443 2237 1634 1180 1030 1035 1108 1153 1204 1843 2077 1603
Philippines 3255 3807 5335 7115 5800 5832 5491 4764 4972 4457 4682 4278 4288 4916 5175
South Korea 9070 12537 14466 16712 14319 14468 17998 16089 20961 15413 52858 56035 59735 72993 71951
Sri Lanka 193 55 38 60 84 90 105 108 151 208 203 220 269 366 327
Thailand 4751 5739 7549 9814 6031 4896 4525 4131 4122 3952 4143 4878 7782 5688 5391
Latin America/Caribbean 71340 72621 83871 98149 110498 110003 106583 110933 127028 112433 105695 123804 133052 156386 182150
Argentina 11936 13450 15373 18830 24202 26533 26562 23122 10389 7888 5626 5732 6448 6822 7122
Brazil 18588 17726 28321 30280 34118 26714 28890 33425 29161 21492 22371 26667 27785 36077 47413
Chile 6938 8934 8925 10649 11461 8696 8054 7648 6738 7226 7226 8832 9141 7436 6464
Colombia 2779 3333 3684 5040 5391 5053 3965 4104 3589 2476 2200 2766 3893 7180 6527
Mexico 22143 20867 18566 21765 20165 26493 23403 27262 63209 61121 57850 68292 76046 80493 94028
Peru 494 573 939 1592 2845 2937 2504 2401 1976 1720 1656 1357 1292 2590 3722













Companies that provide custodial, 
trustee and other related fiduciary 
services. Includes mutual fund 
management companies. 
  8773 Consumer 
Finance 
Credit card companies and providers of 
personal finance services such as 
personal loans and check cashing 
companies. 
  8775 Specialty 
Finance 
Companies engaged in financial 
activities not specified elsewhere. 
Includes companies not classified under 
Equity Investment Instruments or Non-
equity Investment Instruments engaged 
primarily in owning stakes in a 
diversified range of companies. 
  8777 Investment 
Services 
Companies providing a range of 
specialized financial services, including 
securities brokers and dealers, online 
brokers and security or commodity 
exchanges. 
  8779 Mortgage 
Finance 
Companies that provide mortgages, 
mortgage insurance and other related 
services. 






Corporate closed-ended investment 
entities identified under distinguishing 
legislation, such as investment trusts 
and venture capital trusts. 






Non corporate, open-ended investment 
instruments such as open-ended 
investment companies and funds, unit 










Total Export of all commodities to regional countries in Latin America Million USD
2008 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela
Argentina --- 13,273 4,714 810 1,337 1,313 1,420
Brazil 17,606 --- 4,792 2,295 4,281 2,299 5,150
Chile 983 3,849 --- 705 2,210 1,297 1,210
Colombia 649 133 849 --- 617 855 6,092
Mexico 3,367 1,315 1,587 3,032 --- 1,180 2,310
Peru 895 147 1,841 709 299 --- 1,079
Venezuela 1,808 12 1,167 930 284 95 ---
2004
Argentina --- 34,576 5,412 3,831 273 1,032 498
Brazil 96,677 --- 7,391 2,556 1,044 3,958 636
Chile 32,520 425 --- 1,421 308 1,307 499
Colombia 16,730 36 141 --- 254 525 544
Mexico 187,980 417 573 555 --- 624 179
Peru 12,726 36 358 719 262 --- 229
Venezuela 39,887 19 560 344 1,042 441 ---
2000
Argentina --- 26,341 6,991 2,674 131 326 295
Brazil 55,119 --- 6,238 1,248 516 1,713 354
Chile 18,215 639 --- 969 236 816 439
Colombia 13,158 56 284 --- 191 230 373
Mexico 166,294 337 689 545 --- 500 210
Peru 6,866 26 221 263 144 --- 151
Venezuela 30,948 23 1,129 149 853 275 ---
1996
Argentina --- 23,810 6,615 1,766 183 248 254
Brazil 47,746 --- 5,170 1,055 432 679 298
Chile 15,407 700 --- 947 194 146 325
Colombia 10,648 52 119 --- 182 89 613
Mexico 95,661 536 974 756 --- 467 228
Peru 5,835 38 239 123 120 --- 96
Venezuela 23,072 64 747 206 1,250 151 ---






Total Export of all commodities to regional countries in Asia Million USD
2008 China Korea Philippines Taiwan India Indonesia Malaysia Pakistan Sri Lanka Thailand
China --- 73,932 9,132 2,602 31,585 17,193 21,455 6,051 1,630 15,636
Korea 91,389 --- 5,016 24 8,977 7,934 5,794 840 627 5,779
Philippines 5,469 2,523 --- 8 194 603 1,958 44 9 1,509
Taiwan 245 2 16 --- 0 1 4 0 0 2
India 10,094 3,773 755 6 --- 2,659 3,034 1,773 2,838 2,005
Indonesia 11,637 9,117 2,054 5 7,163 --- 6,433 930 354 3,661
Malaysia 18,945 7,759 2,925 15 7,413 6,215 --- 1,719 424 9,512
Pakistan 727 208 115 0 355 63 138 --- 217 88
Sri Lanka 48 35 3 1 418 40 46 71 --- 78
Thailand 15,998 3,639 3,462 28 3,369 6,253 9,783 637 342 ---
2004
China --- 27,812 4,269 1,618 5,936 6,256 8,086 2,466 695 5,802
Korea 49,763 --- 3,379 36 3,632 3,678 4,480 591 243 3,249
Philippines 2,653 1,113 --- 3 89 376 2,070 20 8 1,064
Taiwan 391 4 12 --- 0 0 7 0 0 5
India 4,099 970 363 2 --- 1,206 1,040 522 1,400 857
Indonesia 4,605 4,830 1,238 8 2,171 --- 3,016 416 238 1,976
Malaysia 8,496 4,460 1,943 6 3,015 3,063 --- 702 346 6,026
Pakistan 301 182 29 0 158 57 66 --- 135 61
Sri Lanka 17 18 3 1 385 8 9 39 --- 18
Thailand 7,098 1,851 1,829 5 912 3,210 5,297 434 183 ---
2000
China --- 11,292 1,464 710 1,561 3,062 2,565 670 445 2,243
Korea 18,455 --- 3,360 54 1,326 3,504 3,515 404 380 2,015
Philippines 663 1,173 --- 5 64 183 1,377 8 8 1,206
Taiwan 259 1 2 --- 0 0 7 0 0 2
India 735 439 174 1 --- 390 531 164 594 525
Indonesia 2,768 4,318 820 3 1,151 --- 1,972 149 179 1,026
Malaysia 3,028 3,280 1,726 6 1,924 1,706 --- 396 227 3,549
Pakistan 245 264 38 1 65 112 53 --- 82 63
Sri Lanka
Thailand 2,816 1,264 1,080 5 492 1,337 2,805 201 174 ---
1996
China --- 7,500 1,015 573 686 1,428 1,370 623 192 1,255
Korea 11,377 --- 1,906 62 1,177 3,198 4,333 358 345 2,664
Philippines 328 371 --- 1 37 142 687 18 6 780
Taiwan 264 5 3 --- 0 0 2 0 0 2
India 615 518 184 2 --- 592 531 157 477 447
Indonesia 2,057 3,281 688 0 531 --- 1,110 125 107 823
Malaysia 1,909 2,407 937 7 1,206 1,218 --- 645 158 3,203
Pakistan 119 273 51 2 42 139 39 --- 83 97
Sri Lanka
Thailand 1,869 1,013 631 10 243 963 2,015 147 138 ---





List of banks that are included in the indices of different countries 
CHINA 
Bank of Beijing 'A' 
Bank of China 'A' 
Bank of Communications 'A' 
Bank of Nanjing 'A' 
Bank of Ningbo 'A' 
China Citic Bank 'A' 
China Construction Bank 'A' 
China Merchants Bank 'A' 
China Minsheng Banking 'A' 
Huaxia Bank 'A' 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
'A' 
Industrial Bank 'A' 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 'A' 





Jeil Mutual Savings Bank 
Jeonbuk Bank 
KB Financial Group 
Hana Financial Group 
Shinhan Financial Group 
Woori Finance Holdings 
Industrial Bank of Korea 
Jinheung Mutual Savings Bank 
Korea Exchange Bank 
Korea Mutual Savings Bank 
Busan Bank 
Pureun Mutual Savings Bank 
Seoul Mutual Savings Bank 
Shinmin Mutual Savings Bank 
Solomon Mutual Savings Bank 
 
PHILIPPINES 
Asiatrust Development Bank 
Banco de Oro Unibank 
Bank of the Philippine Islands 
China Banking 
Chinatrust (Philippines) Commercial Bank 
Citystate Savings 
First Metro Investment 
Metropolitan Bank and Trust 
Philippine National Bank 
Philippine Bank of Communications 
Philippine Savings Bank 
Philtrust Bank 
Rizal Commercial Banking 
Security Bank 
Union Bank of the Philippines 
 
TAIWAN 
Bank of Kaohsiung 
Cosmos Bank Taiwan 
Entie Commercial Bank 
Chang Hwa Commercial Bank 
Far Eastern International Bank 
King's Town Bank 
Ta Chong Bank 
Taichung Commercial Bank 
Taiwan Business Bank 
Taiwan Cooperative Bank 





Bank of Baroda 
Bank of India 
Bank of Maharashtra 
Bank of Rajasthan 
Canara Bank 
Central Bank of India 
City Union Bank 
Corporation Bank 
Dena Bank 




ING Vysya Bank 
Icici Bank 
Industries Bank Housing 
Indian Overseas Bank 
Idbi Bank 
Indian Bank 





Karur Vysya Bank 
Indusind Bank 
Oriental Bank of Commerce 
Punjab National Bank 
South Indian Bank 
State Bank of India 
Lakshmi Vilas Bank 




Union Bank of India 
Axis Bank 
State Bank of Mysore 





Bank Artha Graha Internasional 
Bank Bukopin 
Bank Bumi Arta 
Bank Bumiputera Indonesia 
Bank Central Asia 
Bank Capital Indonesia 
Bank Mutiara 
Bank Danamon Indonesia 
Bank Eksekutif Internasional 
Bank International Indonesia 
Bank Kesawan 
Bank Ekonomi Raharja 
Bank Mandiri 
Bank Mayapada Internasional 
Bank Mega 
Bank Negara Indonesia 
Bank Cimb Niaga 
Bank Windu Kentjana 
Bank OCBC Nisp 
Bank Nusantara Parahyangan 
Bank Per Annum Indonesia 
Bank Permata 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
Bank Swadesi 
Bank Victoria International 
Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional 






Cimb Group Holdings 
EON Capital 
Hong Leong Bank 
Hong Leong Financial Group 
Malayan Banking 







Arif Habib Bank 
Askari Bank 
Atlas Bank 
Bank Al Habib 
Bank Al-Falah Limited 
Bank of Khyber 
Bank of Punjab 
Bankislami Pakistan 
First National Bank Modaraba 
Samba Bank 
Faysal Bank 
First Credit and Investment Bank 
Habib Bank 




Habib Metropolitan Bank 
National Bank of Pakistan 
The Royal Bank of Scotland 








Capital Reach Leasing 
Commercial Bank of Ceylon 
Dfcc Bank 
Hatton National Bank 
Housing Development Finance Bank 
Merchant Bank 
National Development Bank 
Nations Trust Bank 
Per Annum Asia Bank 
Sampath Bank 










Bank of Ayudhya 
Cimb Thai Bank 
Kasikornbank 
Kiatnakin Bank 
Krung Thai Bank 
Siam City Bank 
Siam Commercial Bank 
Thanachart Capital 
TMB Bank 
Tisco Financial Group 
 
ARGENTINA 
Banco Galicia 'B' 
Banco Macro 'B' 
Banco Rio 'B' 
BBVA Banco Frances 'B' 
Bpat 




ABC Brasil PN 
Amazonia ON 
Alfa Invest PN 
Santander BR PN 
Banco Brasil ON 
Itauunibanco PN 





BRB Banco PN 
Bicbanco PN 
Bradesco PN 
Cruzeiro Sul PN 
Daycoval PN 
EST Piaui ON 
Merc Brasil PN 
Merc Invest PN 
Nossa Caixa ON 
Indusval PN 

























































Banco Canarias de Venezuela 
Banco Caribe 'A' 
Banco Confederado 
Banco de Venezuela 
Banco Exterior 
Banco Activo Banco Comercial 
Banco Nacional de Credito 
Banco Occidental de Descuento Banco 
Universal 
Banco Provincial 
Banesco Banco Universal 
Bannorte 
Central Banco Universal 
Corporation Banca 
Fondo Comun CA Banco Universal 
Inverunion Banco Comercial 
Fivenez Banco Inversion 
Mercantil Servicios Financieros 'A' 
Venezolano de Credito 
 
 
